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I. INTRODUCTION
Is there a comprehensive system of ordinary legal rules that provides a
regulatory framework within which trials must be conducted? The answer
would seem to be "yes"; a number of sources gather together appellate cases
and statutes that declare how portions of a trial are to be conducted, and
define them loosely as trial law.1 However, this body of law needs to be
more comprehensively and systematically described and analyzed if it is to
be effectively used by the profession and scrutinized by scholars. My purpose
in this article is just that: to begin to define, classify, and analyze the major
doctrines that can be said to make up trial law.
In general terms, I include within the definition of trial law both pro-
cedural and substantive issues concerning the proper way to conduct a trial
(either civil or criminal). These issues address the questions of what proce-
dures should be followed, how the participants are to comport themselves
during trial, and what topics the participants may talk about.2 Many issues
1. See, e.g., Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial
Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629 (1972); F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY Tar.Us
(1959); J. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1983); J. TANroRD, T TRIAL
PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHcs (1983); S. THOMPSON, LAW OF TRms IN ACTIONS
Cnu AN]) CmuNAL (1889). There also are several books in the Matthew-Bender "Art
of Advocacy" series, each of which contains a chapter on the legal doctrines affecting
one phase of the trial. Trial law issues are found under several headings in the West
key number system, including Criminal Law, Juries, Witnesses, Trials, and Evidence,
analyzed in a number of ALR annotations, and discussed briefly in most major law
encyclopedias. Cf. Ordover, Persuasion and the Opening Statement, 12 LrIATION
12, 13 (1986) (stating that "[t]he law of opening statements ... is what individual
lawyers actually do ... and bears little relation to the boundaries set by appellate
decisions").
2. The substantive law of crimes, torts, etc., will define what elements of
any particular cause of action are material, and that obviously also limits what topics
the participants may discuss. However, many questions about what topics may be
discussed are not answered by defining the material elements. For example, whether
the attorneys, or the judge, or a witness may talk about the consequences of a plea
of insanity is not answered in the criminal law's definition of the elements of the
insanity defense, but may be answered by looking at the rules of trial law pertaining
to relevance, prejudicial effect, and discussing matters not in evidence.
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affect trials, such as who has the burden of proof and what the material
elements are, but if the solutions vary according to the subject matter of the
case, it makes little sense to include them. Rather, trial law focuses on those
issues that arise independently of the subject matter of the trial.
An example that should help clarify this distinction can be drawn from
the issues concerning the burden of proof. Who has it and how heavy it is
will be determined by the substantive law of other fields.' The answer will
vary depending on whether we are discussing a criminal prosecution, a prod-
ucts liability case, or a sex discrimination case seeking an injunction. Thus,
the determination of burden of proof is dependent on the subject-matter of
the lawsuit, and I would not include it as an issue of trial law.4 However,
what effect bearing the burden of proof has on a party's position at trial is
included. Trial law is interested in answering questions such as whether the
party with the burden of proof-whichever party that is, and whatever level
of burden is assigned-has the right to open the evidence and give the final
argument.
Trial law is comprised in part by the law of evidence and doctrines that
overlap other fields, such as constitutional law, torts, and civil and criminal
procedure. These include such familiar issues as the procedure for seating
an unbiased jury in a death penalty case, the permissibility of leading ques-
tions, the use of a "per diem" mathematical formula to calculate pain and
suffering, the consequences of inaccurate jury instructions, and the necessity
to object and preserve the record for appeal.
But such issues only scratch the surface of the questions that can be
asked about proper trial procedures. Trials involve more than just the intro-
duction of evidence, and trial law is more than a particular application of
constitutional law, torts, and so forth. There are many issues concerning
how to conduct a proper trial that do not implicate any of the doctrines
associated with these other fields of law. Should the judge allow attorneys
to use voir dire to indoctrinate the jurors? What is the legal effect of the
defendant's attorney conceding liability in opening statement? What happens
if a prosecutor leaves several prejudicial exhibits-shotguns and knives-in
3. See, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THm LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984) (burden of proof for claim
of contributory negligence); R. PEgRns & R. BOYCE, CRmINAL LAW 79 (3d ed. 1982)
(allocating burden of proof in homicide cases).
4. But cf. E. CLEARY, K. BRo-UN, G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, D. KAYE, R. WEI-
SENHOLDER, E. ROBERTS & J. STRONG, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (3d ed. 1984)[hereinafter MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE] (summarizing various rules concerning the
allocation of burdens of proof, and concluding that "there is no key principle gov-
erning the apportionment of the burdens of proof," but not going so far as to
conclude it is therefore not helpful to include the question among the concerns of
evidence law).
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plain view of the jury throughout the testimony? What happens if deliberating
jurors ask to have parts of the transcript re-read to them?
To help answer each of these questions, and many more like them, there
is a large body of common law. I estimate that there are about 300,000
reported appellate trial law cases, a number growing by 5000 new cases each
year. The appeals courts do not seem to treat trial law issues any differently
than other kinds of cases. Appeals based on claims of trial law errors result
in reversal about 20-30% of the time,. approximately the same reversal rate
as for appellate cases generally6 and for evidence cases. 7
Although much of trial law is common law, it is far from being exclu-
sively so. A substantial number of jurisdictions have partially codified their
rules of trial procedure. Most states have codified at least some of their rules
of trial practice, but few have comprehensive sets of rules as complete and
as detailed as their rules of pretrial and appellate procedure.8 The overall
level of codification is similar to that of the law of evidence before the Federal
Rules.
These statutes and court rules cover everything from trivial matters, such
as requiring attorneys to wear acceptable business attire, 9 requiring parties
to mark their proposed exhibits in a certain manner,10 and prohibiting at-
torneys from walking around the courtroom during an opponent's argument
to distract the jury," to general statements about the scope of a party's rights
5. The reversal rate is based on a random sample of 692 appellate opinions
from both state and federal courts in which the reviewing courts decided whether
allegations concerning improper closing arguments warranted findings of reversible
error. I found reversal rates of 19% in criminal cases, 30% in civil cases, and 24%
overall.
6. The general reversal rate was calculated based on a random sample of
469 opinions from state and federal courts in appeals taken from cases that had been
tried to a verdict. It did not include appeals from summary judgments or directed
verdicts, nor from administrative agency decisions. This sample produced reversal
rates of 17% in criminal cases, 39% in civil, and 27% overall.
7. I looked at a random sample of 210 appellate opinions from state and
federal cases tried to a verdict in which at least one issue was raised concerning the
admissibility of evidence. I found a reversal rate of 20% in criminal cases, 23% in
civil cases, and 21% overall.
8. One result of the lack of systematic attention to trial law by scholars has
been an absence of articles calling for uniformity in state trial practice rules.
9. E.g., MINN. R. UriNr. DECORUM 17; Wyo. DIsT. CT. R. 17E (6th District);
cf. Jensen v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 533, 537-38, 201 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280
(1984) (lawyer may wear turban to court; judge cannot dictate manner of dress unless
it disrupts the administration of justice); see also Gold v. McShane, 74 A.D.2d 860,
860, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1980) (priest could not wear clerical collar while rep-
resenting a defendant at trial).
10. E.g., MINN. Civ. TRnmioOK R. 40 (use Arabic numerals and prefix Pl.
or Df.).
11. E.g., Wyo. DisT. CT. R. 17X (6th Dist.).
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to make opening statements and closing arguments.' 2 Almost every state has
codified rules governing procedural matters, such as whether counsel have
the right to ask questions during jury selection, 3 whether the jury must be
sequestered during trial,' 4 which side presents its evidence first, 5 whether
attorneys may use leading questions, 6 whether jurors may take notes,17 which
side argues first and last, 8 whether a judge may impose time limits on closing
arguments, 9 whether instructions precede or follow closing arguments, 20 and
what happens if jurors have questions during deliberations 23 Many states
also have codified rules concerning substantive matters, such as juror qual-
ifications and the grounds for challenges for cause,22 whether law may be
discussed in opening statements, 23 whether counsel may comment on a party's
failure to testify,2 suggest a formula as a way of calculating pain and suf-
fering, 1 criticize the law,26 state a personal opinion about the case, 27 read
portions of the instructions to the jury during closing argument, 2 and what
exhibits may be taken to the jury deliberation room. 29
Thus it is apparent that a complex body of trial law exists, although it
has so far received only sporadic attention from legal scholars and seems
underutilized by the profession. If trial law is to be more systematically
thought about by scholars and more effectively used by attorneys, its basic
doctrines need to be gathered, described, and analyzed in a more compre-
12. E.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 46(a) (in opening statement attorney has the
right to discuss the evidence and issues); HAw. Rnv. STAT. § 635-52 (1976) (in closing
argument, party has right to discuss evidence and comment on law); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3414(4) (1981) (similar).
13. E.g., CONN. CONST. amend. IV; ILL. SUPER. CT. R. 234.
14. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2126 (Supp. 1986).
15. E.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 46(b); INDIANA CODE ANN. § 35-37-2-2 (Burns
1981).
16. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 611(c).
17. E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.131 (1979).
18. E.g., ARJz. R. Civ. P. 51(c); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2132 (1977); N.C.
SUPER. & DIST. CT. R. 10.
19. E.g., IowA R. Crv. P. 195; MAMrE R. Cirv. P. 51(a).
20. Compare CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 607 (West 1976) (arguments first) with
IDAHO R. Crv. P. 51(b) (instructions first).
21. E.g., M-NN. Civ. TnxLBooK R. 34; WAsH. CIm. R. 6.15(f).
22. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (1979).
23. E.g., MNN. DisT. CT. R. 27(c) (no).
24. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-84 (1983); FI.A. R. CRns. P. 3.250.
25. E.g., N.J. R. GEN. APP. 1:7-1(b).
26. E.g., OKa. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 831 (West 1958); S.D. CODIMD LAws
AN. § 15-14-18 (1979).
27. E.g., Wyo. DisT. CT. R. 17V (6th Dist.).
28. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 831 (West 1958) (permitted); W. VA.
TRiAL CT. R. VI(a) (prohibited).
29. E.g., S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 15-14-20 (1979); N.Y. CEm. PROC.
LAW § 310.20 (McKinney 1982).
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hensive way than has been done before. In the following pages, I will attempt
to begin that task.
II. JuRY SELECTION
The first stage of a trial-at least of a jury trial-is jury selection. The
legal issues in this phase are of two kinds. One group consists of procedural
issues, focusing on who conducts the questioning, how the prospective jurors
are to be questioned, how unsatisfactory jurors are removed, and how an
attorney objects to errors and preserves the record. The second group of
issues concerns the contents of questions and the propriety of asking jurors
about particular subjects.
A. Jury Selection Procedure
There is little uniformity among jurisdictions with respect to jury selec-
tion procedure. This is the only phase of the trial where this is so. Jurisdic-
tions differ on all the major issues: whether a party has the right to participate,
whether the judge or attorneys conduct questioning, whether jurors should
be questioned individually or in groups, and how many peremptory challenges
should be allowed. About the only thing they agree on is the procedure for
objecting and preserving a claim of error for appeal.
In subsequent sections, we will see that a party to a lawsuit has consti-
tutional rights to present evidence, conduct cross-examination, give opening
statements, and make closing arguments. The only part of the trial in which
a party does not have a right to participate is questioning the jury. It is
probably true that denial of the right to challenge biased jurors would violate
the guarantee of a fair trial, but no case has yet held that the federal con-
stitution gives a party a right to participate in the questioning process.
Jurisdictions follow one of three different procedures in conducting ques-
tioning. In many states, the attorneys conduct most or all of the voir dire.
Historically, this has been most common. This common law method has been
criticized on the grounds that attorneys supposedly abuse the privilege and
try to indoctrinate the jurors and that it wastes time. The modern federal
rule places the responsibility for voir dire with the trial judge. This method
has been criticized because judges are too unfamiliar with the case and not
willing to take the time to probe deeply for juror biases. A compromise
method is therefore growing in popularity, in which the trial judge conducts
the basic questioning, and then the attorneys are permitted a limited time in
which to conduct in-depth follow-up questions.
Attorney-conducted voir dire used to be the near universal practice. It
was seen as a right that derived from a challenge for cause: a party had the
right to prove, through sworn examination of witnesses or the venire-man
628 [Vol. 51
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himself, the facts necessary to establish grounds supporting a challenge for
cause. 0 Today, only a few states maintain that a party has a right to voir
dire, either by statute or state constitution." While attorney-conducted voir
dire is still common, it usually is more of a customary practice than a com-
mon law procedure. The case law in most states gives the trial judge discretion
to decide who will conduct juror questioning. Because of this discretion, the
practice may vary widely even within the same jurisdiction.32
Even under attorney-conducted procedures, the degree of judicial control
varies. In New York, the trial judge is not even required to be present unless
requested by the parties,33 although a procedure giving this much power to
the attorneys is unusual. Most judges are present during attorney-conducted
questioning, and many will make a few introductory remarks before the voir
dire is turned over to the lawyers. Major differences arise, however, con-
cerning the degree to which judges intervene in and exert control over the
questioning process when it is handled primarily by attorneys. A survey of
Kentucky judges found that those who allowed attorney-conducted voir dire
were split about evenly on the question of intervention. Some indicated they
would intervene to cut off irrelevant or protracted questioning; others said
they rarely intervened. 4 It is safe to say that such intervention is justified
when attorneys attempt to inquire into jurors' emotional reactions to legal
concepts, engage in redundant questioning, attempt to preconunit jurors to
a particular verdict, attempt to curry favor with the jurors, or attempt to
bring out racial bias or other emotional and moral prejudices.,
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the federal rule in which the
judge conducts the entire voir dire. Attorney participation under the federal
rule is limited to the submission of written requests that the judge ask certain
questions. However, the judge is not required to ask any question submitted
by a party, and may ask them, modify them, or refuse to ask them at his
discretion.3 6 In some jurisdictions, the trial judge may deny the attorneys
even this small degree of participation.3 7
30. See 1 S. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 99-101.
31. E.g., CONN. CONST. amend. IV; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-240 (1985).
32. See Fortune, Voir Dire in Kentucky: An Empirical Study of Voir Dire in
Kentucky Circuit Courts, 69 Ky. L.J. 273, 297-98 (1981) (reported that about 20%
of state judges give attorneys complete responsibility for questioning prospective
jurors); see also MICH. GEN. CT. R. 511.3 (either court or attorneys may conduct
voir dire).
33. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4107 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
34. Fortune, supra note 32, at 297-98. Most judges indicated that their de-
cision to intervene did not depend on an attorney making an objection. Id. at 301.
35. See Strawn, Ending the Voir Dire Wars, 18 JUDGES J. 45 (1979).
36. See G. BERMANT, CoNuCT OF THE Vom Dm EXAMINATION: PRACTICES
AN OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DIsTRIcT JUDGES 5 (1977).
37. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 234 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
1986] 629
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There is no constitutional requirement that attorneys be allowed to ac-
tively participate in voir dire questioning. The judge may conduct the entire
voir dire as long as he or she does so adequately to assure an impartial jury.
The mere fact that participation by counsel has been denied normally will
not constitute error; only an inadequate voir dire coupled with a refusal to
allow additional questions to be propounded by a party will warrant reversal
of a judgment. 8 Some commentators argue that because of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of an impartial jury, the refusal to allow a criminal defendant
to participate directly in voir dire is unconstitutional,39 but this view has not
been adopted generally by the courts.
Probably the most common voir dire procedure today is a cooperative
one in which the trial judge conducts basic questioning and then turns the
voir dire over to the attorneys to pursue follow-up questions. This is the
procedure recommended by the American Bar Association: "[i]nterrogation
of jurors should be conducted initially and primarily by the judge, but counsel
for each side should have the opportunity, subject to reasonable time limits,
to question jurors directly, both individually and as a panel." 4 Judges who
employ this method vary on the extent to which they give a free hand to the
parties. Attorney-questioning may be limited in scope, or it may be freely
allowed.
A second, more mundane, procedural issue concerns the mechanics of
voir dire-how are the jurors to be questioned? Here again, practices vary
widely among jurisdictions, and it is more likely to be determined by a
combination of customary local practice and judicial discretion than by fixed
rule. Questions may be posed in the courtroom, in the judge's chambers, 41
in special jury rooms, or in written questionnaires distributed before trial.
Jurors may be questioned en masse, in groups of four to twelve, or individ-
ually.4 2 Individual questioning may be done privately or with other jurors
present.
38. E.g., Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367-69 (7th Cir. 1972); Labbee v. Roadway Express,
469 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1972).
39. Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional
Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 290 (1972); see also People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d
392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981) (overturning rule that prohibited at-
torneys from conducting the voir dire).
40. STANDARDS FOR CRmMIIN. JUSTICE 15-2.4 (2d ed. 1980); see also FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.300(b) (similar).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1977) (court
not obligated to question a prospective juror in judge's chambers); Campbell v. State,
265 Ark. 77, 93, 576 S.W.2d 938, 948 (1979) (denial of defendant's motion to conduct
voir dire in judge's chambers not prejudicial). But see In re Pulitzer Pub. Co., 635
F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1980) (voir dire in chambers inappropriate because of public's
right of access to trial proceedings).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
630 [Vol. 51
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Standardized written questionnaires that elicit general background in-
formation are becoming more and more common. Frequently, these ques-
tionnaires merely track the statutory requirements for minimal qualifications
to serve-residency, age, absence of criminal record, literacy, and so forth.
However, courts are beginning to realize that a more detailed questionnaire
can expedite the voir dire process. Some questionnaires approved by courts
now include detailed demographic questions, questions about prior experi-
ences with the legal system, and other questions normally asked anyway
during the voir dire. 43 In some individual cases, courts have approved detailed
questionnaires that depart from the standardized form and are tailored to
deal with such topics as exposure to pretrial publicity about a particular
case."
As an alternative to the questionnaire, general questions may be posed
to all prospective jurors at the start of the jury selection process. This ac-
complishes the same goal of detecting basic disqualifications from jury serv-
ice, such as nonresidency, recent jury service, or physical disability. This kind
of mass questioning may be conducted in the common jury room or in the
courtroom when the venire is first brought in.
Once the preliminaries are out of the way, the questioning must begin
to focus on the particular case. Probably the most common practice is to
question prospective jurors in groups of four to twelve at a time. 45 Questions
may be posed to the panel as a whole to save time and avoid repetition, or
to individuals when necessary to follow up an answer. The usual procedure
is for the clerk to call at random the names of potential jurors, who are
(per curiam) (prospective jurors questioned in groups of twelve to eighteen); Shepler
v. State, 274 Ind. 331, 336-37, 412 N.E.2d 62, 67 (1980) (no need to individually
question prospective juiors when none of them admitted reading a news article con-
cerning the case); State v. Williams, 383 So. 2d 996, 999 (La. 1979) (examination of
jurors in presence of each other is not a denial of a fair trial); State v. Littlefield,
374 A.2d 590, 597 (Me. 1977) (no need to individually question prospective jurors
when tXr'ial publicity absent); cf. McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 705 F.2d 1553, 1558-
) 59 (11th Cl'. 1983) (en masse questioning in capital case denies right to impartial
jury).
43. Three sample questionnaire forms can be found in Fortune, supra note
32, at 323-26. See also MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 510 (containing sample questionnaire
form).
44. See, e.g., NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYsTEmATIc TEcMHQUEs
254-56 (1979) (reprinting the questionnaire approved for use in Krause v. Rhodes,
570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978), a civil suit growing
out of the highly publicized shooting of several Kent State students by National
Guardsmen).
45. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, § 21 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (jurors to be ex-
amined in panels of four); MiNN. R. CGuM. P. 26.02(4) (jurors examined in groups
of twelve). Busch states that panels of twelve are the most common practice. 1 F.
BuscH, supra note 1, at 492-93.
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seated in the jury box in the order called and are questioned together."
In most jurisdictions, the trial judge has discretion to grant a request
for individual voir dire, either in the privacy of the judge's chambers, or
with the other jurors present.47 Obviously, this method takes longer than
group questioning, and it is usually reserved for exceptional cases that have
attracted a great deal of pretrial publicity. Private questioning also is avail-
able when it appears that further public questioning could taint the panel.
For example, if in response to a general question, a prospective juror states
he or she has a reason to be biased against one of the parties, the judge has
discretion to remove the juror to a place of privacy before inquiring into
why that juror is biased.
There is some conflict over the extent to which questions to individual
jurors should be allowed. Some judges do not permit individual questioning
except to follow up a specific answer given in response to a question posed
to a panel. 4 In general, the law seems to leave this matter to the discretion
of the trial judge, although in a few cases, refusal to allow individual ques-
tions has been held to be error. 49
At the heart of the jury selection process is the challenge (or strike), the
procedure for removing a juror. The lawyer's control over the composition
of the jury is, of course, the right to reject, not select, a juror. Under the
challenge system used in most courts, a juror may be challenged for cause
if legally unqualified, or challenged peremptorily (without the need to state
a reason) by one of the parties. A few states substitute a system of strikes
in place of peremptory challenges.o
46. Under the common law, it was common for the sheriff to determine the
order in which jurors were to be questioned, which frequently resulted in abuses. The
sheriff could put persons hostile to a defendant up first, forcing him to use up his
peremptory challenges. See 1 S. TnOSON, supra note 1, at 37-38.
47. See Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Campbell v. State, 265
Ark. 77, 93, 576 S.W.2d 938, 948 (1979). But see Lackey v. State, 578 S.W.2d 101,
103 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (not permitted).
48. See United States v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 394, 396 (6th Cir. 1977); Peterson
v. State, 350 So. 2d 771, 774 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698,
708, 278 S.E.2d 398, 403 (1981); Commonwealth v. Estremera, 373 Mass. 382, 389-
90, 419 N.E.2d 835, 840-41 (1981); see also Fortune, supra note 32, at 302-03.
49. See United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908, 912 (8th Cir. 1974)
(individual questioning preferred when circumstances suggest possibility of racial bias);
State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258, 1265 (La. 1981); cf. Batten v. State, 533 S.W.2d
788, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (court must grant a request to individually questionjurors in capital murder prosecution); Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973) (refusal to allow individual questioning would be error only in
capital cases).
50. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-100 (Supp. 1985) (parties are given lists of all
jurors eligible for service, and alternately strike names until only twelve are left); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-359 (Supp. 1986) (in routine civil cases, eleven jurors are called
and six struck).
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In most states, the procedure works as follows: (1) a panel, or venire,
of 18 to 36 potential jurors are brought to the courtroom; (2) twelve names
are called at random to sit in the jury box; (3) the court questions them on
their statutory qualifications, excusing any who do not meet statutory min-
ima; (4) other jurors are called to replace any who were excused; (5) the
plaintiff or prosecutor questions the panel first, and makes any challenges
for cause that become apparent; (6) the court rules on the challenges for
cause as they arise, hearing argument or conducting additional voir dire as
appropriate, and replacing any juror who is excused; (7) the plaintiff passes
the jury for cause; (8) the defendant then questions the panel, making any
appropriate challenges for cause; (9) when the process is complete, twelve
legally qualified jurors are in the jury box; (10) the plaintiff has the oppor-
tunity to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror he or she does
not like; (11) the defendant has the opportunity to similarly exercise a per-
emptory challenge; (12) this process continues, alternating back and forth,
until both sides either exhaust their allotment of peremptory challenges or
are satisfied with the remaining jurors; (13) the empty seats are filled with
new jurors and the process starts over, except that the jurors agreed upon
in the first round may not be reexamined; and (14) the process continues
until both sides are satisfied with or unable to challenge the twelfth juror.
Usually, no jurors are sworn in until all have been seated, which at least
theoretically allows a party to wait and see what the next jurors look like
before making a decision whether to challenge a juror from the first group.
While an attorney may not go back and assert a challenge for cause against
a juror whom he has already passed for cause, he may go back and assert
a peremptory challenge against a juror whom he has already passed.
Challenges for cause are of two kinds: legal disability for not meeting
statutory minimal qualifications, or a likelihood of bias because of the pe-
culiar facts of the case. At common law, the former was known as a "prin-
cipal challenge," and the latter as a "challenge for favor." These distinctions
ase no longer used.5" Challenges for cause are now controlled almost entirely
by statutes that set out the legal grounds upon which they may be made.
Such statutes commonly enumerate minimal requirements for eligibility ap-
plicable to all trials, and also include a general authorization for a challenge
if it is determined that the juror cannot be fair and impartial for any reason.
Since challenges for cause go to the legal disability of a prospective juror,
they are unlimited in number, and may be asserted by either party or by the
judge sua sponte as soon as the grounds become apparent. As a general rule,
however, they must be made before any peremptory challenges are exericised
and before the jury is passed for cause; otherwise, the right to challenge for
cause may be deemed waived.52
51. 1 F. BUscH, supra note 1, at 481-82, 497.
52. E.g., Sayer Acres v. Middle Republican Natural Resources Dist., 205 Neb.
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Common grounds for challenges for cause include general citizenship
requirements, connections to the particular case being tried, and moral or
religious scruples that would interfere with the ability to render a verdict. A
prospective juror may be excused in most states if he or she is not a resident
of the county, is under eighteen years old, does not understand English, has
felony convictions or is awaiting trial on a felony, is mentally defective, or
has a physical disability that would make jury service difficult or impossible. 3
Prospective jurors also routinely are disqualified from jury service if they
have been involved in any way in legal proceedings relating to the case being
tried, have been involved in any other legal proceeding involving one of the
parties, are related to some degree of consanguinity (often the sixth) to a
party or the victim in a criminal case, or are familiar with the facts of the
case and have already formed an opinion. 4 Most states also have a provision
allowing the challenge of any juror with religious or moral scruples that
would interfere with returning a verdict-the most common being, inability
to return a verdict of death. 5 Finally, most qualification statutes end with
boilerplate language that a juror may be excused for cause if for any other
reason they hold biases and prejudices that make them unable to render a
fair and impartial verdict.5 6
One of the most controversial issues in jury selection is the systematic
exclusion of persons who disfavor the death penalty from jury service in a
capital case. Under Witherspoon v. Illinois,57 prospective jurors may be chal-
lenged for cause if they say that their reservations about the death penalty
would make it impossible for them to impose it, or if they admit that they
could not be impartial in the determination of guilt, knowing that a guilty
verdict might lead to the death penalty. They are not supposed to be excused
merely because they do not favor capital punishment or would be reluctant
to impose it." This practice, called death-qualifying a jury, is controversial
because it enables the state to stack the deck in favor of conviction. If the
360, 287 N.W.2d 692 (1980); see also Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55, 139 S.E. 877
(1927); Bailey v. Tuck, 591 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). This notion of waiver
for failure to exercise a right-known as procedural default-is a recurring theme in
trial law.
53. E.g., MicH. CopiP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1307a (West 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 9-3, 15A-1212 (1983).
54. E.g., Agiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-211 (1975); N.C. GN,. STAT. § 15A-
1212 (1983); see also People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 462 N.E.2d 478 (1984) (juror
who found out that co-defendant had passed lie detector should have been excused).
55. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (1983); see also State v. Wilson, 554
S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
56. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
659 (West 1969).
57. 391 U.S. 510, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968), overruled, Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
58. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
[Vol. 51
TRIAL LAW
state mandates that the same jury decide guilt and punishment, then all the
prosecutor needs to do is charge a capital offense and he gets to exclude a
great many "liberals" from the jury. Although this results in a jury biased
in favor of conviction,5 9 the practice has been approved by the Supreme
Court.6o
In every state except those that use a struck-jury system, peremptory
challenges are given to both sides by statute. Usually both sides are given
the same number of peremptory challenges, though a few give more chal-
lenges to a criminal defendant than to the prosecution-an unusual example
of a procedure favoring the defendant in a criminal case. The total number
given to each side varies widely, from two or three in misdemeanor and civil
cases, to twenty-six in capital cases. 61 If there are multiple parties on a side,
some jurisdictions give that side extra challenges, others do not.
Peremptory challenges are considered an important right, at least to a
criminal defendant, although not explicitly a constitutional right. The Su-
preme Court has held that it is an important component of a fair trial, and
implied that all litigants-criminal defendants, prosecutors, and civil par-
ties-must be allowed to freely exercise their peremptory challenges. 62 Pre-
venting a party from exercising a statutorily-guaranteed peremptory challenge
is probably reversible error without a showing of prejudice. 6
There is one restriction on this right. The Supreme Court has held that
the prosecutor in a criminal case must be restricted in his use of peremptory
challenges.64 The prosecutor is an agent of the state, and the state may
not make any important classifications-in this case, whom to challenge-
59. See Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases:
An Empirical Study and Constitutional Analysis, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1982); White,
Death-Qualified Juries: The Prosecution-Proneness Argument Reexamined, 41 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 353 (1980).
60. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart
v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
61. E.g., FED. R. Cilm. P. 24(b) (in capital cases, 20 for each side; in other
felonies, the defense gets 10 and the government only six; in misdemeanors, 3 each);
AIZ. R. Cirv. P. 47(e) (4 each in civil cases); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070 (West 1985)
(26 each in capital cases); IowA CODE § 813.2 (1979) (Rule 17: 10 each in felonies,
4 each in misdemeanors). At early common law, the defense in a capital case was
entitled to 35 challenges; the prosecution to unlimited challenges.
62. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919); Pointer
v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
63. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (dictum); United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535 (9th
Cir. 1977); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 402 A.2d 203 (1979); Wasko v. Frankel,
116 Ariz. 288, 569 P.2d 230 (1977).
64. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). The two leading state cases
are People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), and
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979).
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on the basis of a prohibited distinction such as race. If the state is allowed
to challenge black jurors, just because they are black, the defendant (not the
jurors) is denied equal protection of the laws. This new rule effectively
requires the prosecutor to give a reason for asserting a peremptory challenge,
a position that has been criticized because it misses the parties' abilities to
obtain a truly impartial jury.6 The previous constitutional rule was that a defen-
dant had to show that a prosecutor systematically used his challenges to remove
all blacks from all (or most) juries to get his conviction reversed. The burden
of proof to establish such systematic bias was almost insurmountable. A defen-
dant had to show that not only did the prosecutor create an all-white jury
in his case, but that he had done so many other cases." The Supreme Court's
ruling making it easer for a defendant to show bias was somewhat of a suprise.
Most states that had considered the issue had rejected that result and reaf-
firmed the principles of Swain that peremptory challenges may be exercised
without statng a reason.67
There is one final procedural issue-How are objections made to im-
proper jury selection procedures or improper questions and how is the issue
preserved for appeal? Appeals, of course, must putatively be based on the
erroneous action of the trial judge, not the other attorney, so the basic
requirement is that one must have asked the judge to do something. Error
rarely can be committed by the judge, however, because control of voir dire
is left largely to the trial judge's discretion. Unless the judge has obviously
obstructed the seating of an impartial jury,'68 there is little chance that any
ruling he or she makes during voir dire will warrant reversal on appeal. Few
cases have been reversed except for the most serious kind of error-the judge
so restricting the scope of questioning that the voir dire is inadequate. 69
If an error is made, it must be properly objected to and recorded. Many
claims of error are defaulted away because voir dire is seldom transcribed.
The first rule of preserving error, then, is to move that a court reporter be
present to record the entire voire dire if possible, but at least objections and
65. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between
Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. Rrv. 337 (1982).
66. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983).
68. E.g., Parkinson v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 4, 88 So. 2d 793 (1956); State v.
Diedtman, 58 Mont. 13, 190 P. 117 (1920).
69. E.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (reversible error for
judge to allow questions about racial prejudices in case involving black defendant
and racial overtones); Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1980) (verdict
reversed in exploding Mercury Comet gas tank case where no questions were permitted
about exposure to pretrial publicity or similar experiences); United States v. Robinson,
485 F.2d 1157 (3rd Cir. 1973) (similar to Ham, 409 U.S. 524; reversible error).
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rulings. 70 If the judge makes an incorrect ruling by denying a challenge for
cause-for practical purposes, the only ground likely to be considered re-
versible error on appeal-it will support an appeal only if the challenge was
made promptly and the grounds were specifically stated. A general challenge
that does not specify grounds (e.g., "I challenge this juror for cause"), is
not sufficient. 71 Similarly, failure to make a timely challenge, as soon as the
grounds become apparent and before the jurors are passed for cause, will
likely be considered a procedural default and waive a claim of error.72 If the
claim of error concerns the propriety of a question, a party must have made
a timely objection to any improper questions or a motion to allow the asking
of a proper question. 73
There is one final procedural default trap that can prevent appeal. In
most jurisdictions, a party must exhaust its peremptory challenges in order
to appeal from the wrongful denial of a challenge for cause. If a party still
has a peremptory challenge left, the party could use it on the juror in ques-
tion, and failure to do so is a waiver of the claim that the juror should have
been excused for cause. 74 This obviously puts the attorney in a bind. If he
uses all his peremptories in order to preserve a claim of error, he may have
to challenge a favorable juror just to preserve his record; if he uses a per-
emptory challenge on the juror in question, the juror is excused and the
denial of the challenge for cause may become harmless error. Several states
have recognized this problem, and allow a claim of wrongful denial of a
challenge for cause to be heard even if the attorney excused that juror with
a peremptory challenge, at least if he is thereby unable to challenge another
unfavorable juror.75
Even if an attorney manages to preserve a claim of error in voir dire
for appeal, it is unlikely to result in reversal. As with other violations of the
70. See In re Mertens, 56 A.D.2d 456, 392 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1977) (right to have
voir dire transcribed).
71. See Tatum v. United States, 330 A.2d 522 (D.C. 1974); State v. Myers,
198 Mo. 225, 94 S.W. 242 (1906); Dukes v. State, 578 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1978).
72. See State v. Diedtman, 58 Mont. 13, 190 P. 117 (1920); Sayer Acres v.
Middle Republican Natural Resources Dist., 205 Neb. 360, 287 N.W.2d 692 (1980);
People v. Ellis, 54 A.D.2d 1052, 388 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1976); Bailey v. Tuck, 591 S.W.2d
605 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
73. E.g., Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 430, 119 N.E. 716 (1917); State v.
Williams, 375 So. 2d 364 (La. 1979); State v. Jones, 594 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. 1980).
74. E.g., Williams v. State, 146 Ga. App. 543, 246 S.E.2d 729 (1978); Hopkins
v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 1981); State v. Lewis, 391 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1980);
Lambert v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 277 Or. 223, 560 P.2d 262 (1977); see
also Bell v. State, 338 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (waives claim that party
was not given enough peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 1250 (1977).
75. See Commonwealth v. Stamm, 286 Pa. Super. 409, 429 A.2d 4 (1981);
see also cases collected in 1 F. BUscH, supra note 1, at 529-31.
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trial practice rules, error in jury selection is likely to be found to be harmless,
invited by appellant's own conduct, or cured by some instruction or ad-
monition from the judge. These procedural devices for avoiding reversal on
appeal will be discussed later.
76
B. The Scope of Voir Dire: Permissible and Impermissible Questions
Regardless of who asks the questions, the topics that may legitimately
be inquired into are fairly well-established by common law. In gejieral terms,
prospective jurors may be asked qiiestions that elicit informati6n relevant to
challenges for cause or to gather information to facilhitate the intelligent
exercise of peremptory challenges. Thus, jurors may be asked questions about
whether they meet statutory qualifications, whether they have the kinds of
biases and prejudices that would interfere with their ability to be impartial,
and whether they have religious or moral scruples that would make it difficult
for them to return a verdict in accordance with law. To a limited extent,
prospective jurors also can be asked questions designed to elicit general in-
formation about themselves so that the parties can more intelligently exercise
their peremptory challenges. Questions primarily designed to begin advo-
cacy-indoctrinate jurors, ingratiate one's self and one's client with jurors,
and innoculate them against an opponent's position-are not proper. Many
questions, however, may have dual purposes, tending both to legitimately
search for biases and also to begin advocacy. Courts traditionally have had
a difficult time resolving whether such questions are proper, preferring to
prevent attorneys from participating at all rather than make difficult deci-
sions.
It is always proper to question prospective jurors about whether they
meet the statutory requirements for jury service. In many jurisdictions, how-
ever, it is not necessary to do so, because a clerk or jury commissioner will
have prescreened prospective jurors for basic qualifications such as literacy,
residency, age, prior jury service, or criminal record requirements. It also is
common for the presiding judge to begin the voir dire by posing general
questions to the panel about their statutory qualifications, not only matters
such as age and residency, but also whether they are related to the parties,
have been involved in the case, or have any scruples against the subject-
matter of the suit. Either the court or the attorneys may ask jurors whether
76. For example, in McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548
(1984), the Court held that even though a juror has mistakenly answered voir dire
questions, his failure to provide accurate information did not automatically lead to
reversal, but must be subjected to a harmless error analysis. See infra text accom-
panying notes 406-64; see also Billington v. United States, 15 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1926);
Conner v. State, 54 Ariz. 68, 92 P.2d 524_(1939); In re Worrell, 35 N.C. App. 278,
241 S.E.2d 343 (1978), cert. denied, 295 N.C. 90, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978); Smith v.
Maher, 84 Okla. 49, 202 P. 321 (1921).
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they have formed any opinions about the case, whether they can abide by
and follow the applicable law, and any other matter upon which competency
depends. 77
The law in most jurisdictions permits the attorneys to challenge for cause
any juror who cannot be fair and impartial for any reason. Thus, questions
that legitimately could expose biases, prejudices, and sympathies that could
affect a juror's impartiality should be permitted. This-freedom is restricted
by an old common law rule that jurors need not answer any questions cal-
culated to humiliate or embarrass them 7 -although the balance between this
notion of juror privacy and the need to prevent biased jurors from partici-
pation has never been clearly struck. The extent to which such questions will
be permitted is largely a matter for judicial discretion.7 9
However, there is substantial agreement in the common law that, subject
to the trial judge's limited discretion to refuse to allow them, it is permissible
to ask about the following kinds of topics. Questions that inquire into the
prospective jurors' emotional reactions in favor of or against a party, major
witness, or attorney, either for some personal-reason or because of their
occupations, are permitted. s0 As long as they arerelevant to the facts of the
particular case, attorneys can ask about sympathy or antipathy toward a
person or his station in life, prejudices against cofprtions, and racial,
ethnic, sexual, or national prejudices.8' If there is a legitimate issue in the
case, jurors even may be questioned about their religious beliefs.8 2 Questions
77. See generally 1 F. BuscH, supra note 1, at 533-53 (discussing grounds for
juror incompetency).
78. E.g., Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (dic-
tum).
79. Compare Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (trial judge's refusal
to question jurors about racial prejudice was error in a case with racial overtones)
with Ristiano v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (no error in judge's refusal to allow
questions about racial prejudice, despite fact that defendant was black and victims
white). See also United States v. Daily, 139 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1943); State v. Miller,
357 Mo. 353, 208 S.W.2d (1948); Long v. State, 187 Tenn. 139, 213 S.W.2d 37
(1948); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273. S.E.2d 36 (1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
80. See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1980) (prior run-in with law
enforcement officers, hostility to state); Trevino v. State, 572 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (tendency to automatically believe police witnesses just because they are
police officers).
81. See People v. Blyden, 79 A.D.2d 192, 436 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1981) (racial
and ethnic prejudice), rev'd on other grounds, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 432 N.E.2d 758, 447
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1982); cf. United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980)
(questions about religious prejudices not mandatory, because defendant's religion not
obvious), aff'd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir'. 1981).
82. Inquiring about religious beliefs usually is improper unless a religious issue
is involved in the case. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956). But see Wasy v. State, 234 Ind. 52, 123 N.E.2d
462 (1955).
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that inquire into possible prejudices concerning the subject-matter of the case
or a major issue in it also are permitted. This list includes cases involving
insanity, alibi or justification defenses, narcotics, gambling, or obscenity
charges, disinheritance, intrafamily torts, crimes against children, malprac-
tice, strict liability, defamation, and police informants." Jurors also may be
asked about their friendship, acquaintance, business relationship or other
connections with parties, important witnesses, and attorneys. 84 They may be
asked about financial interest in the outcome of the case, or personal knowl-
edge of the event being litigated that might cause them to have a preformed
opinion about its outcome." Questions may be asked about whether the
jurors or persons close to them have ever been involved in similar litigation
as a party, witness, or juror.86 Finally, it is generally permissible to ask about
other background similarities and experiences that might cause the juror to
feel natural alliance with one side or the other, based on factors such as
service in the same branch of the military, similar marital status, having
children of similar ages, living in the same neighborhood, or being engaged
in a similar occupation.
8 7
One recurring issue is whether a question (usually asked by the plaintiff)
that discloses the existence of the defendant's insurance is permissible. Gen-
erally the law tries to keep the jurors ignorant on the question of insurance
throughout the trial.88 But because jurors can properly be questioned about
their interest in or attitudes toward the parties, an argument can be made
that they also should be subject to questions about their connections with
83. See State v. Brown, 547 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1977) (self-defense); State v.
Roseman, 583 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (use of accomplice as state's witness);
State v. Sanders, 242 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1978) (insanity defense), overruled on other
grounds, State ex rel. White v. Mohn, 283 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1981).
84. See Lightsey v. Strickland, 240 Ga. 523, 242 S.E.2d 23 (1978); Crosby v.
Southeast Zayre Inc., 274 S.C. 519, 265 S.E.2d 517 (1980).
85. See Marshall v. City of Beach, 294 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1980) (financial
interest as taxpayers); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Shepard, 262 S.C. 217, 204
S.E.2d 11 (1974) (stockholders in telephone company).
86. See Hart v. State, 265 Ind. 145, 352 N.E.2d 712 (1976) (juror on prior
similar criminal case); Commonwealth v. Davis, 282 Pa. Super. 51, 422 A.2d 671
(1980) (victim of similar crime).
87. See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977) (mem-
bership in same religious organization as victim); People v. Viggiani, 105 Misc. 2d
2,10, 431 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Crim. Ct. 1980) (homosexuality). But see United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (trial of alleged drug kingpin in New York, judge
refused to allow questions about jurors' backgrounds out of fear for their safety),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
88. See, e.g., Klein v. Herring, 347 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(never permissible to inform jury of amount of insurance coverage); White v. Piles,
589 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (error to disclose insurance during closing
argument); FED. R. Evm. 411 (inadmissible during witness examination).
640 [Vol. 51
TRIAL LAW
or interest in the insurance companies that ultimately will pay the damages. 9
On the other hand, it is feared that if disinterested jurors find out the
defendant is insured, they will award damages not on the basis of proven
liability, but on the basis that it is going to be paid by an insurance company.
The cases vary considerably on the extent to which insurance can be disclosed
on voir dire. In general terms, limited good-faith inquiry is permitted to
determine if jurors will be influenced in their decisions by their interests in
insurance companiesY° In many courts, such questions may be pursued only
after the attorney makes a prima facie showing that such inquiry is justified
(e.g., by a juror answering a question about employment by stating he works
for State Farm Insurance Company).9 Questions designed merely to inject
the issue of insurance are not permitted and may constitute reversible error. 92
There is more agreement among the courts on another recurring issue-
whether to question jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity, and
how to determine if that publicity has biased them. In general, in a notorious
case, jurors can be questioned about their exposure to media coverage. If
extensive exposure to pretrial publicity is shown, a presumption arises that
the prospective juror's ability to be impartial has been destroyed.93 The judge
then has an obligation to question jurors about how much they have read
or heard about the case, whether anything has stood out in their minds, and
whether it has caused them to form an opinion on an issue in the case. If
the juror has been exposed to media coverage but has not formed any opin-
ions on an issue in the case, that juror is not subject to a challenge for
cause. 4
Answers that place a prospective juror within one of these categories of
potential bias do not lead automatically to a challenge for cause. Unless a
state statute provides for automatic removal of a juror, it must appear from
his or her answers that the juror cannot be fair and impartial for one or
more of these factors. In practice, if the challenged juror says that he or she
89. E.g., Jones v. Crawford, 361 So. 2d 518 (Ala. 1978); Dedmon v. Thal-
heimer, 226 Ark. 402, 290 S.W.2d 16 (1956).
90. See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. City of Colorado Springs, 43 Colo.
App. 112, 602 P.2d 881 (1979); George v. Howard Constr. Co., 604 S.W.2d 685(Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Barnett v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981).
91. See Coe v. Schneider, 424 A.2d 1 (Del. 1980).
92. See, e.g., Yust v. Link, 569 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Roman v.
Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). See generally Vetter, Voir Dire II: Liability
Insurance, 29 Mo. L. Rnv. 305 (1964).
93. See, e.g., Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1980) (suit
over exploding Mercury Comet gas tank; inquiry into exposure to publicity should
have been allowed); see also Schultz, The Jury Redefined: A Review of Burger Court
Decisions, 43 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBS. 8, 21-22 (1980).
94. See Commonwealth v. Richard, 377 Mass. 64, 384 N.E.2d 636; Holland
v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 567, 275 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 91
Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980).
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can lay aside emotional responses and decide the case impartially, or denies
that he or she would be influenced at all, the challenge for cause will be
denied, however ludicrous the result. 95
Somewhat more controversial is whether attorneys may ask prospective
jurors about their willingness to follow the law, particularly unpopular laws.
Melvin Belli, for example, strongly recommends asking jurors about their
willingness to follow the law, suggesting that they be asked if they are "in
sympathy with" a rule of law.9 It is perhaps more common to ask jurors if
they can follow a particular instruction even if they disagree with it.97 Even
though bias against a particular law is a legitimate ground for challenge,
judges often hear such questions as instruments of indoctrination or as in-
vading the exclusive province of the judge to instruct on the law. This results
in a wide variety of practices and in inconsistent appellate cases.98 Judicial
fears that attorneys will somehow brainwash or indoctrinate jurors by asking
them about the law seem misplaced, and the idea that only the judge may
instruct on the law is outdated. As long as the attorneys do not misstate the
law, they should be allowed to ask the jurors about their ability to follow
it.
Courts are divided on whether to allow questions designed solely or
primarily to elicit information on which to base peremptory challenges. Ob-
viously, the kinds of questions discussed above may yield information rele-
vant to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. But what about a question,
such as what magazines a juror subscribes to, that has no relevance to any
issue that would support a challenge for cause, yet the answer may be of
great help to an attorney in attempting to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges? Some judges routinely allow such questions, as long as they are
not humiliating or embarrassing to the prospective juror; most pay at least
lip service to the principle that a broad scope of voir dire questioning is
95. E.g., Cagle v. McQueen, 200 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 815 (1953); Glover v. State, 248 Ark. 1260, 455 S.W.2d 670 (1970); Chafin v.
State, 246 Ga. 709, 273 S.E.2d 147 (1980); State v. Clark, 340 So. 2d 208 (La. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 936 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 415
N.E.2d 192 (1981); cf. State v. Bashor, 188 Mont. 397, 614 P.2d 470 (1980) (juror
said she could not be fair, challenge for cause denied, but verdict affirmed anyway).
But see Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968);" State v. Caron,
118 La. 349, 42 So. 960 (1907) (it is the judge who must be satisfied that the juror
can genuinely put aside his feelings).
96. 1 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 402 (1982). But see Kelly, Defense Psychology
in Negligence Cases, in ADvocAcY AND Tim KING'S ENGLISH 181 (1960) (disagrees).
97. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 317 (1981).
98. See generally Fortune, supra note 32, at 313-15 (describing variety of views
among Kentucky judges; some permitting and some prohibiting such questions); Gold,
Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on Willingness to Follow Law, 60 IND.
L.J. 163 (1984) (analyzing legal precedent on subject).
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required to provide a basis for the intelligent exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges. 99 But some courts persist in the old-fashioned view that voir dire
questions may only be asked if they are relevant to a possible challenge for
cause;I°° a rule that has somehow survived from the days of small towns
when the lawyers already knew the jurors and were required to challenge
them before they asked any questions. Under that system, one first challenged
a juror for cause and then proved it by eliciting testimony from the challenged
juror, and the only relevant inquiries under such a procedure were questions
relating to the challenge for cause. The continuing vitality of the restrictive
rule, after the reasons for it have changed, is an anachronism.
Finally, the courts also are split over whether to allow attorneys to use
their voir dire questions to begin advocacy-to start the process of persuading
jurors. Many trial lawyers suggest that the voir dire is the place to start the
process of persuasion by indoctrinating the jurors on a partisan view of the
facts, and by ingratiating themselves and their clients with the jurors. 0' This
technique most commonly involves the hypothetical question, in which the
lawyer previews anticipated favorable evidence or weaknesses in the oppo-
nent's case, and explains how it helps lead to a favorable verdict, and then
attaches a meaningless question to the end to-avoid the objection that he is
arguing his case instead of asking questions. For example:
Ms. Jones, suppose the evidence showed that my client is crippled for
life and unable to work or even go to the bathroom by himself, and we had
experts testify that he would have to live with this permanent condition for
25 years. Suppose the other jurors began to discuss $500,000 as a possible
verdict. Could you consider such a verdict, or do you have some precon-
ceived idea tht there is a maximum amount you are supposed to award?
The extent to which such questions are allowed seems to be largely a matter
of judicial discretion. It can be argued that i f the juror should answer that
she could not consider it because she did not bleve in verdicts over $100,000,
then she could be challenged for cause; therefore, the question should be
allowed. Some courts have taken this position and give the attorneys a rel-
atively free hand.' °2 The majority position, however, is that hypothetical
99. See, e.g., United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973);
Reeves v. State, 264 Ala. 476, 88 So. 2d 561 (1956), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 368(1958); People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981);
Woodworth v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 274 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1955); Eagan v.
O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P.2d 821 (1933).
100. See Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 383 A.2d 389, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
852 (1978); Commonwealth v. England, 474 Pa. 1, 375 A.2d 1292 (1980).
101. See, e.g., Spence, A Voir Dire Masterpiece, 3 TIUAL DIPLOMACY J. 8, 9-
10, 56 (1980); J. TANroRD, supra note 1, at 240-41 (summarizing the advice of several
trial attorneys).
102. E.g., Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1967); see also Fortune,
supra note 32, at 315-17 (21% of Kentucky judges allowed all hypotheticals; 41%
allowed some hypotheticals).
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questions are not competent when it is obvious that they are being asked in
an effort to indoctrinate the jury, disclose favorable evidence, or argue one's
case. It is generally held to be improper either to ask a juror what verdict
he or she would return if certain facts were proved, or to ask whether the
juror could return a particular verdict by applying the anticipated instructions
to an assumed set of facts. 103 One other variation, generally disapproved, is
for the attorney to disclose exhibits he or she hopes to introduce later.' 4 The
farther a question strays from the proper purpose of voir dire-the weeding
out of partial jurors-the more likely it is to be prohibited.
III. OPENING STATEMENTS
The second phase of the trial consists of the opening statements of the
parties. There is substantially less law concerning opening statements than
there is for jury selection. What there is falls into the same two general
categories: a body of procedural law, much of it statutory, that includes the
right to be heard, the order in which statements are given, and whether they
are waivable; and a body of common law addressing issues concerning the
content of the statements and what kinds of topics may be discussed.
A. Opening Statement Procedural Issues
There is a great deal of uniformity in opening statement procedural rules.
Across jurisdictions and over time, the law is relatively consistent on such
issues as whether a party has a right to make an opening statement, whether
opening statements may be waived or reserved, who speaks first, whether a
directed verdict may be granted based only on opening statements, and what
the legal effect is of an admission made by the attorney during opening
remarks.
Most, but not all, jurisdictions give parties the right to give opening
statements. The right is usually statutory; rarely has it been elevated to
constitutional status.'0 In this respect it is unique. The right to examine and
103. E.g., Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 1981); Rankin v. Blue Grass
Boys Ranch, 469 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971); State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d
193 (1969); Commonwealth v. Werts, 483 Pa. 222, 395 A.2d 1316 (1978); But cf.
Eichstadt v. Underwood, 337 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1960) (plaintiff permitted to use black-
board during voir dire to write out total damages requested).
104. See, e.g., Finley v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 309, 181 P.2d 849 (1947) (show-
ing jury a mugshot of a witness held to be error); Palmer v. State, 121 Tenn. 465,
118 S.W. 1022 (1908) (attempt to show jurors a newspaper article and question them
about it was properly refused).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (re-
versing conviction for refusal to allow opening statements but not explicitly on con-
stitutional grounds).
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cross-examine witnesses and to argue is clearly constitutionally based, and a
party clearly has no right to personally voir dire prospective jurors; only
opening statements are a nonconstitutional right. In most cases in which an
opening statement is requested but denied (at least in jury trials), the courts
have held that an important part of the right to be heard has been witheld
that warrants reversal in all but the strongest cases.'06 However, since the
right is not constitutional, it is subject to some limits, and courts have said
it can be refused in nonjury trials or simple cases.' °7 Not all courts agree
that parties have a right to make opening statements, and a minority have
explicitly given the trial judge discretion to dispense with them.10O A number
of appellate cases holding that this is a question of discretion reach that
result in part by misciting as precedent cases involving the judge's discretion
to set the order or timing of statements. Where openings are permitted, a
party generally has the right to make his opening statement without inter-
ference from or adverse comments by the judge.' °9
The purpose of an opening statement is to state what evidence will be
presented; it is not an argument on the merits of the case. For that reason,
some older cases have suggested that if a defendant does not intend to
produce any evidence, he is not entitled to make an opening statement." 0
This overlooks the fact that the defendant will cross-examine the prosecution
or plaintiff's witnesses, thereby eliciting evidence, and that the plaintiff/
prosecutor may have neglected to tell the jury about facts favorable to the
defense that will come out in his own case-in-chief. Most jurisdictions rec-
ognize the unfairness of permitting only one side to give its slant on the
facts, and extend the right to open to both sides regardless of who will be
calling witnesses."'
Opening statements customarily are given after the jury has been selected
and sworn in and before any evidence is produced. The party with the burden
106. E.g., United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982); United
States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975). But compare the strange case of
Stewart v. State, 245 Ala. 511, 512, 17 So. 2d 871, 872 (1944), holding that if the
prosecutor makes no opening statement, then the defendant can be refused permission
to make one himself; giving to the prosecutor the power to decide whether the
defendant is allowed to make an opening.
107. E.g., United States v. Five Cases, More or Less, Containing "Figlia Mia
Brand," 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
108. See United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982) (admitting to
an almost complete absence of precedent); State v. Brown, 277 S.C. 203, 284 S.E.2d
777 (1981).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 580 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 930 (1978).
110. E.g., Lewis v. United States, 11 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1926); Thompson v.
People, 139 Colo. 15, 336 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 972 (1959).
111. E.g., United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982); Oesby v.
United States, 398 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1979).
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of going forward-usually the plaintiff or prosecutor-gives the first opening
statement," 2 followed immediately by the defendant. In most (but not all)
jurisdictions, the defense has the option of postponing (reserving) opening
statement until the beginning of its presentation of evidence."' However,
even when a statute or rule seems to set a specific order and timing for
opening statements, the trial judge usually has residual discretion to vary the
normal order in unusual circumstances.1 4
One such recurring unusual situation is a multi-party lawsuit. Where
several attorneys represent multiple plaintiffs or defendants, or the case in-
volves a third-party complaint, the order of statements customarily is resolved
among the parties at pretrial conference. If the parties are unable to set the
order themselves, every jurisdiction gives the trial judge discretion to set the
order, which will not be overturned as long as there is some rational reason
for the order. The party with the most to gain usually will go first for
plaintiffs, and the party with the primary liability or the largest financial
interest usually will go first among defendants." 5 With consent of the court,
attorneys representing multiple defendants may give their openings at dif-
ferent times, some immediately following plaintiff, and some waiting until
the start of the defense case. Obviously this gives the defendants an advan-
tage, and the judge usually should require that multiple parties arrayed on
one side make their opening statements all at one time. That is the usual
practice in criminal cases involving multiple defendants, especially if they are
represented by a single attorney." 6
Jurisdictions differ on whether a party may waive its opening statement
altogether. Many require the party with the burden of going forward to give
an opening statement. Usually, a party required to open must present a full
and fair statement of its case, demonstrating that he can make out a prima
112. E.g., Dayoc v. Johnson, 427 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1968); MicH. GEN. CT. R.
507.1.
113. See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. United States, 415 A.2d 548, 551 n.5 (D.C. 1980);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093 (West 1985); MINN. R. Crv. P. 39.04. All of the above
give the defendant the right to either open immediately or reserve until the start of
its own case. United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1966) (upholding
trial court's decision to require defendant to make statement immediately or not at
all), vacated on other grounds sub noma. Stone v United States, 390 U.S. 208 (1968).
But see State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Iowa 1976) (defense not permitted
to reserve).
114. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 607 (West 1976) (trial must proceed
in normal order unless court, for special reasons, otherwise directs); State v. Guffey,
205 Kan. 9, 13, 468 P.2d 254, 260 (1970) (court has inherent discretion to vary order
seemingly required by statute).
115. See generally M. LiTTLETON, OPENING TO THE COURT OR JURY 30 (1966).
116. See Commonwealth v. Weitkamp, 255 Pa. Super. 305, 386 A.2d 1014
(1978) (codefendants being tried together must all open at the same time). See gen-
erally A. AMSTERDAm, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRI MAUAL FOR nmE DEFENSE OF
CRBMNAL CASES § 353 (2d ed. 1971).
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facie case." 7 Other jurisdictions permit the plaintiff to waive opening re-
marks. In these jurisdictions, if the plaintiff does choose to make an opening
statement, it is not required to demonstrate a prima facie case."' Almost all
jurisdictions permit a defendant, especially a criminal defendant, to waive
opening remarks," 9 although a few require statements from both sides. 20
Many jurisdictions require that each party with a burden of going for-
ward with evidence make a complete opening statement demonstrating thatit ha& enough evidence for a legally sufficient case. Such opening statements
must include enough facts to make out a prima facie case on all essential
elements of the claim or defense. Failure to state a case may result in dis-
missal, nonsuit, or a directed verdict against that party before any evidence
is introduced. Such a drastic resolution of the case threatens to deprive a
party of its basic due process rights to be heard and to present evidence, so
a directed verdict will be granted only if it appears that counsel has stated
all of his or her evidence and has been given the opportunity to amend his
or her remarks to satisfy this requirement.' 2 ' Courts exercise this power spar-
ingly, and the law prefers that the case be tried on the merits. This is primarily
a rule of civil procedure, although at least one jurisdiction has extended it
to criminal cases.'2 The courts are split on the propriety of such a drastic
117. Fleetwood v. State, 168 Ind. App. 545, 343 N.E.2d 812 (1976); State v.
Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So. 2d 121 (1971); People v. Kurtz, 51 N.Y.2d 380, 414
N.E.2d 699, 434 N.Y.S.2d 200, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1980); see MicH. GEN.
CT. R. 507.1. Compare State v. Little, 572 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)(required even in nonjury trials) with State v. Mitchell, 362 So. 2d 501, 502 (La.
1978) (not required in nonjury trials).
118. See Mora v. People, 172 Colo. 261, 472 P.2d 142 (1970); Hanes v. Bacon
Sales Co., 602 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Biggs, 29 Utah 2d 183, 506
P.2d 1273 (1973); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093 (West 1985); MmN. R. Cirv. P. 39.04.
119. See State v. Alexander, 339 So. 2d 818 (La. 1976); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 607 (West 1976); cf. MicH. GEN. CT. R. 507.1 (openings may be waived only with
consent of court and opponent).
120. See OR. R. Crv. P. 58(B)(1).
121. See Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411,415 (1934) (dictum); Knapp
v. Wabash R.R., 375 F.2d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff stipulated that opening
statement contained all the evidence); Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 299,
541 P.2d 550, 551 (1975) (after court gave plaintiff an opportunity to supplement
opening); Willis v. Gordon, 20 Cal. 3d 629, 633, 574 P.2d 794, 796, 143 Cal. Rptr.
723, 725 (1978); Caldrow v. Appliance Indus., 49 Cal. App. 3d 556, 559, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 636, 637 (1975) (facts as stated showed no legal basis for recovery); Welniak
v. Alcantara, 100 Mich. App. 714, 716, 300 N.W.2d 323, 324 (1980); Natoli v.
Johnson, 490 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (case must be fully stated); see
also Annotation, Dismissal, Nonsuit Judgment, or direction of Verdict on Opening
Statement of Counsel in Civil Action, 5 A.L.R.3D 1405 (1966).
122. E.g., White v. State, 11 Md. App. 423, 274 A.2d 671 (1971); see also
People v. Kurtz, 51 N.Y.2d 380, 414 N.E.2d 699, 434 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981) (dictum states it could be granted).
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procedure, and many do not approve of summary disposition based only on
opening statements. 23
One other unexpected procedural result may occur based on the content
of what an attorney says during opening statement. Factual admissions may
constitute binding judicial admissions that preclude the party from contesting
the facts admitted, and may relieve the opponent of the burden of proving
them. If a factual concession is clear, unequivocal, and deliberate, it is likely
to be held a binding admission.24 Similarly, if an attorney makes a clear
statement that he or she intends to rely on only one of several grounds
asserted in the pleadings, or only one of several available defenses, that party
may be estopped from asserting the alternative grounds.'2 If there is any
ambiguity in the statement, it is presumed that the attorney is not making
an admission. This whole concept is somewhat antiquated, since it probably
is related to the old evidence rule that a party was bound by the testimony
of its witnesses, and could neither impeach them nor introduce evidence that
contradicted the testimony of the client. This evidence rule is rarely invoked
any more, so there seems little reason why the opening statement rule should
continue either.
The one remaining important group of procedural rules concerns how
to object to a violation of the rules of opening statement, and how to preserve
a claim of error for appeal. As with other parts of the trial, the general rule
is that an attorney must make a timely and specific objection to any violation;
usually, the objection must also be accompanied by a motion to strike the
offending remarks.' 6 Unless the remarks were extremely prejudicial, the court's
granting of the motion to strike and instruction to disregard the objectionable
statement will obviate the error. 27 If an attorney can anticipate a particular
123. See Wilfork v. Associates Grocers of Fla., 343 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); Golf v. Richards, 19 Md. App. 250, 310 A.2d 203 (1973); cf. Uccello
v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975) (disfavored practice);
In re E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971) (drastic remedy); State v.
Lynch, 79 N.J. 327, 399 A.2d 629 (1979) (disfavored practice).
124. Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal. App. 2d 289, 75 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1969);
Lystarczyk v. Smits, 435 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Goodman v. Firmin
Desloge Hosp., 540 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see McLhinney v. Lansdell
Corp., 254 Md. 7, 254 A.2d 177 (1969); cf. Silva v. Periera, 1 Mass. App. 368, 298
N.E.2d 701 (1973) (usually not an admission; proof can vary from opening statement).
But see Harris v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 574 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1978) (opening is
not a stipulation, not a substitute for evidence).
125. See 2 F. BUSCH, supra note 1, at 804. But see Barnett v. Freeman, 157
Ga. App. 760, 761, 278 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1981) (limiting opening to one theory does
not limit evidence).
126. E.g., Haines v. State, 170 Neb. 304, 102 N.W.2d 609 (1960); cf. Leonard
v. United States, 277 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1960) (motion for mistrial at end of statement
sufficient if the opening statement as a whole deprived the defendant of a fair trial).
127. See People v. McClellan, 62 Ill. App. 3d 590, 378 N.E.2d 1221 (1978)
(claiming defendant connected to other robbery); see also cases collected in 5 F.
BUSCH, supra note 1, at 290-92.
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improper matter his or her opponent is likely to mention in opening state-
ment, the attorney may be able to successfully move in limine for an order
that the matter not be discussed.'2 Of course, the opening statements, ob-
jections, and rulings must appear in the official transcript to be preserved
for appeal. Opening statements often are not recorded, and an attorney may
have to make a motion to have a record made to preserve any issues arising
in opening statements for appeal.
B. The Content of Opening Statements-
What May the Attorneys Discuss?
The basic rule of opening statements is that an attorney must limit him-
or herself to a discussion of the anticipated evidence; the attorney may not
argue about how to resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor discuss how to
apply the law to the facts, nor attempt to arouse the emotions of the jurors.
How strictly these limits are enforced, however, is a matter usually left to
the discretion of the trial judge. Violations of the basic rules of opening
statement rarely will support reversal on appeal. Some judges permit the
attorneys wide latitude to discuss their cases; others will more strictly enforce
the general rules concerning what one may and may not say during the
statement. As one strays further and further from the legitimate purpose of
an opening statement-informing the jurors in a general way about the nature
of the case so that they will be better prepared to understand the evidence
when they hear it129- objections are more likely to be sustained. In rare
cases, if impermissible remarks made during opening statement jeopardize
the fairness of the trial, they may amount to reversible error or warrant the
granting of a mistrial. 30
The most basic content rule of opening statements is that argument is
prohibited.' The rule is easy to state, but hard to precisely define. One trial
lawyer has written that the definition is simple: "If it is something you intend
128. Motions in limine are discussed in detail in Epstein, Motions in Limine-
A Primer, 8 LrrIGATION 34 (1982), and in J. TANFORD, supra note 1, at 313.
129. Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934); State v. Kroll, 87
Wash. 2d 829, 558 P.2d 173 (1976).
130. See, e.g., Stennett v. State, 340 So. 2d 67 (Ala. Crim. App.) (reversible
error), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 68 (Ala. 1976); Vosevich v. Doro, Ltd., 536 S.W.2d
752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (reversible error); Yount v. Seager, 181 Neb. 665, 150
N.W.2d 245 (1967) (depending upon particular circumstances, mistrial may be war-
ranted); State v. Colvin, 425 A.2d 508 (R.I. 1981) (reversible; not cured by instruction
to disregard).
131. See, e.g., United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1977); Blackwell
v. State, 278 Md. 466, 365 A.2d 545 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); State
v. Fleming, 523 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Lam v. Lam, 212 Va. 758, 188
S.E.2d 89 (1972); State v. Cunningham, 23 Wash. App. 823, 598 P.2d 756 (1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wash. 2d 823, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980).
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to prove, it is not argument. If it is not susceptible of proof, it is argu-
ment.' 3 2 Another has suggested that the test is whether a witness could take
the stand and make the same statement. If the rules of evidence would prevent
such testimony, or if no actual witness exists who can give it, it is argument."3
However, neither of these statements is complete. The cases seem to permit
something more than just a recital of anticipated evidence. Many jurisdictions
also allow an attorney to state his or her legal claim or defense, at least in
basic terms,3 4 and to describe the nature of the case and summarize the
issues, at least in complicated matters.'35 Some jurisdictions also permit the
attorneys to draw reasonable inferences from the anticipated evidence, and
thereby tell the jury in more conclusory fashion the gist of the evidence. 3
The prohibition against argument must be understood in light of the reasons
for giving opening statements. As long as opening remarks will assist the
jury in understanding the evidence, they are permissible. However, when they
turn distinctly partisan-asking the jury to resolve disputes, make inferences,
or interpret facts favorably to -the sp-eake-r---the--renfarks are argumentative. 13 7
How the general rule against using opening statements to make legal
arguments is interpreted varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many juris-
dictions-probably a majority-do not permit attorneys to discuss law in
detail during opening statements, 38 but do permit the attorneys to briefly
state the main legal issues on which the case depends. A Vermont court held:
In an opening statement to the jury the plaintiff's counsel briefly outlined
his claim with regard to the law of negligence. The gist of the statement in
this regard was that negligence is a shortage of duty; but some expressions
were used that deviated from an accurate definition of negligence. Counsel
expressly disclaimed that such statement was made in correct legal form,
and at the outset reminded the jury that they were to take the law from the
132. L. DEcoF, ART OF ADvOcACY-OPENNG STATEMENT § 1.06[l] (1982).
133. J. JEANs, TRmLu ADvocAcY 206-07 (1975).
134. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1951); People v. Myers,
30 Mich. App. 409, 186 N.W.2d 381 (1971); cf. MINN. DIsT. CT. R. 27(c) (attorney
must confine himself to stating facts); TEx. R. Civ. P. 265(a).
135. See Pallas v. Crowley-Milner & Co., 334 Mich. 282, 54 N.W.2d 595 (1952)
(but one cannot argue the law).
136. See, e.g., People v. Bass, 84 Ill. App. 3d 624, 405 N.E.2d 1182 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Stevens, 276 Pa. Super. 428, 419 A.2d 533 (1980).
137. See People v. Cole, 80 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1107, 400 N.E.2d 931, 933
(1980) (improper to state that witness would not be telling truth); Hartman v. Mead-
ows, 243 Md. 158, 220 A.2d 555 (1966). But see Hurst v. State, 356 So. 2d 1224
(Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (emotional argument did not warrant reversing conviction).
138. See United States v. De Rosa, 548 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1977); Holmes v.
State, 422 A.2d 338 (Del. 1980); Long v. Shafer, 162 Kan. 21, 174 P.2d 88 (1946);
Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 124 N.E.2d 441 (1955), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. In re Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 806, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956); Lam v. Lam, 212 Va. 758, 188
S.E.2d 89 (1972).
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court. There was nothing of an inflammatory character in the statement,
and what was said about the law was put forward in a way that suggested
to the jury that the claim of the defendants would differ from that of the
plaintiff. An exception was taken to the opening statement, but it avails
nothing. In so holding, there is no intention on the part of the court of
giving countenance to the idea that counsel may argue the law to the jury,
or read law to the jury, or treat as open questions of law upon which the
court has ruled, or in any way seek to have the jury understand that they
can do otherwise than to take the law from the court.1 39
When a cause of action is based on a statute, the parties will usually be
allowed to read the statute or an approved jury instruction, but will not be
allowed to go further and argue how the lav is supposed to be interpreted.'"
Courts are split over whether it is permissible to read from or refer to
the pleadings during opening statement. The majority allow an attorney to
refer to or read from them-despite the fact that they are not evidence-at
least if doing so will explain the procedural posture of the case or the factual
contentions, or will help make clear which issues are contested and which
are admitted. 141 This matter is usually left to the discretion of the trial judge. 42
A few jurisdictions have changed this common law rule of discretion by
statute; some prohibit the reading of pleadings, 143 some require that they be
read.'"
Opening statements are supposed to be limited to summaries of the
evidence a party intends to introduce. Four major rules follow from this:
attorneys may not refer to inadmissible evidence, may not exaggerate or
overstate their evidence, may not discuss evidence they expect the opponent
139. Lewes v. John Crane & Sons, 78 Vt. 216, 219-20, 62 A. 60, 61 (1905);
see also Ky. R. Cium. P. 9.42(a) (the prosecutor "shall state to the jury the nature
of the charge" as well as the evidence he will introduce); Ward v. State, 246 Ind.
374, 205 N.E.2d 148 (1965). Contra Williams v. Goodman, 214 Cal. App. 2d 856,
29 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1963); State v. Kendall, 200 Iowa 483, 203 N.W. 806 (1925).
140. See, e.g., Jarecki v. Ford Motor Co., 65 Mich. App. 78, 237 N.W.2d 191
(1975); State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949).
141. See People v. Coppa, 65 A.D.2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1978) (dictum);
Haynes v. Monroe Plumbing & Heating Co., 48 Mich. App. 707, 211 N.W.2d 88
(1973). But see Zindrick v. Drake, 75 Ill. App. 3d 702, 705, 393 N.E.2d 1277, 1280
(1979) (attacking ad damnum as exaggerated not permitted).
142. See, e.g., Biscayne Beach Theater v. Hill, 151 Fla. 1, 9 So. 2d 109 (1942),
overruled on other grounds, Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983); Terone v.
Anderson, 54 A.D.2d 562, 387 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1976); State v. De Righter, 145 Ohio
St. 552, 62 N.E.2d 332 (1948). Contra Vanorman v. J.C. Penney Co., 60 S.W.2d
409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933).
143. E.g., U.S. DIST. CT. R. 9 (W.D.N.C.) (pleadings will not be read); see
also Zindrick v. Drake, 75 Ill. App. 3d 702, 393 N.E.2d 1277 (1979) (ad damnum
clause may not be read).
144. E.g., IowA R. Cams. P. 18(1); cf. NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.141 (1979) (clerk
must read indictment or information to jury at start of trial).
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to introduce, and may not go into too much detail about each witness'
testimony. These rules are enforced to varying degrees in different jurisdic-
tions.
The basic rule enforced in all jurisdictions is that an attorney may not
refer in opening statement to evidence that would be inadmissible at trial
because it violates the rules of evidence. If such evidence is alluded to, the
opponent may object, move to strike, and seek to have the jury instructed
to disregard it. 141 If the facts wrongfully disclosed are damaging enough, it
may justify a mistrial or be reversible error on appeal. 14 Nevertheless, courts
recognize that one cannot anticipate accurately all of the judge's evidentiary
rulings, so the mere fact that evidence is later ruled out will not support a
mistrial. The evidence must be prejudicial-must make an erroneous verdict
likely-and/or the attorney must have acted in bad faith before mistrial is
required. 47 If evidence is referred to in opening statement in violation of a
motion in limine, it is more likely to lead to a mistrial or reversible error.
If evidence admissibility is borderline or depends on the successful laying of
a foundation, and there has been no advance ruling by the judge, is it error
to discuss it in opening statement? While it may be unwise tactically, 141 it is
not error as long as the attorney has reasonable grounds to believe the
evidence would be admissible.'1
A closely related problem concerns exaggeration and overstatement-
probably the most common kind of "misstatement" of facts that occurs in
opening statements. It is improper for a party to refer in opening statement
to "facts" that are unprovable because no witness will testify to them.
5 0
145. E.g., Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1980);
Rutledge v. State, 374 So. 2d 975 (Fla.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1979); State v.
Waste Management, 81 Wis. 2d 555, 261 N.W.2d 147, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865
(1978).
146. See United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1977); Hall v. State,
138 Ga. App. 20, 225 S.E.2d 705 (1976); State v. West, - Mont. ., 617 P.2d 1298
(1980); State v. Kenny, 128 N.J. Super. 94, 319 A.2d 232 (1974), aff'd, 68 N.J. 17,
342 A.2d 189 (1975); State v. Colvin, 425 A.2d 508 (R.I. 1981).
147. See, e.g., United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16 (lst Cir. 1978); Rutledge
v. State, 374 So. 2d 975 (Fla.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Duncan, - Pa. -, 370 A.2d 1191 (1977).
148. See J. TANFORD, supra note 1, at 284 (summarizing several sources of
tactical advice).
149. See Schwedler v. Galvan, 46 Ill. App. 3d 630, 360 N.E.2d 1324 (1977);
Timsah v. General Motors Corp., 225 Kan. 305, 591 P.2d 154 (1979); McKinley v.
Vize, 563 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Nabozny, 54 Ohio St. 2d 195,
375 N.E.2d 784, vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 (1978); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmITrrY DR 7-106(c)(1) (1982) (lawyer may not allude
to any matter unless he has a reasonable basis to believe it is relevant and admissible);
I ABA STANDARDS FOR CnmffNA JusTc §§ 3-5.5, 4-7.4 (2d ed. 1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1982).
150. See People v. Parks, 49 Ill. App. 3d 65, 363 N.E.2d 93 (1977); State v.
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Often such exaggerations and misstatements will take the form of reasonable
inferences from the evidence-conclusions one thinks flow logically from the
evidence. Such conclusory statements are proper during closing argument,
but not during opening statement. It is difficult for the courts to police this
rule, because the judge cannot know until the end of the evidence whether
an apparent factual statement was proved directly or is only an inference.
Thus, the general standard of enforcement is to allow lawyers considerable
latitude in stating what they expect to prove, so that anticipatory objections
rarely are sustained. Unless the overstatement is prejudicial or obviously
made in bad faith-in which case a mistrial is usually appropriate"'-the
only remedy is to move to strike the remark after one's opponent rests his
or her case, and request that the judge instruct the jury to retroactively
disregard it. 152
It also is usually error for the party making the first statement to an-
ticipate what the opponent is going to say, or for either party to discuss
evidence the other is going to introduce. Case law on this point is sparse,
but it is likely that, while it is proper for the trial judge to sustain an objection
to such an anticipatory statement, it will not support a reversal of judgment
if the trial judge erroneously permits it. The rationale is that, unless an
attorney intends to offer the evidence himself, he lacks a good faith basis
to believe his opening statement will be supported by evidence.' A party
has no control over whether his opponent will call a particular witness or
elicit testimony on a particular defense. However, once the opponent has
committed him- or herself to a course of action-by filing notice of intent
to raise a particular defense or by promising to call a certain witness in the
opening statement-then a party may discuss that anticipated evidence in a
nonargumentative way.154
Kenny, 128 N.J. Super. 94, 319 A.2d 232 (1974); see also Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497 (1978) (fundamentally unfair for counsel to make statements of fact
that she or he cannot prove because the rules of evidence would not permit it); State
v. Boyd, 600 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (prosecutor knew witness was unavail-
able).
151. E.g., United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 951 (1979); Lybarger v. State Dept. of Roads, 177 Neb. 35, 128 N.W.2d 132
(1964); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 485 Pa. 409, 402 A.2d 1027 (1979).
152. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 602 S.W.2d 148 (Ky.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1088 (1980); Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 326 A.2d 707 (1974); see also State
v. Lawrence, 137 Vt. 597, 409 A.2d 997 (1979) (whether defendant prejudiced by
prosecutor's opening statement is determined on a case-by-case basis in context of
entire proceeding).
153. See Zindrick v. Drake, 75 Ill. App. 3d 702, 393 N.E.2d 1277 (1979).
Contra Snowhill v. Lieurance, 72 Wash. 2d 781, 435 P.2d 624 (1967).
154. See State v. Ivory, 609 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Lane,
49 Ohio St. 2d 77, 358 N.E.2d 1081 (1976), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
See generally 2 F. BuscH, supra note 1, at 794, 800-01.
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The final rule concerning discussion of facts in opening statement is the
strange one that a party may not go into too much detail. This rule is not
found in all jurisdictions. Some solve the problem by permitting the setting
of time limits. Where the rule is found, it basically upholds the right of the
trial judge to take action to prevent a party from wasting the court's time
by going over needless details. It is doubtful that a violation of this rule by
a long-winded attorney would ever be grounds for reversal on appeal, but
neither can the long-winded lawyer complain that he was cut off after a
reasonable time. 55
If a party intends to introduce an exhibit during the presentation of
evidence, he should be able to preview it as well as previewing the witness
testimony. There is no logical difference between evidence presented by ex-
hibits and evidence presented by oral testimony. Although case law is sparse,
and attorneys rarely attempt to use exhibits in opening statement, it appears
that most jurisdictions probably would permit a party to use exhibits during
opening statements. Those exhibits a party reasonably believes will be ad-
mitted into evidence may be shown to the jury. Accurate charts, diagrams,
and maps that will later be used to illustrate the testimony of witnesses may
be used in opening statement for the same purpose-to help the jury visualize
and understand the evidence. 56 Some case law approves the use of illustrative
diagrams during opening statement even if they will not be introduced into
evidence, as long as they serve the purpose of opening statements in explain-
ing the case to the jury in a nonargumentative way. 157 Other kinds of exhibits
that will be offered during trial, such as the weapons, autopsy photographs,
and bloody clothing associated with a crime, may be permitted at the court's
discretion.' With all exhibits, the advance approval of the court probably
155. See Stuthman v. United States, 67 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1933); Pacific Fire
Ins. Co. v. Overton, 256 Ala. 400, 55 So. 2d 123 (1951); People v. Hamilton, 268
Ill. 390, 109 N.E. 329 (1915); State v. Denney, 352 So. 2d 204 (La. 1977); see also
United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversible error to give detailed
statement of facts not later supported by testimony); State v. Browner, 587 S.W.2d
948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (dictum: opening statements should not be detailed).
156. See People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 302 P.2d 307 (1956) (en banc),
overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1964); State v. Jones, 233 La. 775, 98 So. 2d 185 (1957); see 4-County
Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954).
157. See Young Mines Co. v. Blackburn, 22 Ariz. 199, 196 P. 167 (1921);
People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 302 P. 2d 307, (1956) (en banc), overruled on other
grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P. 2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964);
.ewyn v. Morris, 135 Ga. App. 289, 217 S.E.2d 642 (1975); State v. Sibert, 133 W.
Va. 717, 169 S.E. 410 (1933); cf. People v. Reed, 27 Cal. App. 2d 484, 81 P.2d 162
(1938) (prosecutor wrote his name on the blackboard several times to illustrate state-
ment about handwriting identification); see also Highfield v. State, 246 Ga. 478, 272
S.E.2d 62 (1980) (attorney used blackboard to write names of witnesses, approved).
158. See People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 302 P. 2d 307, (1956) (en banc),
overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P. 2d 33, 36 Cal.
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is required, at least by customary practice in most jurisdictions, because
judges feel there is something more prejudicial about an exhibit than mere
testimony.
The final basic prohibition of opening statements is that the attorneys
are not permitted to attempt to arouse the emotions of the jurors. One theme
that runs throughout the rules of trial practice is that the jurors are supposed
to be impartial and decide the case based on a dispassionate consideration
of the evidence. 159 Therefore, making remarks during opening statement that
tend to distract the jury from the facts and law, inject irrelevant side issues
concerning the personalities and characteristics of the persons involved in the
trial, or otherwise arouse emotional reactions in jurors, is prohibited. While
the catalogue of the kinds of remarks likely to arouse emotions is too long
to detail, these improper remarks can be grouped into several categories:
arousing sympathy for or antipathy against one of the parties,' ° arousing
class, racial, ethnic or religious prejudices, 61 injecting insurance, wealth,
poverty or other information on a defendant's ability to pay a verdict, 162
and, in criminal cases, appealing to fear, the desire for vengeance, vigilan-
tism, and other emotions likely to turn the jury into a lynch mob. 163 Violations
Rptr. 201 (1964); Shelton v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 733, 134 S.W.2d 653 (1939);
see State v. Posey, 347 Mo. 1088, 152 S.W.2d 34 (1941) (even though alleged weapon
not introduced at trial). See generally State v. Cook, 606 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (may refer to exhibits).
159. Because jurors take an oath to put aside prejudices, they may be chal-
lenged for cause if their feelings interfere with their ability to be fair to both sides
and relevant evidence may be excluded if it tends to arouse their emotions. FED. R.
Evm. 403. Moreover, even final arguments may not unduly appeal to emotions.
160. E.g., Chicago, S.P., M. & O.R. Co. v. Arnold, 160 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.
1947) (references to client's children); Nevels v. State, 351 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (talking about how the crime victim's family suffered); Kakligan v. Henry
Ford Hosp., 48 Mich. App. 325, 210 N.W.2d 463 (1973) (accusing opponent of evil
motives in filing suit); Paris v. Keefhaver, 512 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)(making disparaging remarks about other party); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. List, 424 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (telling jurors opponent's husband was
in prison). But see Hurst v. State, 356 So. 2d 1224 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
161. See United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) (class prejudice);
Annotation, Counsels Appeal in Criminal Case to Race, Nationality or Religious
Prejudice as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, or Reversal, 45 A.L.R.2D 303 (1956);
Annotation, Statement by Counsel Relating to Race, Nationality or Religion in Civil
Action is Prejudicial, 99 A.L.R.2D 1249 (1965).
162. E.g., Horton v. Continental Volkswagen, 382 So. 2d 551 (Ala. 1980) (size
of car dealership); Palmer v. Emery Transp. Co., 130 Ill. App. 2d 125, 268 N.E.2d
238 (1970) (defendant's wealth).
163. E.g., Nevels v. State, 351 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (tellingjury how much the crime victim's family is suffering); People v. Johnson, 43 Ill.
App. 3d 649, 357 N.E.2d 151 (1976) (telling jury that victim's husband deserted her
because of rape); cf. Commonwealth v. Haynes, 245 Pa. Super. 17, 369 A.2d 271(1976) (harmless error: telling jury how victim had been mutilated).
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of this rule are more likely to lead to reversible error than others.
IV. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
The next phase of the trial is the presentation of evidence-primarily
the interrogating of witnesses and examination of exhibits. Many of the legal
rules discussed in this section already will be familiar as rules of evidence; I
will not spend any time summarizing them. It should, however, become
apparent that the traditional rules of evidence are only a part of a larger
system of rules that regulates all aspects of the presentation of evidence.
Some rules are common to all sides during the introduction of evidence,
others are unique to either direct examination or cross examination. Much
of the law concerning this phase of the trial is intended to regulate what the
witnesses may say and do, but it also addresses the propriety of the conduct
of the trial judge and the attorneys.
A. Witness Examination
In most trials, a majority of the evidence is presented through the tes-
timony of witnesses. These witnesses are called by one of the parties or the
court-usually in a predetermined order-and then direct and cross-exami-
nations are conducted. Witness examination is controlled by rules of pro-
cedure, rules that regulate the kinds of questions that attorneys may ask,
rules limiting the content of what the witnesses may testify to, and special
rules concerning direct examination and cross examination.
As with other parts of the trial, the law seems to say that the basic legal
principle of witness examination is trial court discretion. Federal Rule of
Evidence 611(a) provides:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the inter-
rogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harass-
ment or undue embarrassment.'
Yet, discretion plays no greater a role in controlling witness examination than
it does elsewhere in the trial. Legal rules exist that limit or override that
discretion, and appellate courts pay no more systematic deference to trial
court discretion when reviewing errors concerning witness examination than
they do for any other kind of errors.'6 5
164. FED. R. Evm. 611(a). The advisory commmittee noted that spelling out
detailed rules to govern direct examination was neither desirable nor feasible. Id.
advisory committee's note.
165. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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1. Procedure for Presenting Evidence
It is said that the trial judge has discretion to determine the order of
proof. 66 Yet, the party with the burden of going forward with evidence-
usually the plaintiff-almost always presents its evidence first, followed by
the defense case, followed by rebuttal. In an ordinary case, it is probably
error to reverse the normal order, although a "wrong" ruling is unlikely to
support a new trial because the aggrieved party will be hard-pressed to show
prejudice. As long as each party is given the opportunity to present its case
at some time during the trial, an erroneous ruling on the proper order is
undoubtedly harmless error. 167 Due process is satisfied when each side is given
one opportunity to present its evidence. Unless the court restricted the scope
of evidence in a party's case-in-chief, whether to allow rebuttal or surrebuttal,
and their appropriate scope, these are decisions mostly within the court's
discretion. Rebuttal commonly is allowed, limited to responding to new issues
raised in the defense case-in-chief, such as an affirmative defense, or to
rebutting specific facts testified to by defense witnesses.16 Surrebuttal is dis-
cretionary; generally allowed if the plaintiff raised new issues in his rebut-
tal. 169 The trial judge has the discretion, of course, to permit a party to
reopen his case to introduce evidence inadvertently omitted from his case-
in-chief, 170 even after the close of evidence M or the submission of the case
to the jury. 172
166. See, e.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Leaman, 546 F.2d 148 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 917 (1977); People v. Lanphear, 28 Cal. 3d 463, 622 P.2d 950, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1980) (en banc).
167. See, e.g., DeElna v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Ariz. 563, 592 P.2d 759
(1979) (en banc); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 38 N.C. App. 712, 248 S.E.2d 871 (1978),
cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 34 (1979); State v. Hickey, 287 N.W.2d 502
(S.D. 1980); Allegheny Dev. Corp. v. Barati, 273 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1980).
168. See United States v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 932 (1978); United States v. Chatham, 568 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1978); Van Horn
Lodge v. Ahearn, 596 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1979); Ellis v. Kansas City, 225 Kan. 168,
589 P.2d 552 (1979); Fortin v. Hike, 205 Neb. 344, 287 N.W.2d 681 (1980); In re
Kamesar's Estate, 81 Wis. 2d 151, 259 N.W.2d 733 (1977).
169. See United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978); State v. Young, 116 Ariz. 385, 569 P.2d 815 (1977) (en banc); People
v. Cannon, 62 Ill. App. 3d 556, 378 N.E.2d 1339 (1978).
170. See United States v. McCalvin, 608 F.2d 1167 (8th Cir. 1979); Shell Oil
Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ct. App. 1978); Robert V. DeShazo
& Assoc. v. Farm Mgt. Serv., 101 Idaho 154, 610 P.2d 109 (1980); Joynt v. Barnes,
71 Ill. App. 3d 187, 388 N.E.2d 1298 (1979); City of Indianapolis v. Heeter, 171
Ind. App. 119, 355 N.E.2d 429 (1976); State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 231 S.E.2d 644
(1977); Beasley v. State, 539 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); see also People
19861 657
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
While the trial judge sets the order in which the parties present their
evidence, he is not supposed to interfere in the parties' decisions concerning
internal organization, such as which witnesses to call in what order. 17 How-
ever, the judge may limit the time available for a party to present its evidence,
or put limits on the number of cumulative or repetitive witnesses a party
may call. 74 Obviously, any such restriction must be reasonable considering
the seriousness and complexity of the case. Because of the sixth amendment
right of compulsory process, the court theoretically must be more careful in
limiting witnesses called by a criminal defendant. 175
There is one universal rule of procedure for the presentation of evidence,
so fundamental that in some jurisdictions it is known simply as "the rule."
At the request of either party, most witnesses must be excluded from the
courtroom.1 76 The purpose of this rule is to prevent witnesses from conform-
ing their testimony to evidence previously introduced. In that way, it is
consistent with other rules of witness examination designed to make sure that
the jury hears each witness' personal recollection of the events in his or her
own words, however flawed that recollection might be. The separation rule
(also called sequestering or excluding witnesses) generally does not apply to
parties or to other important witnesses if an attorney can convince the judge
that a particular witness' presence is necessary. The judge has a fair amount
of discretion in deciding whom to exclude and whom to allow to remain in
v. Petrov, 75 Mich. App. 532, 255 N.W.2d 673 (1977) (witness who was having baby
during state's case-in-chief could testify during rebuttal).
171. See United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1977); Carter v. State, 140 Ga. App. 208, 230
S.E.2d 357 (1976); State v. Person, 298 N.C. 765, 259 S.E.2d 867 (1979).
172. See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980)
(en banc), overruled on other grounds, People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 718 P.2d 99,
226 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986) (en banc); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476
(1980); State v. DeLoch, 554 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). Contra Harris v.
State, 371 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979).
173. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 350 So. 2d 615 (La. 1977); National Super-
markets v. Shower, 613 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also State v. Banks,
362 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978) (judge cannot screen defense witnesses in advance).
174. See M.C.I. Comm. Corp. v. A.T. & T., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.) (order
limiting parties to 26 days to present case-in-chief upheld), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 891
(1983); Riter v. Jiminez, 343 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (court may restrict
repetitive witnesses); Maloney v. Wake Hosp. Sys., 45 N.C. App. 172, 262 S.E.2d
680 (1980) (court may limit cumulative witnesses).
175. See People v. Van Zile, 48 Ill. App. 3d 972, 363 N.E.2d 429 (1977) (may
not limit occurrence witnesses but may limit impeaching witnesses); State v. Trickel,
16 Wash. App. 18, 553 P.2d 139 (1976) (character witnesses may be limited).
176. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 615; Chamberlain v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins.
Co., 593 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1980). Compare Morton v. Wiley, 271 Ark. 319, 609
S.W.2d 322 (1980) (exclusion mandatory) with Hawaiian Ocean View Estates v. Yates,
56 Haw. 53, 564 P.2d 436 (1977) (exclusion discretionary).
[Vol. 51
19861 TRIAL LAW 659
the courtroom.177 If a witness violates a separation order, at least if he does
so with the connivance of one of the parties, the court has the power to
prohibit the witness from testifying at all, but is not required to ban the
witness. 178
The trial judge also may interrogate witnesses or call additional wit-
nesses. In most jurisdictions, judges have statutory authority to arrange for
and hire neutral expert witnesses,17 9 but the power to interrogate witnesses
is broader than that. As long as the judge does not display partiality to one
side or the other, he or she may participate fully in the presentation of
evidence, interrogating witnesses called by the parties or calling new wit-
nesses.18 0 A witness called by the court may be cross-examined by all parties
to the case regardless of which side they are on."'
Whether the jurors are or should be permitted to participate in inter-
rogating witnesses is another matter. In most jurisdictions, the rule probably
is that juror questioning is disfavored but not prohibited, and must be care-
fully supervised by the court. Usually, the juror should submit his or her
question to the judge, who can screen it for violations of the rules of evi-
dence.18 2
There is one other procedural rule that is perhaps so obvious that it
needs little discussion. Parties have the right to have their witnesses testify
177. See In re United States, 584 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1978) (police officer in
charge of investigation usually remains); International Harvester Corp. v. Hardin,
264 Ark. 717, 574 S.W.2d 260 (1978) (corporate party's employee most closely in-
volved with case may stay); Hopkins v. Department of Highways, 350 So. 2d 1271
(La. Ct. App. 1977) (expert witnesses usually may remain); see also Lindsey v. Lind-
sey, 361 So. 2d 601 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (not error to permit defendant's relatives
to remain when judge determines that plaintiff's request that they be excluded is a
tactic to isolate defendant from family during trial); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698,
278 S.E.2d 398 (1981) (not error to allow victim's widow to remain), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1213 (1983). But see Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 388 A.2d 926 (1978)
(rule mandatory; no exception for principal investigator).
178. Compare United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1977) (discre-
tionary whether to allow witness to testify), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978) and
Stephen W. Brown Radiology Assoc. v. Gowers, 157 Ga. App. 770, 278 S.E.2d 653
(1981) (generally, witnesses should be allowed to testify) with Stanford v. Morgan,
588 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (witness not allowed to testify under circum-
stances) and Martin v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 847, 234 S.E.2d 62 (1977) (absolute
prohibition against witness testifying).
179. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 706.
180. See United States v. Gunter, 631 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Cornfield, 563 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); State
v. Heiser, 36 N.C. App. 358, 244 S.E.2d 170 (1978).
181. E.g., People v. Triplett, 87 Ill. App. 3d 763, 409 N.E.2d 401 (1980).
182. See United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 826 (1979); United States v. Mitchell, No. F-1003-84 (D.C. App. Mar. 12, 1985).
But see State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685, 279 S.E.2d 203 (1981) (jurors are not
permitted to question a witness).
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without interference. The attorneys may interrupt in order to make proper
objections or the judge may interrupt for valid procedural reasons, but other
persons may not disrupt a direct examination. The judge should not permit
the friends and relations of the parties to demonstrate their feelings, nor
tolerate any intimidating actions or pressure from political groups, citizen
committees, religious organizations, or any other outside organizations." 3
Nonparties, such as witnesses, public interest groups, and the families of
victims may not interrupt in order to object.'84 The judge also has power to
prohibit parties and attorneys from unnecessarily interrupting the presenta-
tion of evidence. 8 5
The basic procedure for eliciting testimony from witnesses is for the
attorney to ask questions and the witness to answer them. With the exception
of a few rules of cross-examination, this process is regulated by a series of
loosely-enforced rules concerning the proper form of questions and answers,
designed to assure that the evidence presented is accurate from the witness'
point of view. Attorneys are prohibited from asking questions that interfere
with or subvert this goal, although the rules are only loosely enforced and
there is a fair amount of judicial discretion to vary from them.8 6
Thus an attorney may not directly supply evidence to the jury by sug-
gesting or assuming facts not in evidence or misquoting witnesses. 18 7 The
attorney is not supposed to ask compound questions involving two or more
separate issues, nor any other form of ambiguious, vague, or incomprehen-
183. See, e.g., People v. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1978)
(interference by spectators and pickets); Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316, 276 S.E.2d 15
(1981) (victim's father lunged at defendant); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W.
Va. 1985) (fair trial denied in case involving drunk driving, when judge did nothing
to prevent presence of 20 to 30 spectators wearing M.A.D.D. buttons); cf. Lehr v.
State, 398 So. 2d 791 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (victim's family may sit near jury as
long as they do not say or do anything). See generally Annotation, Manifestations
of Grief, Crying, and the Like by Victim or Family of Victim During Criminal Trial
as Ground for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 46 A.L.R.2D 949 (1956).
184. See Worth v. Dortman, 94 Mich. App. 103, 288 N.W.2d 603 (1979); State
v. Newman, 568 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
185. See, e.g., FED. R. CRAM. P. 43(b)(2) (disruptive defendant maybe removed
from courtroom); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (disruptive defendant may be re-
moved from courtroom or bound and gagged), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970);
People v. Simon, 80 Cal. App. 675, 252 P. 758 (1927) (improper remarks by attorney
are objectionable); see also Katz, Meeting the Challenge (Of Unfair Tactics), 1958
TmAL LAv. Gurmn 249 (attempts to distract the jury).
186. See, e.g., Riverside Ins. Co. v. Smith, 628 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1980).
187. E.g., School City of Gary v. Claudio, 413 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 448 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 1983); State v. Staten, 271
N.C. 600, 157 S.E.2d 225 (1967); State v. Bouse, 199 Or. 676, 264 P.2d 800 (1953)
(en banc); State v. Herring, 226 N.C. 213, 37 S.E.2d 319 (1946); State v. Barcomb,
136 Vt. 141, 385 A.2d 1089 (1978). See generally Denbeaux & Risinger, Questioning
Questions: Objections to Form in the Interrogation of Witnesses, 33 ARK. L. REv.
439, 478-79 (1980).
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sible question that might confuse the witness about what is being asked.',8
An attorney is supposed to ask each question only once, and is prohibited
from asking a question he previously asked and the witness answered, or
otherwise eliciting repetitive testimony. 89 And, on direct examination, the
attorney generally may not ask leading questions in which the attorney, not
the witness, chooses the words, phrases or ideas that are to be expressed. 90
As there was for the other phases of the trial, there is a procedure for
objecting to violations of the rules of presenting evidence. The basic require-
ments are: A timely and specific objection, a transcript showing the error,
and a motion to strike or offer of proof if appropriate. Although it rarely
comes up, there is also a standing requirement to object: only the parties
and the judge may object to evidence. Witnesses and others may assert valid
privileges, but may not otherwise object to evidence.' 9'
The two primary requirements are that a timely and specific objection
be made. The timeliness requirement means that one must object as soon as
the grounds become apparent. That usually means the objection must be
made to an attorney's question on the grounds that it calls for inadmissible
evidence, rather than waiting until after the answer. 192 When, however, the
question was innocuous, but the answer violates evidence rules, an objection
is still timely if made to the answer before the next question is asked. 19 As
188. E.g., Schmoe v. Cotton, 167 Ind. 364, 79 N.E. 184 (1906) (question must
be understandable); Conner v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Ind. App. 173, 77 N.E.2d 598
(1948) (one topic at a time); Sterling v. Marine Bank, 120 Md. 396, 87 A. 697 (1913)
(question must be clear). See generally Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 187, at 483-
84.
189. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 611(a)(2) (judge charged with controlling examination
to avoid needless consumption of time); Id. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded
if it constitutes needless presentation of cumulative evidence). Compare Porro v. P.T.
Ferro Constr. Co., 71111. App. 3d 377, 390 N.E.2d 958 (1979) (repetitive photographs
properly excluded) with Dresser v. State, 454 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1983) (repetitive and
unnecessary photographs properly admitted). See generally 3 F. BuscH, supra note
1, at 315; Braswell, Objections-Howls of a Dog-Pound Quarrel, 4 CAMP3ELL L.
Rv. 339, 357-58 (1982).
190. See United States v. Cooper, 606 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979). A precise
definition of a leading question is impossible. See discussion of leading questions,
how to define them, and when they are permissible, in E. BRovmEE, OBJEcTMoNS
TO EVIDENCE § 2.1 (1974); McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 6; J. TANoRD
& R. QUINLAN, INDIANA TRIL EVIDENCE MANUAL § 33.1 (1982).
191. See Worth v. Dortman, 94 Mich. App. 103, 288 N.W.2d 603 (1979); State
v. Newman, 568 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). A witness may, of course, assert
a testimonial privilege.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977); Wilkinson v. Duncan, 294 Ala. 509, 319 So. 2d
253 (1975); Cartier v. State, 420 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980); In re Luntsford, 24 Wash.
App. 888, 604 P.2d 195 (1979).
193. See, e.g., State v. Decker, 591 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Reynolds
v. Rio Rancho Estates, 95 N.M. 560, 624 P.2d 502 (1981); Commonwealth v. Farris,
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a general rule, it also is untimely to object too soon in anticipation of
upcoming inadmissible evidence, although the trial judge has some discretion
to permit a premature objection. 94 The specificity requirement means that
the objecting attorney must state the grounds for the objection with sufficient
particularity that the judge understands which evidence rule is being violated.
A general objection that does not explain the grounds is insufficient to pre-
serve any claim of error for appeal, 191 although the trial judge probably will
rule on it anyway. In addition, many jurisdictions permit the grounds for
the objection to be stated within the hearing of the jurors, but require that
any arguments concerning the objection be conducted out of their presence. 196
There are several common secondary rules of objection procedure that
must be complied with to avoid procedural default. The alleged error, the
objection, and the ruling must appear in an official transcript, and that
transcipt supplied to the appellate court. The law differs from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction over whose reponsibility it is to arrange for recording-the
court's or parties'. 97 Objections to erroneously admitted evidence must be
made every time the same or similar evidence is offered, 98 either by a series
of objections or by lodging a continuing objection. 199 Because one can only
appeal from an adverse ruling by the judge, a party has a right to a ruling
on an objection, although the judge properly may reserve ruling until later. 200
251 Pa. Super. 277, 380 A.2d 486 (1977); Terpstra v. Soiltest, 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218
N.W.2d 129 (1974).
194. E.g., Stephens v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 367 So. 2d 192 (Ala. 1978);
Campbell v. Wilson, 143 Ga. App. 656, 239 S.E.2d 546 (1977); Flanagan v. DeLapp,
533 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1976); see also MnqN. Civ. Tx tuBooK R. 49 (an incomplete
question shall not be interrupted by an objection).
195. See, e.g., Short v. Riles, 144 Ga. App. 463, 241 S.E.2d 580 (1978); Brown
v. State, 417 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 1981); Wirtanen v. Provin, 293 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
1979); FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(i). See generally Spettigue v. Arizona Highway Comm'n,
14 Ariz. App. 334, 483 P.2d 566 (1971).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978); People v. Wadkins, 101 Mich. App.
272, 300 N.W.2d 542 (1980); see also Wyo. DisT. CT. R. 17N (6th District).
197. Compare Garo v. Garo, 340 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (party)
with In re Trotter, 3 Kan. App. 2d 566, 598 P.2d 557 (1979) (court).
198. See, e.g., State v. Garris, 292 Ala. 495, 296 So. 2d 712 (1974); State
Highway Dep't v. Hollis, 106 Ga. App. 669, 127 S.E.2d 862 (1962); Jones v. State,
425 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1981); Dunes Club v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 294, 130
S.E.2d 625 (1963); Winkel v. Hankins, 585 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). But
see Burnett/Smallwood & Co. v. Helton Oil Co., 577 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Ct. App.
1978) (once party has made proper objection and been overruled he may assume
judge would rule consistently; repeated objections not required); West-Nesbitt, Inc.
v. Randall, 126 Vt. 481, 236 A.2d 676 (1967).
199. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala. 424, 304 So. 2d 583 (1974); People
v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969); N.C. R. Crv. P.
46(a)(1).
200. Compare State v. Staley, 292 N.C. 160, 232 S.E.2d 680 (1977) (failure to
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If an objection is made to something the jury already has heard, it must be
accompanied by a motion to strike and a request for an instruction that the
jury disregard it. 201 If the judge sustains an objection and wrongly prevents
a party from offering its evidence, that claim of error is preserved only if
the party makes an offer of proof-includes in the record (but out of the
hearing of the jury) a specific statement of the evidence that he or she
intended to introduce. 20
2. Direct Examination
Direct examination procedures are fairly uniform from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but often there are minor local variations. The right to present
evidence is basic to due process, but one must do so through competent
witnesses whose testimony complies with rules of evidence. The attorney calls
the witness, the court determines that witness' competency, and then the
examining attorney interrogates the witness using a question-and-answer for-
mat.
In some jurisdictions, trivial procedural rules exist that regulate such
things as whether the attorneys must sit or stand, or how close to the witness
they can approach. Some courts, for example, require attorneys to remain
behind a lectern or stay seated unless they need to show an exhibit to a
witness; others permit the attorneys free movefinent around the courtroom.
Some courts require attorneys to ask permission to approach a witness with
rule may be reversible error even if underlying objection lacks merit) with Barron v.
Pacific Emp. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 113, 253 S.E.2d 777 (1979) (failure to rule is
equivalent to overruling objection). See also McElwain v. Schuckert, 13 Ariz. App.
468, 477 P.2d 754 (1970) (judge may reserve ruling); Schlatter v. Ibarra, 218 Kan.
67, 542 P.2d 710 (1975) (duty of party to insist on a ruling); Comber v. Inhabitants
of Plantation, 398 A.2d 376 (Me. 1979) (court may admit evidence subject to motion
to strike if not connected up).
201. See Anglo Nat'l Bank v. Lazard, 106 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 624 (1939); Strickland v. Strickland, 285 Ala. 693, 235 So. 2d 833 (1970);
Fairway Builders v. Malouf Towers Rental Co., 124 Ariz. 242, 603 P.2d 513 (Ct.
App. 1979); Laguna v. Prouty, 300 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1981); Isom v. River Island
Sand & Gravel, 273 Or. App. 867, 543 P.2d 1047 (1975). But see Hackenson v.
Waterbury, 124 Conn. 679, 2 A.2d 215 (1938) (motion to strike not necessary where
objection made promptly and sustained).
202. See Jones v. State, 576 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1978); Watts v. Six Flags Over
Georgia, 140 Ga. App. 106, 230 S.E.2d 34 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977);
Sherman County Bank v. Kolhoff, 205 Neb. 392, 288 N.W.2d 24 (1980); Palazzolo
v. Rahill, 121 R.I. 31, 394 A.2d 690 (1978). But see United States v. Brown, 540
F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976) (statement by counsel not an offer of proof); In re Marriage
of H.B.. 559 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (summarization not allowed, proper
procedure is to elicit testimony from witness). See generally 5 F. BUSCH, supra note
1, at 328-32; Waltz, The Offer of Proof, 1972 TRIAL LAW. GuiDE 385; MnqN. R.
Crv. P. 43.02.
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
a document; others do not. Such matters are not only questions of local
customary practice. In many jurisdictions, these trivial matters are covered
in statutes or rules of procedure with state-wide effect. 203
The question concerning who may be a witness also is answered fairly
uniformly. Anyone with admissible evidence is competent to be a witness if
that person-by oath or otherwise-indicates an understanding of the need
to tell the truth and has some minimal ability to testify without lying or
fabricating.20 Only a small group of persons are incompetent: the presiding
judge, the jurors, and in some jurisdictions, the spouse of a criminal defend-
ant, and persons barred by so-called dead man's statutes.M5
The basic format for a direct examination is a question-and-answer dia-
logue between the witness and the attorney, in which the witness provides
the evidence and the lawyer facilitates, but does not take over. Thus, it
generally is error to conduct an examination at either extreme. The witness
may not generally be left to his or her own devices to testify as the witness
sees fit through an unguided narrative, 201 nor may the attorney take over the
examination through leading and suggestive questions that deprive the witness
of the opportunity to express his or her evidence in the witness's own words.2 7
The attorney is supposed to ask a comprehensible question about a particular
subject,28 and the witness is supposed to give a responsive answer. 209
These basic boundaries leave much room for judicial discretion. How
the judge will strike a balance between prohibited leading questions by the
203. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. R. PRac. FOR SUPER. & DIST. Crs. Rule 12 (direct
examination shall be conducted from a seated position at counsel table); MINN. Crv.
TRMBooK R. 48 (lawyers shall be seated or stand at counsel table; lectern may be
used with court's permission); see also Wyo. DisT. CT. R. 17-I (6th Dist.) (attorneys
may approach witnesses with documents and diagrams; no permission required).
204. See United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, 608
F.2d 1373 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); In re R.R., 79 N.J. 97,
398 A.2d 76 (1979).
205. See, e.g., FED. R. EvwD. 601-606;'J. TAN~oRD & R. QumnqAN, supra note
190, §§ 8.1-8.6.
206. See, e.g., J. TANroR & R. Qunm"AN, supra note 190, §§ 36.1-36.3. But
see CAL. R. FOR EcoN. LrATION PROJEcT 1737 (1978) (narrative testimony not
objectionable).
207. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 611(c) (leading questions should not be used on direct
examination).
208. See, e.g., Schmoe v. Cotton, 167 Ind. 364, 79 N.E. 184 (1906) (incom-
prehensible questions not allowed); Conner v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Ind. App. 173,
77 N.E.2d 598 (1948) (compound or multiple questions asked at once not permitted);
Sterling v. Marine Bank, 120 Md. 396, 87 A. 697 (1913) (judge may require attorney
to rephrase an unintelligible or ambiguous question).
209. E.g., Moschetti v. City of Tucson, 9 Ariz. App. 108, 449 P.2d 945 (1969);
Cody v. Toller Drug Co., 232 Iowa 475, 5 N.W.2d 824 (1942); State v. Ferguson,
280 N.C. 95, 185 S.E.2d 119 (1971) (nonresponsive answer may be stricken from
record if witness volunteers inadmissible evidence).
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attorney and the requirement that the attorney direct the examination will
vary from judge to judge, and no standard has evolved to guide this discre-
tion. 210 Some judges will prefer the specific question and response format
because it affords the opposing counsel greater opportunity to object, and
because it tends to keep the witness's testimony more within the boundaries
of the rules of evidence than a narrative.2 1 1 Such judges often will sustain
objections to long, narrative answers, especially if the objecting attorney can
articulate a fear that specific inadmissible evidence may be testified.to by
the witness. Of course, other judges prefer to hear narrative testimony from
the witness, believing it to be more reliable than testimony tightly directed
by an attorney.212
The judge also has discretion whether to allow redirect examination, and
if so, to set its scope. 2 3 Courts routinely allow redirect on any new matters
brought out during the cross-examination. This principle is so well established
that it is probably an abuse of discretion if the judge does not permit at
least this limited scope of redirect examination. 21 4 In a few states, statutes
specifically elevate this limited form of redirect examination to a procedural
right.21 5
The purpose of redirect examination is to clarify and supplement con-
fusion and uncertainties caused by cross-examination, so that the entire ex-
amination of the witness will fairly represent his or her knowledge. Therefore,
in most jurisdictions, it is error to go into new matters for the first time in
redirect that should have been presented in the examination-in-chief, although
the judge has discretion to vary from this rule in the interests of justice.21 6
210. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 611(a) (court shall exercise reasonable control
oveer the mode of interrogation); see also Frisella v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 583
S.W.2d 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
211. R. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRALu HANDBOOK 335 (1974).
212. Social psychologists have discovered that narration is more accurate, but
that specific narrow questions produce more details. In increasing the amount of
information by narrow questions, however, one increases both accurate and inaccurate
information. See Lipton; On the Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, 62 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 90 (1977); Marquis, Marshall & Oskamp, Testimony Validity as a Function
of Question Form, Atmosphere, and Item Difficulty, 2 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 167
(1972); E. Lorrus, EvwrrNEss TomoNY 93-94 (1979).
213. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978); Woodford v. State, 273 Ind. 487, 405
N.E.2d 522 (1980); see also State v. Hinkley, 52 Wash. 2d 415, 325 P.2d 889 (1958).
214. See, e.g., Commercial Banking Corp. v. Martel, 123 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.
1941); Parker v. State, 265 Ark. 315, 578 S.W.2d 206 (1979); People v. Tucker, 142
Cal. App. 2d 549, 298 P.2d 558 (1956); People v. Nailly, 75 Ill. App. 3d 762, 394
N.E.2d 776 (1979).
215. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-710 (1979); CAL. Evm. CODE § 774 (West
1966); see also People v. Cuevas, 67 A.D.2d 219, 414 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1979) (party
has right to rehabilitate impeached witness).
216. See United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1978); Hampton v.
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Courts generally have held that it is permissible to use redirect examination
for the following purposes: to correct a mistake or misstatement made during
cross-examination, 217 to explain or qualify an apparent contradiction between
testimony given on direct and cross-examinations, 2 8 to explain ambiguous
or incomplete testimony, to place an ambiguous answer in its proper con-
text,219 to explain a prior inconsistent statement, ° to explain or qualify ap-
parent interest or bias, but not to justify a bias by explaining the reasons
for it,n1 to elicit testimony about a whole transaction or conversation when
the cross-examiner only referred to one part taken out of contextm2 to refresh
a witness's recollection after he or she has become confused or testified to
a lack of memory on cross-examination,223 and to show mitigating circum-
stances surrounding a criminal conviction or other act of misconduct dis-
State, 144 Ga. App. 151, 240 S.E.2d 327 (1977); State v. Romero, 369 So. 2d 1342
(La. 1979); State v. Price, 301 N.C. 437, 272 S.E.2d 103 (1980); State v. Conklin,
37 Wash. 2d 389, 223 P.2d 1065 (1950).
217. See, e.g., Cochrane v. State, 48 Ariz. 124, 59 P.2d 658 (1936) (correcting
misstatement); Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959) (mistaken witness
may rectify errors); see also Schwartau v. Miesmer, 50 N.J. Super. 399, 142 A.2d
675 (1958) (recalling witness to say that truck was dump truck, not a pick-up).
218. See, e.g., Watkins v. Holmes, 93 N.H. 53, 35 A.2d 395 (1943).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 421 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir.) (full expla-
nation of short answer), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 931 (1970); Thornton v. City of
Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545 (1948) (complete facts upon which opinion
was based); People v. Tucker, 142 Cal. App. 2d 549, 298 P.2d 558 (1956) (explaining
incomplete answer); State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 386 A.2d 243 (1978) (witness has
a natural right to clarify own testimony); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v.
Exchange Nat'l Bank, 40 Ill. App. 3d 623, 356 N.E.2d 376 (1976) (explaining incom-
plete answer); State v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3 (1945) (that witness who
admitted conviction did not know what word meant; had actually been acquitted).
220. See United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1976) (received
death threat), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977); State v. Duncan, 290 N.C. 741,
228 S.E.2d 237 (1976); People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 193 P. 92'(1920) (bribed by
defendant's brother).
221. See Clark v. State, 264 Ind. 524, 348 N.E.2d 27 (1976), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1050 (1978); Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981);
see also Hovey v. State, 29 Ala. App. 149, 195 So. 282 (may not give reasons justifying
bias), cert. denied, 239 Ala. 309, 195 So. 283 (1940).
222. See United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
599 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990 (1979) (in general); Nitzel v.
Austin Co., 249 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1957) (written statements); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Doerksen, 75 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1935) (remainder of conversation); People v.
Miller, 58 Ill. App. 3d 156, 373 N.E.2d 1077 (1978) (context of conversation); see
also White v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 416, 166 S.W.2d 873 (1942) (relevant parts
only, not necessarily entire conversation); cf. Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423,
553 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976) (discussing statement on cross-examination does not
allow plaintiff to elicit that statement was made to an insurance agent).
223. See United States v. Parr-Pla, 549 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 922 (1977); Duncan v. State, 20 Ala. App. 209, 10 So. 472, cert. denied, 211
Ala. 614, 101 So. 745 (1924).
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cussed during cross-examination. In many jurisdictions, redirect examination
also may be used to elicit prior consistent statements if the witness was
impeached by a prior inconsistent statement.
One final issue of direct examination concerns refreshing the recollection
of a witness. During the direct examination, it is proper for the attorney to
take steps to refresh the recollection of a witness whose memory of specific
events proves inadequate. Most jurisdictions require a foundation that the
witness cannot now recall all the facts about an event, or that the witness'
memory is exhausted. If the witness is unable to answer a question, his or
her memory may be refreshed so that testimony may be given, but if the
witness does answer the question, then it is improper to "refresh" the wit-
ness's memory in an effort to change that answer. An attorney has no right
to try to correct what he thinks is a mistake on the part of the witness
through the guise of refreshing recollection. An attorney may attempt to jog
the witness' memory by asking a leading question that suggests the forgotten
fact,226 or by letting the witness examine a document (that has been properly
marked as an exhibit). 227
3. Cross-Examination
The most important procedural rule of cross-examination is the right to
conduct it. It is safe to say that all litigants have the right to cross-examine
witnesses who give adverse testimony. For defendants facing criminal charges,
this right is said to derive from the sixth amendment guarantee that the
accused may confront witnesses against him. In civil cases, the right to cross-
examine is said to be part of fundamental due process to which all parties
are entitled. This does not mean that cross-examination is completely un-
bridled in scope and duration. A party is entitled to a full and fair oppor-
224. See Wittenberg v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 744 (D. Minn. 1969);
Leonard v. State, 369 So. 2d 873 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 877
(Ala. 1977); People v. Hanson, 83 I1. App. 3d 1108, 404 N.E.2d 801 (1980); Kiracofe
v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly,
156 Md. 81, 143 A. 648 (1928) (witness can explain mitigating circumstances, cannot
claim innocence). But see Lipscomb v. State, 162 Neb. 417, 76 N.W.2d 399 (1956)
(no explanations permitted).
225. E.g., Thompson v. State, 223 Ind. 39, 58 N.E.2d 112 (1944); cf. State v.
Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E.2d 522 (1968) (prior consistent statement admissible if
there has been any attack on witness's credibility).
226. See Bell v. State, 267 Ind. 1, 366 N.E.2d 1156 (1977); Baker v. State, 35
Md. App. 593, 371 A.2d 699 (1977).
227. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 550 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See
generally Kalo, Refreshing Recollection: Problems with Laying a Foundation, 10
RuT.-CAMDEN L.J. 233, 233-38 (1979).
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tunity to cross-examine, but not to raise irrelevant issues or mislead the
jury.228
In Mattox v. United States,229 the Supreme Court held that under no
circumstances shall the accused be deprived of the right to subject prosecution
witnesses to the ordeal of cross-examination. In Pointer v. Texas,210 the Court
stated: "[I]t cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of
cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case
to confront the witnesses against him." This right includes the opportunities
to test the recollection and sift the conscience of the witness, and to give the
jury the chance to view the witness' demeanor under pressure.
Other parties also have rights, rooted in fundamental concepts of due
process, to cross-examine witnesses who give adverse testimony. The prose-
cution is entitled to cross-examine defense witnesses, including the defendant
if he or she waives the privilege against self-incrimination by giving direct
testimony. 23' In civil cases, refusal to allow cross-examination on relevant
matters covered during direct testimony is a denial of a fundamental right
and is usually a sufficient ground for reversal. While a judge has more
discretion to limit cross-examination in civil cases, the judge may do so only
after a party has had a fair and substantial opportunity to exercise the right. 2
This fundamental guarantee is accompanied by a few secondary rules
designed to facilitate its enforcement. The right of cross-examination has
been held to encompass not merely the opportunity to ask questions, but
also the right to compel answers. A judge is supposed to compel a reluctant
witness to answer proper questions on pain of being held in contempt. In
extreme cases where the witness' refusal to cooperate effectively denies a
party the right to conduct cross-examination, the court may strike out all or
part of the direct examination and instruct the jury to disregard it, or even
grant a mistrial.233 At the other extreme is the "overcooperative" witness
228. See Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1009 (1978); Jackson v. State, 157 Ga. App. 604, 278 S.E.2d 5 (1981); People
v. Garrett, 44 II1. App. 3d 429, 358 N.E.2d 364 (1976).
229. 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
230. 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
23 1. See Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900); Viener v. State,
150 Ga. App. 175, 257 S.E.2d 22 (1979).
232. See, e.g., Denver Symphony Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Colo. App.
547, 526 P.2d 685 (1974); Weaver v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 696, 215
S.E.2d 503 (1975); Glassman v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 166 Iowa 254, 147 N.W.
757 (1914); cf. Cash v. Bolle, 423 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1968) (en bane) (scope and extent
discretionary).
233. Whether the direct examination must be stricken depends not on whether
the witness was unjustified in refusing to answer, but on whether it is fair to allow
the direct evidence to stand unchallenged. See, e.g., Henderson v. Twin Falls County,
59 Idaho 97, 80 P.2d 801 (1938) (witness died before cross-examination; jury in-
structed to disregard direct testimony). Compare Montgomery v. United States, 203
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who volunteers more than he or she was asked or otherwise gives nonres-
ponsive answers. While the prohibition against allowing the attorney to ask
misleading questions gives the witness the right to explain answers, the witness
must remain responsive to the question asked. In many jurisdictions, the
cross-examiner may move to strike the unresponsive part of a witness' answer,
and, if the problem continues, have the judge admonish the witness.? 4
A second procedural issue concerns the timing of cross-examination. As
a general rule, cross-examination follows the completion of the direct ex-
amination. It is within the discretion of the trial judge to allow the cross-
examination to take place at some other time. Judges frequently will allow
an interruption of the direct for limited cross-examination on issues of the
competency of the witness2 5 or the competency of offered evidence-most
often, the qualifications of a proposed expert, the foundation for an exhibit,
or the foundation for an exception to the hearsay rule. In many jurisdictions
this mini-cross is called a voir dire examination. Cross-examination also may
be postponed for the convenience of witnesses.236 A judge also may allow a
party to recall a witness for additional cross-examination.2 7 This is permis-
sible not only when a subsequent witness' testimony reveals new matters, but
also when the cross-examiner realizes he or she simply forgot to ask an
important question the first time. The timing of cross-examination, except
to the extent that it is specified by statute, is entirely at the judge's discretion.
There are two different rules concerning the permissible scope of cross-
examination. A majority of jurisdictions limit cross-examination to the issues
raised on direct; a minority follow the English practice of allowing cross-
examination on any relevant issue. The limited-scope rule is illustrated by
Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence: "Cross-examination should
be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters af-
fecting the credibility of the witness." There are innumerable variations of
interpretation of this rule, and how strictly it is enforced is a matter for
judicial discretion. The strict view, which is usually attributed to Philadelphia
F.2d 887 (5th Cir.) (witness claimed fifth amendment privilege on cross-examination;
violation of the right to cross-examine) with United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557
(9th Cir. 1980) (witness claimed fifth amendment on cross-examination; direct did
not have to be stricken). Compare Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87 (6th Cir.)(refusal to answer questions for no reason; direct not stricken), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
781, reh'g denied, 319 U.S. 783 (1943) with United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp.
639 (W.D. Ky. 1937) (unjustified refusal to answer questions required direct to be
stricken).
234. See Mullins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 204, 276 S.E.2d 877 (1981); Webster
v. State, 206 Ind. 431, 190 N.E. 52 (1933); State v. Marshall, 571 S.W.2d 768 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978).
235. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 251 Ind. 587, 244 N.E.2d 100 (1969).
236. See, e.g., Sperry v. Estate of Moore, 42 Mich. 353, 4 N.W. 13 (1880).
237. See People v. Lewis, 180 Colo. 423, 506 P.2d 125 (1973) (en banc);
Parham v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 458, 192 N.W.2d 838 (1972).
1986]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
& T. R. Co. v. Stimpson,238 is that the right to cross-examine extends only
to matters brought up on direct and the general credibility of the witness.
The federal rule is similar, but also permits the judge to allow the attorney
to go beyond these strict boundaries as long as he does so "as if on direct,"
i.e., without using leading questions. 239 Another variation is the so-called
"Michigan Rule," which permits inquiry not only into the subjects raised
on direct examination, but also any new matter that would tend to modify,
explain, or rebut what was said or implied.3 The English Rule permits wide-
open cross examination on any relevant issue, whether or not it was inquired
into during the direct examination. Unlike the federal rule, this variation
permits a party to pursue new matters while still retaining the power to use
leading questions and the other tools of cross-examination.24' Regardless of
which test is used, all jurisdictions permit cross-examination for purposes of
impeachment if the witness has given any direct testimony. Wide latitude is
usually allowed to test and challenge the credibility of the witness, even when
it involves questioning on collateral matters . 2
The majority rule limiting the scope of cross-examination to matters
raised during direct is premised in part on the ability of the cross-examiner
to recall the witness as his own and elicit direct testimony. What happens
under these limited scope rules if a criminal defendant takes the stand but
limits his testimony to only one of the several material issues? The prose-
cution would seem to be prohibited by the fifth amendment from calling the
defendant to testify against himself, and by the rules pertaining to the scope
from pursuing the other issues during cross-examination. There is a split of
opinion here. Many jurisdictions-probably a majority-appear to allow
broader cross-examination of a defendant than of other witnesses. 243 How-
ever, other jurisdictions say that the rule is the same for defendants as for
other witnesses.2 The pattern of decisions is erratic.
There is one situation in which the scope of cross-examination may be
narrower than the subjects covered on direct examination. If evidence is
238. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 480 (1840).
239. FED. R. Evw. 611(b); see also Boiler v. Cofrances, 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166
N.W.2d 129 (1969) (in civil cases, it would be a waste of time to make party recall
witness in own case, so he can go beyond the scope of cross-examination if he conducts
it as if it were a direct).
240. See Campau v. Dewey, 9 Mich. 381 (1861).
241. See generally 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE iN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW §
1891(1) (Chadboum rev. 1976).
242. See id. § 1891(2).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1976); People v. Zerilo, 36 Cal. 2d 222,
223 P.2d 223 (1950); State v. Harris, 564 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
244. See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1925) (testifying
defendant subjects himself to cross-examination to same extent as any other witness,
but not to a greater extent); State v. Zdanis, 173 Conn. 189, 377 A.2d 275 (1977)
(similar).
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admitted on direct that violates the rules of evidence, a party is not necessarily
entitled to go over it or expand upon it. While the judge in his discretion
may permit a party to introduce additional inadmissible evidence in order to
offset prejudice caused by previous inadmissible evidence,2 5 it is usually said
that the proper scope of cross examination is limited to matters covered on
direct that are relevant to the controversy. Pursuing irrelevant matters, or
repeating hearsay, only compounds the problems. 6 The fact that inadmis-
sible evidence was brought up on direct is a waiver of the offering party's
right to appeal in the event that the judge erroneously allows the cross-
examiner to repeat it; it does not make the subject open to cross-examination.
If the party who called the witness conducts a redirect examination, the
other side may ask for permission to conduct recross-examination. The court
has discretion to permit or refuse it. Unlike the first cross-examination,
recross is not a right unless new matters have been raised for the first time
in the redirect examination.24 7 When it is permitted, recross-examination usu-
ally is strictly limited to issues raised on redirect. It is within the discretion
of the judge to allow recross on matters inadvertently omitted from the first
cross-examination; and it is also within the judge's discretion to prohibit it.28
There are some special rules concerning the mode of interrogation on
cross-examination; the rules concerning the kinds of permissible questions
that may be asked are different than on direct. The major difference is that
leading questions, which were prohibited during direct examination, are usu-
ally allowed.? 9 There are limits: generally one may not use leading questions
when cross-examining one's own client who was called as an adverse witness
by the other side,20 one may not ask misleading or trick questions nor frame
leading questions in such a way as to elicit half-truths and distortions,2' and
245. See, e.g., United States v. Nardi, 633 F.2d 972 (1st Cir. 1980).
246. See People v. McDaniel, 59 Cal. App. 2d 672, 140 P.2d 88 (1943).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Caudle, 606 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1979); Kinser
v. Cooper, 413 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1969); Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064
(D.C. 1978).
248. Compare People v. McTush, 78 Ill. App. 3d 603, 397 N.E.2d 463 (1979)
(defense not entitled to recross on matters omitted from cross), rev'd on other grounds,
81 111. App. 3d 513, 410 N.E.2d 861 (1980) with State v. King, 355 So. 2d 1305 (La.
1978) (prosecutor properly permitted to recross on matters omitted from cross).
249. See Galley v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1974); State v. Ryder,
348 A.2d 1 (Me. 1975). But ef. Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322 (7th
Cir. 1979) (no one has absolute right to ask leading questions on cross-examination).
250. See, e.g., Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626 (6th
Cir. 1978); Zukowsky v. Brown, 79 Wash. 2d 586, 488 P.2d 269 (1971); J & B Motors
v. Margolis, 75 Ariz. 392, 257 P.2d 588 (1953); Annotation, Cross-Examination By
Leading Questions of Witness Friendly to or Biased in Favor of Cross-Examiner, 38
A.L.R.2D 952 (1954); see also MINN. R. Cirv. P. 43.02.
251. E.g., McDonald v. State, 340 So. 2d 103 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (may
not assume facts not in evidence).
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the judge always has discretion to stop a leading interrogation that seems to
be resulting in unreliable evidence.
25 2
The other kind of question prohibited on cross-examination is one that
becomes argumentative. Argumentative questions are speeches by the lawyer
disguised as questions. Argumentative refers not to arguing with (badgering)
the witness, but to making inferences and suggesting conclusions that belong
in closing argument. An argumentative question is one that does not seek to
elicit an answer; indeed, it is usually one where the attorney does not care
what the answer is. There are four common types of argumentative questions:
speech-making, in which the lawyer uses a question to make a rhetorical
point; 2 3 summarizing testimony, in which the lawyer simply repeats parts of
the cross-examination he wants to emphasize;5 4 pursuing a line of questions
despite the witness' denial of any knowledge about the subject-matter in
which the attorney implies that he personally believes the witness is lying;2s5
and sarcastic comments to the jury not in question form. 25 6
252. See United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980); Nelson v. State,
257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496 (1974).
253. See Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1980);
Self v. Dye, 257 Ark. 360, 516 S.W.2d 397 (1974); In Re Kemp's Will, 236 N.C.
680, 73 S.E.2d 906 (1953). For example: "So, Mr. Witness, since you testified you
were looking the other way, you really have no idea what color the traffic light
was, do you?"
254. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979).
For example:
Q: You were fifty feet away? A: Yes.
Q: It was night? A: Yes.
Q: There was no moonlight? A: That's right.
Q: And you saw the scar on his face? A: Yes.
Q: So you are asking the jury to believe you could see a scar on a man's
face from fifty feet away on a dark night?
But see Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 327, 264 A.2d 280 (1970) (in long trials, it
is necessary for prosecutor to keep evidence in perspective by periodically recapi-
tulating testimony of state's witnesses).
255. See State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1980). An example of such
a colloquy follows:
Q: You robbed that convenience store, didn't you? A: No
I did not, I was in Cleveland.
Q: You pulled a shotgun on the clerk, didn't you? A: No.
Q: Then you asked for money? A: No.
Q: And then you pulled the trigger, didn't you? A: No.
256. See, e.g., State v. Blount, 4 N.C. App. 561, 167 S.E.2d 444 (1969). For
example:
Q: You claim to have seen a scar on his face from fifty feet away on a
dark night? A: Yes.
Q: You have remarkable vision, Mr. Witness. Did you see anything else?
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The other difference between direct and cross-examination concerns the
use of exhibits. Any document, photograph, chart, map, model, or other
exhibit introduced during the direct examination may be referred to on cross-
examination. It may be shown again to the witness and further questions
may be asked about it. If the direct examiner used a blackboard or other
illustrative exhibit without formally introducing it, that exhibit similarly may
be used. Even objects and documents referred to during direct but not in-
troduced usually can be compelled by the cross-examiner for inspection, and
introduced into evidence. 25 7
The more difficult question is whether new exhibits may be used or
offered into evidence during cross-examination. Certain types of collateral
exhibits usually are permitted: documents used to refresh memory, prior
inconsistent written statements, and certified records of convictions may be
introduced. 25 However, many jurisdictions do not permit new substantive
exhibits to be introduced during cross-examination. In states that permit
wide-open cross-examination, new exhibits usually are allowed, but in juris-
dictions that restrict the scope of cross-examination, the introduction of new
exhibits may also be restricted. In some, new exhibits are per se beyond the
scope of the direct examination and not permitted. In others, new exhibits
may be introduced, but only if their subject matter is relevant to issues raised
on the direct examination. 2 9
The introduction of an exhibit by the defendant on cross-examination
may have unanticipated procedural consequences. Some jurisdictions have
held that introducing an exhibit-perhaps even one used only for impeach-
ment-constitutes opening the defendant's case. Theoretically, that could
result in a waiver of the right to make a directed verdict motion at the close
of the plaintiff's case. 260 In those jurisdictions where the defendant can earn
the right to open and close the final arguments if he presents no evidence,
introducing a document on cross-examination may cost him that privilege. 261
Finally, there is a special group of rules regulating what attorneys may
do to impeach the testimony of witnesses. While under modern law, a party
theoretically could impeach his own witness on direct examination, 262 that is
a rare occurrence. The important impeachment rules permit an attorney to
257. But see Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 306 A.2d 857 (1972)
(cross-examination as to contents of exhibit not introduced should not be permit-
ted).
258. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 609 (impeachment by evidence of conviction
of crime); id. 613(b) (extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement).
259. See Kellerher v. Porter, 29 Wash. 2d 650, 189 P.2d 223 (1948).
260. I could not find any cases on the subject. It may be a point of only
academic interest anyway, since the defendant may still make a directed verdict
motion at the close of all the evidence.
261. E.g., Grimsley v. State, 304 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
262. See FED. R. EvID. 607.
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ask questions about prior convictions23 and, in some jurisdictions, prior acts
of misconduct that did not result in conviction,264 prior inconsistent acts and
statements,2 65 and prior incidents showing biases, prejudices, or financial
interest in the case.26 The attorney may not ask about lack of religious
beliefs.2 67 The rule is fairly uniform that before an attorney may ask about
any of these specific events he must direct the witness' attention to the time,
place, and circumstances under which the incident took place. This is some-
times thought of as a foundation requirement, insofar as directing the witness
to the specific time and place of an event demonstrates to the court that the
attorney has a good faith basis for asking the question and is not merely
fishing.
B. Exhibits and Visual Evidence
Exhibits may occasionally be used during cross-examination, and in some
jurisdictions may be offered into evidence during cross-examination, but they
are overwhelmingly associated with direct. The rules governing exhibits and
the foundations required for their introduction are not difficult to understand
if one understands the different purposes for which they can be used. There
is much confusion in the case law and legal writing that comes from a failure
to distinguish clearly among different kinds of exhibits. This problem is
exascerbated by a lack of agreement about what names to give to different
kinds of exhibits. For example, exhibits are sometimes collectively denomi-
nated as demonstrative evidence, in order to distinguish them from testi-
monial evidence.268 At other times, only exhibits used as part of a courtroom
demonstration are considered demonstrative exhibits. Based on the purposes
for which they are used and the different foundation requirements, it makes
most sense to distinguish among four kinds of exhibits: real evidence, writings
and documents, illustrative exhibits and demonstrations, and silent witness
exhibits.
Real evidence consists of objects offered as having played an actual and
direct part in the incident giving rise to trial. A classic example is the actual
murder weapon. When real evidence is offered, the attorney must lay a
foundation that the object is the actual one that was involved in the incident,
and that it is still in the same condition in all material respects. If the object
is unique or readily identifiable, direct testimony that it is the very one and
263. See, e.g., Id. 609.
264. See Id. 608(b). Contra Randall v. State, 455 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. 1983).
265. See FED. R. Evm. 613.
266. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Way v. State, 224 Ind.
280, 66 N.E.2d 608 (1946).
267. See FED. R. Evm. 610.
268. See, e.g., McCoRMiICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 212, at 664; Cady,
Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Mo. L. REv. 333 (1967).
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still appears to be in the same condition will suffice. On the other hand, if
the object is one of a number of mass-produced objects without identifiable
marks, or if it is susceptible to alteration or was tested in a laboratory, the
offering attorney probably will have to prove a chain of custody, establishing
through circumstantial evidence the unlikelihood of tampering, contamina-
tion, or substitution. 269
Real evidence also must be relevant, but no higher standard of proba-
tiveness is required for an exhibit than for testimony. If an item of evidence
tends to prove any material issue, it is relevant. There is a common misap-
prehension that an item of real evidence must be connected to one of the
parties to be admissible; the law is otherwise. 270 For example, a gun found
at the scene of a robbery is relevant to prove that the crime of armed robbery
was committed, even if it cannot be connected to the defendant.
Writings or documents are a kind of real evidence. They are objects that
played an actual role in the transaction giving rise to the lawsuit. Because
of their unique characteristics, a separate foundation requirement has de-
veloped for them. To be admissible, a writing must be authenticated and
must satisfy the best evidence rule. To authenticate a writing, one proves
that it is what it appears to be-a writing produced by a certain person
(private writings), by someone within a business (business writings), or by a
government official as part of his official duties (official or public writings).
Public writings generally can be authenticated merely by showing a certifi-
cation.27v Private writings, whether business or personal, require a witness
for authentication-someone who can testify to whose handwriting or sig-
nature appears on the page, or can establish by circumstantial evidence a
likelihood that the writing was prepared by a particular individual or by
someone (even if they cannot be identified) within a business.272 If the terms
of the writing are independently material-that is, if legal rights and duties
turn on how a document is worded-then the offering party must comply
with the best evidence rule and make a reasonable effort to locate the original.
Under modern law, however, the best evidence rule is of little importance. 273
Exhibits that played no direct role in the events being litigated, but which
are offered to illustrate a witness' testimony and make the evidence more
comprehensible to the jury are also admissible. This kind of illustrative ex-
hibit includes maps, charts, diagrams, scale models, photographs, movies,
and similar items used to illustrate how events occurred and what things
269. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, §§ 212-14.
270. E.g., State v. Moore, 181 Ind. App. 242, 391 N.E.2d 665 (1979).
271. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 902.
272. See, e.g., United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); FED. R. Evm.
901(b); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1420.
273. See MCCORMCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 271, at 705; FED. R.
Evm. 1002-1006.
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looked like. The specific source of an illustrative exhibit is irrelevant-for
example, it does not matter if a diagram is drawn by the witness, the attorney,
or a professional draftsman. The only foundation requirement is that the
offering attorney must prove that the exhibit is reasonably fair and accurate
enough to help the witness communicate his peculiar perspective. 2 4 Whether
the exhibit is objectively accurate is of no matter.275
Photographs present some unique problems and must be distinguished
from other kinds of illustrative evidence. Jurors are likely to assume that a
photograph is correct, even to the minute details recorded, and forget that
it is offered only as a general representation-a mistake they are not likely
to make with a hand-drawn diagram. A photograph, because of its ability
to record small details, carries a higher potential for being dramatic and
emotional than other kinds of exhibits. Two considerations follow from these
differences: gruesome or dramatic photographs are more likely to be excluded
because of their prejudicial effect,276 and the judge may require a stricter
foundation concerning the accuracy of the photograph.277 The contemporary
view is that photographs are admissible despite inaccuracies as long as those
inaccuracies are clearly explained to the jury.278
Closely related to illustrative exhibits are demonstrations conducted by
the witness. Like a diagram or other physical object that helps illustrate what
the witness testifies to, a demonstration by the witness may help illustrate
oral testimony and make the evidence clearer to the jury. Again, appellate
opinions tend to imply that there is broad judicial discretion whether to allow
274. E.g., Jackson v. State, 426 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 1981); McKee v. Chase,
73 Idaho 491, 253 P.2d 787 (1953); Humphrey v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Ariz.
167, 70 P.2d 319 (1937).
275. Cf. Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 134 N.E.2d 526 (1956)
(if exhibit is so inaccurate as to be misleading to the jury, the judge may exclude
it).
276. See Commonwealth v. Chacko, 480 Pa. 504, 391 A.2d 999 (1978). The
court, however, has broad discretion to admit gruesome photographs if they are
relevant, and in practice, such photographs rarely are refused. See People v. Jack-
son, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1035 (1981); State v. Morales, 120 Ariz. 517, 587 P.2d 236 (1978). In fact,
when I researched one jurisdiction- Indiana-I discovered that over the last twenty-
five years, not a single criminal case was reversed because excessively gruesome
photographs were admitted. E.g., Loy v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. 1982) (35
gruesome color slides admitted).
277. See, e.g., Hopper v. Reed, 320 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1963); Lee v. Crit-
tenden County, 216 Ark. 480, 226 S.W.2d 79 (1950); Virginian Ry. v. Hillsman,
162 Va. 359, 173 S.E. 503 (1934).
278. E.g., Moyer v. United States, 312 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1963); Botz v.
Krips, 267 Minn. 362, 126 N.W.2d 446 (1964); Spence v. Rasmussen, 190 Or. 662,
226 P.2d 819 (1951). Compare Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Perry, 326 F.2d 921 (5th
Cir. 1964) (posed photograph admissible) with City of Biloxi v. Schambach, 247
Miss. 644, 157 So. 2d 386 (1963) (posed photograph inadmissible).
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a demonstration,279 but in practice it is usually error to refuse a demonstration
if the proponent can lay the foundation. Illustrative demonstrations, usually
conducted by the witness, are admissible if the witness testifies that he can
with reasonable accuracy demonstrate some relevant event and that he can
more clearly explain what happened if allowed to demonstrate something
that may be difficult to describe in words alone. Experimental demonstra-
tions, usually intended to show cause and effect, require the additional foun-
dation that the circumstances in the courtroom under which the experiment
will take place are substantially similar to the conditions under which the
original event took place. 2 0
While illustrative exhibits are almost always admitted, the common law
has developed several rules of exclusion for demonstrations. Demonstrations
designed to show causation-for example, that a chair would fall over if one
leaned back in it, or the bindings on a ski would not properly release if one
fell- are inadmissible unless substantial similarity of conditions is shown. 281
It also is generally improper for a witness to give a physical demonstration
of the effect of an injury, such as manipulating a body part so as to cause
an outcry of pain or walking with a limp.2 2 And, contrary to television
portrayals, it generally is improper to reenact the crime.2 3 The problem with
this kind of demonstration is that it goes beyond merely illustrating the
witness' testimony and becomes evidence itself.
279. See Ivey v. State, 369 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Depositors
Trust Co. v. Blanchard, 377 A.2d 101 (Me. 1977); Cooke v. Walter Kidde & Co.,
8 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 394 N.E.2d 968 (1979).
280. See State v. Ballard, 351 So. 2d 484 (La. 1977); Geisel v. Hainti, 427
S.W.2d 525 (Mo. 1968); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959); Way v.
Hayes, 513 P.2d 1222 (Nev. 1973); State v. Jenkins, 260 N.W.2d 509 (S.D. 1977);
State ex rel. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980); Breimon v. General
Motors Corp., 8 Wash. App. 747, 509 P.2d 398 (1973).
281. See Burriss v. Texaco, Inc., 361 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1966); Hamilton v.
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 132 A.2d 500 (D.C. 1957); Scott County School Dist. v.
Asher, 160 Ind. App. 299, 312 N.E.2d 131 (1974); Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 268 N.W.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034
(1980); Orwick v. Belshan, 304 Minn. 338, 231 N.W.2d 90 (1975); Uss v. Town of
Oyster Bay, 37 N.Y.2d 639, 339 N.E.2d 147, 376 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1975).
282. See People v. Stokes, 75 Ill. App. 3d 813, 394 N.E.2d 681 (1979); Landro
v. Great N. Ry., 117 Minn. 306, 135 N.W. 991 (1912); Willis v. City of Browning,
161 Mo. App. 461, 143 S.W. 516 (1912); Stewart v. Weiner, 108 Neb. 49, 187 N.W.
121 (1922); Peters v. Hockley, 152 Or. 434, 53 P.2d 1059 (1936); Annotation,
Propriety of Permitting Plaintiff in Personal Injury Action to Exhibit His Person
to Jury, 66 A.L.R.2D 1338 (1955). But cf. Washington v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134 (D.D.C. 1979) (not error if jurors see plaintiff hobble
as he takes the stand); Heidbreder v. Northampton Township Trustees, 64 Ohio
App. 2d 95, 411 N.E.2d 825 (1979) (child permitted to show paralysis and inability
to perform simple tasks).
283. See People v. Goodfriend, 106 Misc. 2d 989, 436 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup.
Ct. 1981).
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The one situation in which this kind of evidence is admissible for sub-
stantive purposes is when the proponent can lay a foundation for a silent
witness exhibit. The silent witness exhibit is beginning to be recognized in
many jurisdictions which recognize that limiting the use of photographs to
illustrative purposes presents problems when no witness can verify the ac-
curacy of the events portrayed. For example, a bank robbery can take place
in the absence of eyewitnesses yet may be recorded by automatic cameras.
Since no witness saw the robbery, no one can verify the accuracy of the
photographs, so they are inadmissible as illustrative evidence. If no other
theory of admissibility exists, the photographs must be excluded even if they
clearly show the faces of the robbers. This peculiar result has led to the
development of the silent witness theory of admitting exhibits. Since no
eyewitness is available to verify the accuracy of a silent witness exhibit, some
other means must be established for proving a likelihood that the contents
of the pictures are accurate. The most common procedure is to call witnesses
familiar with the scene to identify objects and persons in the photograph
and establish where and approximately when it was taken. In many juris-
dictions, it may be necessary also to call an expert who can establish that
the process involved in making this particular recording is likely to result in
accurate images. Some courts require that there be evidence that the equip-
ment used to record and play back the images be in good working order and
competently operated; some that the actual photograph appear untampered
with. 284 A single common law foundation has not yet emerged.
There are certain procedural formalities that must be followed in intro-
ducing exhibits regardless of what kind of exhibits they are. It is safe to say
that most courts require something approximating the following steps: (1)
mark the exhibits for identification, (2) lay the foundation through witnesses,
(3) show the exhibit to the opposing attorney, (4) make a formal offer of
the exhibit into evidence, offering to hand it up to the judge, (5) after voir
dire, if any, obtain a ruling on its admissibility, and (6) publish the exhibit
to the jury. 25 Items of real evidence usually are passed among the jurors.
With simple documents and photographs, copies can be made so that each
juror will have one.286 Large diagrams and charts may be placed on an easel
284. See United States v. Clayton, 643 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Bergner v.
State, 397 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va.
745, 187 S.E.2d 189, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1050 (1972).
285. See Hurvitz v. Coburn, 117 Ariz. 300, 572 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1977)
(attorneys may read admitted documents to jury); see, e.g., Lawson v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976) (preferred practice is to read relevant
portions to jury); Fariss v. PGP Gas Prod., 606 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980)
(offering party must see that exhibit is properly marked), rev'd on other grounds,
620 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1981). See generally J. TAN-FoD, supra note 1, at 319-20.
286. See L. Frank & Co. v. Devillier's Foodliner, 365 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct.
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where the jurors can see them. The contents of exhibits may not be disclosed
to the jurors until after the judge has ruled on their admissibility. This is
probably the most often violated rule of trial practice; it is almost certainly
harmless error to prematurely discuss or disclose the contents of an exhibit
if it is subsequently admitted into evidence.28 7
Jury views are related to exhibits and demonstrations, but do not involve
witnesses. Whether the court permits a jury view is almost exclusively a matter
for the judge's discretion. 288 Views and the procedure for conducting them
are regulated mostly by statutes. Under most procedures, the jurors, accom-
panied by the parties, are transported by the bailiff to the scene and permitted
to view it. It is improper for the bailiff, lawyers, or witnesses to point out
the significance of details or direct the jurors to any particular features. 219
It is rare for the judge to reconvene court at the scene to enable witnesses
to testify about it, and rarer still for the judge to authorize a reenactment
of the events. 210 Views are most commonly granted in suits concerning real
property.291
When witnesses are unavailable, depositions may be substituted for live
testimony. The procedure for getting the contents of a deposition disclosed
to the jury vary widely. Some courts prefer that someone play the role of
the witness and read the deponent's answers, while the attorney reads the
questions-simulating a direct examination; others forbid this theatrical
method. 292 The deposition is not supposed to be simply introduced into evi-
App. 1978) (photocopies may be substituted); Wilkins v. Cash Register Serv. Co.,
518 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (broad discretion to permit distribution of
copies to jurors).
287. E.g., Santine v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 591 P.2d 329 (Okla. Ct. App.
1978).
288. E.g., People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136, 556 P.2d 72 (1976); Tarquinio
v. Diglio, 175 Conn. 97, 394 A.2d 198 (1978); Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194
(Del. 1979); Sipple v. Fowler, 151 Ga. App. 135, 259 S.E.2d 142 (1979).
289. See, e.g., State v. Musgrove, 178 Mont. 162, 582 P.2d 1246 (1978); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-37-2-5 (Burns 1985) (in criminal cases); id. § 34-1-21-3 (in civil
cases); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 219 (Purdon 1975).
290. See Gross v. State, 267 Ind. 405, 370 N.E.2d 885 (1977); cf. Rodrigues
v. Ripley Indus., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974) (improper to conduct demonstrations
but proper to point out relevant features).
291. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.12 (West 1947) (civil real property cases
only); cf. Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981) (views of both real
and personal property allowed); Arnold v. Laird, 94 Wash. 2d 867, 621 P.2d 138
(1980) (observation of dog was evidence but not a view); see also 4 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 241, §§ 364-65.
292. Compare Century Plaza Co. v. Hibbett Sporting Goods, 382 So. 2d 7
(Ala. 1980) and Gammell v. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d 90, 153 Cal. Rptr. 169
(1979) (having someone take stand and read deponent's part is preferred method)
with State v. Schade, 584 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (practice is discouraged).
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dence and given to the jury to read, as that would unduly emphasize one
witness' testimony over others.
C. Substitutes for Evidence
Evidence can also be "introduced" without calling a witness or offering
an exhibit. The parties may satisfy portions of their burdens of proof by
resorting to stipulations, judicial notice, and presumptions.
A stipulation is an agreement between the parties to a lawsuit that certain
facts are true. Stipulations are considered binding judicial admissions, ad-
missible against the parties who entered into them, and uncontrovertable. 293
A stipulation of fact means that the fact is no longer contested and therefore
not a material issue. Evidence concerning the stipulated matter becomes ir-
relevant, and evidence contradicting it strictly inadmissible.294 The parties
generally are allowed to stipulate to factual issues, foundations, and that
certain elements of a cause of action or defense have been proved, but they
may not stipulate to purely legal matters without the consent of the court. 295
If facts are matters of common knowledge or authoritatively settled and
readily available in reference books, they need not be formally proved. The
trial court (as well as the appellate courts) may take judicial notice of them.
Courts may take notice of state and federal laws, their own court records,
facts of common knowledge, and scientific facts on which scientists are
generally agreed and which can be found in ordinary reference books. Under
the modern view, the court is usually required to take notice if the requesting
party is able to produce reliable documentation of the fact or law. At least
if the fact to be noticed is of any significance to the resolution of the dispute,
both sides have the right to be heard prior to the taking of notice. 296
Finally, a party may satisfy part of his burden of proof by resorting to
an evidentiary presumption. Much has been written about the effect of var-
ious kinds of presumptions that relieve a party of the necessity to produce
any testimonial or documentary evidence. Because a presumption permits a
party to prove its case without offering any proof, they are much more
restricted in criminal cases than in civil. In criminal cases, presumptions
cannot be used in such a way that the prosecution is relieved of its burden
of proving every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Permissive
293. See, e.g., Ireland v. Stalbaum, 162 Neb. 630, 77 N.W.2d 155 (1956);
Central Coat, Apron & Linen Serv. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 136 Conn. 234, 70 A.2d
126 (1949).
294. See Martin v. Hunter, 179 Kan. 578, 297 P.2d 153 (1956). But cf. United
States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958) (evidence consistent with the stip-
ulation still admissible).
295. E.g., Wireman v. Fairchild, 450 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
296. See generally FED. R. Evm. 201; McCoP.IUCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
4, §§ 328-30, 332-35.
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presumptions-those where the judge instructs the jury that they may but
are not required to reach a certain conclusion from circumstantial evidence-
are probably valid. The validity of such presumptions will be determined on
a case-by-case basis, looking at the judge's instructions and the circumstantial
evidence offered. If the presumed conclusion more likely than not flows from
the facts adduced, then a permissive presumption instruction may be given.
A common kind of permissive presumption is the presumption of possession
based on close proximity. Mandatory presumptions-those where the judge
instructs the jury that they must reach a certain conclusion from the evidence
unless the defendant proves otherwise-generally are unconstitutional because
they shift the burden of proof to the defendant. So-called "bursting bubble"
presumptions, which only shift the burden of going forward with evidence,
are generally allowed. Conclusive presumptions-where the defendant is not
permitted to disprove the fact presumed-are, of course, unconstitutional. 29
In civil cases, jurisdictions are free to create virtually any kind of pre-
sumption they want. Permissive and mandatory presumptions are permitted,
and the courts have held that they present no constitutional issue. 298 Never-
theless, even in civil cases, conclusive presumptions that do not permit a
party to contradict a conclusion may, in extreme circumstances, be a denial
of due process. Presumptions tend to be thought of as part of the substantive
law, and the federal practice is to follow state law presumptions. 299
V. CLOSING ARGUmENT
After all the evidence has been presented, the parties may give closing
arguments. The legal rules of closing argument fall into the same two cat-
egories: those that regulate closing argument procedures, and those that con-
trol the content of argument-what the attorneys may say. The common law
of closing argument is by far the best developed within trial law, primarily
because of a large number of appeals in criminal cases based on "prosecu-
torial misconduct."
A. Closing Argument Procedure
The procedural rules of closing argument fall into two groups. The first
concerns the right to make a closing argument and the limits that can be put
on its exercise. The second concerns the procedure for objecting and pre-
serving a claim of error for appeal.
297. See generally Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); County Court
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); McConfcK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, §§ 342, 346-348.
298. See generally Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, reh'g denied, 445 U.S.
920 (1980); McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, §§ 342-345.
299. FED. R. Eviw. 301.
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It is safe to say that every party in a civil or criminal trial has a right
to be heard in argument on the merits of the case. In criminal cases, and
probably also in civil cases, the right is constitutional.2° This includes the
right to argue the facts in evidence, to argue how the law is to be applied,
and to employ oratorical and rhetorical skills. 10' The modern view is that the
right applies in both jury and nonjury trials, and that the judge lacks the
power to dispense with arguments even in civil bench trials.2 2 For the party
with the burden of proof, the right to argue usually includes the right to
argue first and last. This is part of the broader right to open and close each
phase of the trial that follows the party with the burden of proof. 03
A party may waive its right to argue, either explicitly or implicitly. Of
course an explicit statement by a party that he does not wish to make ar-
gument is a waiver. In addition, all jurisdictions agree that the right to argue
can be impliedly waived-that waiver can be inferred from conduct.2 4 How-
ever, there is a split on whether waiver may be implied from a party's
inaction-silence or failure to affirmatively request argument. The consensus
probably is this: silence in the face of a specific request that the right either
be exercised or waived, and failure to request argument when the party has
had reasonable opportunity to do so are waivers; other forms of silence are
not.
3 05
One of the more common procedural issues is whether the party going
girst and last can partially waive argument-waive its first argument but give
its final argument. This maneuver is usually called "sandbagging" the de-
fense. It forces the defense to make its argument first, depriving the defend-
300. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (due process; criminal
cases); Turley v. Kotter, 263 Pa. Super. 523, 398 A.2d 699 (1979) (due process;
civil cases); ALA. CONST. art I, § 6 (state constitutional guarantee); cf. HAW. REv.
STAT. § 635-52 (1976) (statutory guarantee); Sodusky v. McGee, 27 Ky. (4 J.J.
Marsh.) 267 (1830) (natural law right).
301. See, e.g., Powell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 268 Ark. 1093, 598 S.W.2d
449 (1980); Thorsen v. City of Chicago, 74 I11. App. 3d 98, 392 N.E.2d 716 (1979).
302. But see Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101 (1929) (one of a
handful of older cases holding arguments discretionary in civil bench trials).
303. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Cmv. P. 51(c); see also Silver v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 116 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1940) (defendant who admits plaintiff's allegations and
proceeds on affirmative defense earns right to open and close). But see FLA. R.
CRnM. P. 3.250 (if defendant puts on no evidence he earns right to open and close);
Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.02 (defendant opens, plaintiff closes).
304. E.g., McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510, 73 P.2d 649 (1937).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 671 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1982) (silence
is waiver only if party had opportunity to assert right but failed to do so); Fuhrman
v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977) (failure to request argument not a waiver
if counsel had no opportunity to request it); Piatt v. Head, 35 Kan. 282, 10 P. 822
(1886) (silence after request is a waiver); see also Homey v. McKay, 138 Neb. 309,
293 N.W. 98 (1940) (failure to assert right to open and close argument prohibits
assertion of same issue on appeal).
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ant of the ability to respond to anything the plaintiff says. There is a split
of authority. In many jurisdictions this maneuver is seen as unfair, and is
prohibited. The party with the right to go last has the obligation to go first,
and must either make both arguments or waive argument altogether3 (u This
seems to be the modern rule. However, several older cases, at least implicitly,
permit this kind of partial waiver.3 a 7
Several procedural rules facilitate the exercise of the right to argue.
Indeed, courts are inclined to believe that closing arguments are an important
part of the adversary system of justice and encourage their exercise. Trial
judges generally are supposed to allow the parties time to prepare arguments.
Although the interpretation of what constitutes reasonable preparation time
may differ, and long recesses need not be granted, it is probably an abuse
of discretion to refuse a request for a few minutes recess before argument. 0
The second facilitating rule is the prohibition against interruption and dis-
ruption of argument. Simply stated, no one may interfere with or disrupt
argument except the judge, or the opponent, who may do so only to assert
valid grounds for objection.3 9
There also are several well-established procedural rules that inhibit and
restrict the exercise of the right to argue. For reasons having to do with
crowded calendars and court efficiency, arguments may be limited. Unless a
statute establishes the time available for arguments, the trial judge may set
"reasonable" time limits.310 Courts are supposed to take into account the
complexity of the legal and factual issues, the length of the trial and number
of witnesses, and the seriousness of the case when setting these limits.311 In
306. E.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 46(g); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2132 (1977); IowA
R. Civ. P. 195; TENN. R. CraM. P. 291; see also Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Sellers,
129 Ga. App. 811, 201 S.E.2d 485 (1973) (trial should not be a game); Reagan v.
St. Louis Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117, 79 S.W. 435 (1904) (waiver of first argument
is waiver of all).
307. See, e.g., McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 510, 73 P.2d 649
(1937); Chandler v. Miles, 38 Del. 431, 193 A. 576 (1937).
308. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cooper, 230 Pa. Super. 204, 327 A.2d 177
(1974) (implies that it would be error to refuse a request for a 15-minute recess;
not error to refuse request for several days recess).
309. See, e.g., King v. Kaplan, 94 Cal. App. 2d 697, 211 P.2d 578 (1949)
(error for judge to instruct jury to disregard arguments); State v. Hardy, 189 N.C.
799, 128 S.E. 152 (1925) (error to interrupt and criticize attorney for making his
argument); Martin v. Philadelphia Gardens, 348 Pa. 232, 35 A.2d 317 (1944) (trial
judge's excessive interference denies due process); People v. Higgins, 88 A.D.2d
921, 450 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982) (error for attorney to interrupt); Aaz. R. Civ. P.
51(d) (attorney may not interrupt except to raise questions of law); Wyo. DIST. CT.
R. 17(X) (attorney shall not walk around to divert jury's attention).
310. Compare ME. R. Civ. P. 51(a) (plaintiff allowed 50 minutes for first
argument, defense allowed one hour, then plaintiff permitted 10 minutes for re-
buttal) with Mo. R. Cam. P. 27.02(1) (court fixes time limits).
311. See Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 213 S.W.2d 7 (1948), cert. denied,
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the absence of a statute or procedural rule to the contrary, the trial judge
also has the discretion to limit the number of attorneys who may argue and
the number of arguments they may make. 312 In complex cases involving
multiple parties, all jurisdictions give the trial judge discretion to set the
number, order, and time limits on each party.3
3
Procedures for making and preserving objections are similar to the pro-
cedures for objection already discussed. In general, they are as follows. First,
the judge must permit a party the opportunity to object to a violation of
closing argument rules or to request a procedural right, and the opportunity
to preserve that objection or request for appeal. That means the judge must
be present during arguments, must not prevent a party from objecting, and
must provide for a transcript upon request. 1 4 Second, the objection or request
must be timely. That means that objections must be made as soon as the
grounds become apparent, and generally may not be made for the first time
at the close of argument.1 5 For requests to exercise a procedural right or
privilege, the request must be made in advance (obviously), but there is little
agreement how far in advance.1 6 Third, the objection or request must be
specific. A vague or general objection does not preserve any issue for appeal
340 U.S. 837 (1950); cf. State v. Kay, 12 Ohio App. 2d 38, 230 N.E.2d 652 (1967)
(trial court imposed 45-minute limit because of crowded court schedule; reversed
because judge did not consider merits of case).
312. Some states set the number of arguments by statute, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-8-70 (1982) (2 per side); PA. R. Cams. P. 1116(b) (one argument per
party). In the absence of statute, setting the number and order of arguments is
within the judge's discretion. See Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 83 Mich.
App. 373, 268 N.W.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980); Holmes v.
Black River Elec. Coop., 274 S.C. 252, 262 S.E.2d 875 (1980).
313. See, e.g., Lemons v. St. John's Hosp., 5 Kan. App. 2d 161, 613 P.2d
957 (1980).
314. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 93 Ill. App. 3d 12, 416 N.E.2d 740 (1981)
(closings should be recorded); Caplan v. Reynolds, 191 Iowa 453, 182 N.W. 641
(1921) (dictum-judge must be present); Johnson v. Zadworny, 6 Mass. App. Ct.
934, 381 N.E.2d 1119 (1978) (attorney rose to object, judge motioned him down,
case reversed-though not specifically on this point); W. VA. TRIA CT. R. VI(a)
(counsel may interrupt argument to make objection).
315. See Houston v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982);
Watts v. State, 630 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). But cf. United States v.
Pool, 660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981) (not necessary to interrupt opponent in mid-
sentence). In a minority of jurisdictions, objections saved and made at the close of
argument are still timely. Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 431 N.E.2d 880 (1982); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 500 Pa. 226, 455 A.2d 632 (1983).
316. See Horney v. McKay, 138 Neb. 309, 293 N.W. 98 (1940) (request to
open and close can be made any time before argument); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-209 (West Supp. 1986) (request for more time must be made before arguments
begin).
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nor compel the trial court to take any action.3 17 And fourth, in the case of
an objection, the party must make a specific request for a remedy. Usually
that means that a party is expected to do three things: (1) object, (2) move
for an instruction to the jury to disregard the improper argument or for
some other appropriate remedy, and (3) move for a mistrial if the error is
serious."1 The mistrial motion need not be made at the same time as the
objection, because it may be based on cumulative errors.319 The other re-
quirements for making proper objections generally-that they be argued out
of the jury's hearing and that the appeals court be provided with a tran-
script-apply to closing argument errors also.320
B. Regulating the Content of Closing Arguments:
What the Attorneys May Say
The substantive rules of closing argument that govern the propriety of
the contents of a party's argument fall into five categories. There is an
extensive body of common law concerning what kinds of arguments can be
made about the facts, what attorneys may say about the law, what kinds of
arguments can be made about damages, the extent to which attorneys may
make emotional pleas, and the extent to which they may suggest that infor-
mation other than the evidence and law be used to reach a verdict.
The courts seem to consider appeals to emotions to be the most serious
kind of improper closing argument. Almost any unwarranted attempt to
arouse the emotions, prejudices, biases, and sympathies of the jury can be
reversible error. Attorneys are permitted to display emotions during argu-
ment,32' but may not make arguments designed to arouse the jurors' emotions
and distract them from the law and facts. Thus, arguments asking for sym-
pathy for the client or crime victim or arousing feelings of anger and antip-
317. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Union Constr. Co., 439 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1969);
Jones v. State, 644 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 805.11
(West 1977).
318. See, e.g., Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891); Moldovan
v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 268 N.W.2d 656 (1978); Beck v.
Modern Am. Life Ins. Co., 589 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Barnes v. Quality
Beef Co., 425 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1981); State v. Sparks, 298 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1982).
319. See Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997 (Del. 1982); Bew v. Williams, 373 So.
2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
320. E.g., Kelly v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983) (cannot
review allegation of error without transcript); FED. R. APP. P. 10 (transcript usually
required); MINN. Civ. TiALBooc R. 31 (objections argued out of jurors' presence).
321. See Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W. 341 (1897) (plaintiff's
lawyer cried during summation, no error, may even be professional duty to shed
tears if counsel has them at his disposal).
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athy toward the other client are prohibited.31 Arguments that tend to arouse
racial, ethnic, religious, and similar prejudices are improper. 3  In civil cases,
arguments that bring up the wealth of the parties or the existence of insurance
are usually error if that is suggested as a reason for returning a verdict.32
In criminal cases, prosecutors often make arguments about the problems
of crime, the need to protect the community, the evil of criminals, the need
to avenge the victim, and other arguments tending to turn the jury into a
lynch mob. Courts have been reluctant to label these cases as error, despite
their clear tendency to whip the jury into an emotional frenzy. Such argu-
ments rarely result in reversible error unless the appeals court believes they
resulted in an innocent person being convicted. Bearing in mind that there
is a great deal of inconsistency and variation among the cases, a few gen-
eralizations can be made. Arguments that merely repeat what jurors already
322. See Missouri K. T. R. Co. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951)
(plaintiff argued that defendants had taken plaintiff off payroll when he was in-
jured, erroneous attempt to arouse anger of jurors); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Willis, 140 Ga. App. 225, 230 S.E.2d 363 (1976) (error to warn jury of defendant's
treachery and danger it posed); People v. Eckles, 83 IIl. App. 3d 292, 404 N.E.2d
358 (1980) (error to hold up picture of victim and argue her life had been snuffed
out when she was too young to die); People v. Leverette, 112 Mich. 142, 315 N.W.2d
876 (1982) (error to try to arouse sympathy for crime victim); cf. Beal v. Southern
Union Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337 (1960) (not error to refer to pitiable
condition of plaintiff in personal injury suit alleging that defendant must compen-
sate plaintiff for causing that condition). But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Becton,
58 Tex. Civ. App. 578, 124 S.W. 474 (1910) (not error for plaintiff to argue that
if Jesus Christ came to earth and took out a fire policy these companies would
charge him with arson).
323. See New York Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310 (1929) (sectional
prejudice); Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 170 Ga. 817, 154 S.E. 243
(1930) (racial prejudice); McWilliams v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 Ill. App. 83, 89
N.E.2d 266 (1949) (religious prejudice); State v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968 (La. 1981)
(racial prejudice); Suarez v. Dosky, 171 N.J. Super. 1, 407 A.2d 1237 (1979) (prej-
udice against Puerto Ricans), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 300, 412 A.2d 806 (1980); Schotis
v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305, 1 P.2d 221 (1931) (prejudices
against foreigners). But see State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 449 A.2d 1280 (1982)
(argument that there was a racial motive for killing not error when supported by
evidence).
324. See Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil Co., 186 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1950) (error to
raise insurance issue), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Klein v. Herring, 347 So.
2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (asked jury to consider defendant's resources);
Manninger v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 719, 381 N.E.2d 383
(1978) (constantly emphasized defendant's wealth); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mat-
tingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960) (arousing prejudice against large corporation);
Morris v. Huff, 238 Miss. 111, 117 So. 2d 800 (1960) (error to inject insurance);
Purpura v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 475, 147 A.2d 591 (App.
Div. 1959) (error to argue that defendant has a lot of money), cert. denied, 29 N.J.
278, 148 A.2d 894 (1959). It is permissible to argue wealth if punitive damages are
an issue. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. A.C. Allen & Sons, 122 Va. 603, 95 S.E.
406 (1918).
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know-e.g., that there is a crime problem-are not error.23 Similarly, it is
not error to warn about the danger to the community in failing to convict
the guilty, or that the jurors have a duty to convict if they believe the
defendant to be guilty. 26 But, once the prosecutor starts to suggest that the
defendant should be convicted, based not on facts but as an example to other
criminals, to be taught a lesson, to avenge an injustice done to the victim,
because the community desires it, or because this person might commit future
crimes, it is error.3 27
The other kind of nonfactual argument that the courts have trouble with
are arguments that suggest a relationship between the jurors and the com-
munity. The basic rule of propriety for these "civic duty" arguments is
similar to the rule concerning prosecutors' "safe streets" arguments. As long
as the attorney is not suggesting that a verdict be returned on any basis other
than the facts in evidence, he or she may make arguments designed to make
the jurors take their jobs seriously-arguments that the jurors consider com-
munity values, or speak for the community. 28 On the other hand, arguments
that ask the jury to substitute as the basis for decision the wishes of the
community or the financial interest of the community instead of the facts
of the particular case are improper.3 29
325. See State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d 832 (1971) (not error to
refer to prevalence of crime); State v. Bissantz,'3 Ohio App. 3d 108, 444 N.E.2d
92 (1982) (not error, in bribery case, to argue that community needed public officials
with integrity); Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442 A.2d 236 (1982) (no
error to tell jury that gang violence was a problem in city).
326. See Matthews v. State, 3 Md. App. 555, 240 A.2d 325 (1968) (no error
to tell jury they act as a protective force for the citizens of the county); Wilhelm
v. State, 272 Md. 404, 326 A.2d 707 (1974) (not error to argue there was danger
to community from violence prone people).
327. See Hines v. State, 425 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (error to
argue that jurors should use this opportunity to send a message to other criminals);
People v. Frazier, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 438 N.E.2d 623 (1982) (appeal to fear
that defendant would commit future crimes); Cosey v. State, 93 Nev. 352, 566 P.2d
83 (1977) (error to argue defendant will commit more robberies if not convicted);
Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa. Super. 312, 392 A.2d 810 (1978) (error to suggest
that guilty verdict should be returned if jurors wished to help fight growing crime
problem on subways); see also School Bd. of Palm Beach v. Taylor, 365 So. 2d
1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (error to suggest that dartage award would set an
example to prevent future indicents).
328. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) (no error to
tell jury they are conscience of community); Matthews v. State, 3 Md. App. 555,
240 A.2d 325 (1968) (no error to tell jury they act as a protective force for the
citizens of the county); Carleton v. State, 425 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1983) (no error
to ask jury to speak for community).
329. See Finney v. G.C. Murphy Co., 400 Pa. 46, 161 A.2d 385 (1960) (error
to suggest that a plaintiff's verdict will cause everyone's insurance rates to go up);
Byrns v. St. Louis Co., 295 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1980) (error to suggest that verdict
will cause taxes to go up); Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1982) (error
688 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Proper argument is supposed to be confined to facts introduced in evi-
dence, facts of common knowledge, and logical inferences based on the
evidence. If an attorney strays beyond these somewhat vague boundaries
when making arguments about the facts of the case, he may commit error.
Fact errors overall are next .most likely to result in reversible error.
It is improper to argue or allude to facts not in the record, to misstate
a witness's testimony, or to attribute to a witness testimony that was not
given. Whether these are trivial or serious errors depends on whether the
attorney merely makes a mistake of form that does not alter the evidence
(such as attributing testimony to the wrong witness), or makes a substantive
error that does alter the evidence, either by discussing "facts" not proved
or by contradicting the evidence admitted. This reference to facts not in the
record is most likely to result in reversible error if the new information is
likely to be used by the jury to resolve one of the critical issues and is not
cumulative of other admitted evidence.330 Generally, courts usually make
reasonable allowances for honest mistakes of memory, and ignore misstate-
ments of unimportant facts. 31 Obviously, it is error to refer to evidence that
was suppressed or ruled inadmissible by the court.
33 2
The more difficult issues in fact arguments revolve around the proper
interpretation of the rule allowing attorneys to draw reasonable inferences
from the facts. It is improper to insinuate the existence of unproved facts
or to invite the jury to speculate about missing evidence, when there is no
factual basis in the record for such a conclusion.333 Beyond that, however,
to ask jurors to use this opportunity to send a message to criminals); Prado v.
State, 626 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (error to tell jury to listen to desires
of community).
330. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); Hughes v. State,
437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981); Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); State v. Wren, 643 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1983); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509,
212 S.E.2d 125 (1975).
331. See, e.g., Pickett v. State, 417 So. 2d 589 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); People
v. Rhoads, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982); see also Wilson v. State,
126 Ark. 354, 190 S.W. 441 (1916) (attributing testimony to wrong witness consti-
tutes unimportant misstatement; not reversible error).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Hickman, 468 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam); Richards v. United States, 175 F. 911 (8th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 218
U.S. 670 (1910); People v. Scott, 108 Ill. App. 3d 607, 439 N.E.2d 130 (1982);
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 860 (1978); see also Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1982)
(criticizing court's ruling excluding evidence is error).
333. See, e.g., Murray v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 255 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1958) (defendant suggested that personal injury plaintiff would be able to retire at
full pension); People v. Terry, 57 Cal. 2d 538, 370 P.2d 985, 21 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1962) (en banc) (prosecutor implied that a threat originated with defendant, despite
evidence that a third person was responsible), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1963);
State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975) (prosecutor implied that the
defendant had a criminal record).
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it is proper for an attorney to make an argument that draws a conclusion
as long as the basis for that conclusion or inference is evidence in the record.
While courts say that only reasonable inferences are permitted, in fact they
allow any kind of inference, however illogical, as long as it is closely tied to
facts in evidence.3 34
One common kind of inferential argument is based on the absence of
evidence. In many situations, the law permits the attorney to draw the jurors'
attention to missing evidence, and ask them to infer that the opposing party
did not produce the evidence because it would have been damaging.3 35 In all
civil cases, it is considered legitimate argument to comment upon the fact
that a party did not testify, did not deny conduct or statements attributed
to him, or did not produce a witness related to him or under his control
who was likely to possess material information. 3 6 It also is usually proper
to draw an adverse inference from an adversary's failure to produce evidence
in his possession or uniquely under his control. 337 In criminal cases, the
defendant similarly may comment on the prosecution's failure to produce
evidence or res gestae witnesses, without regard to whether the evidence is
primarily under the control of the state. However, the courts are split on
the extent to which the state can ask the jurors to draw an adverse inference
from the defendant's failure to offer evidence. Direct comments on the
defendant's personal failure to testify are universally prohibited, 3 8 as are
indirect comments, such as referring to the state's case as "uncontradicted
and unrefuted," when the defendant is the only person who could have
provided such refuting testimony.339 Most jurisdictions also prohibit com-
334. See Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981) (attorneys may
make absurd or illogical deductions); see also State v. Sims, 639 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) (valid inference for prosecutor to argue that defendant might be a
drug user despite evidence he had no convictions for drug offenses); Clanton v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 286 S.E.2d 172 (1982) (valid inference for prosecutor
to argue that defendant would kill other inmates based on his criminal record).
335. See generally Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 Amiz. L. REv. 27 (1984).
336. See Bessemer v. Clowdus, 261 Ala. 388, 74 So. 2d 259 (1954) (per
curiam); Ray Korte Chevrolet v. Simmons, 117 Ariz. 202, 571 P.2d 699 (Ct. App.
1977); King v. Karpe, 170 Cal. App. 2d 344, 338 P.2d 979 (1959); Thompson v.
Colter, 242 Ga. 784, 251 S.E.2d 526 (1979); Borth v. Borth, 221 Kan. 494, 561
P.2d 408 (1977); see also Hinton v. Waste Techniques Corp., 243 Pa. Super. 189,
364 A.2d 724 (1976).
337. See, e.g., Dollison v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 42 Ill. App. 3d 267, 355
N.E.2d 588 (1976); Clayton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 276 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1955); Forbes v. Long, 184 N.C. 38, 113 S.E. 575 (1922); see also Stevenson
v. Abbott, 251 Iowa 110, 99 N.W.2d 429 (1959) (proper to comment on opponent's
failure to produce evidence to support allegations in pleadings).
338. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
339. See Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1982); Angel v. State, 627
S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Shattuck, 141 Vt. 523, 450 A.2d 1122
(1982); cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (dictum stating that pros-
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menting on the defendant's failure to produce evidence unless that evidence
is exclusively within the defendant's power to produce and is material to the
nature of his defense.314 Others hold that because a defendant has no obli-
gation to present evidence, it is improper for the prosecutor to comment in
any way upon his failure to produce evidence.141
The second common inferential argument that attorneys make is that,
based on the evidence, a certain amount of damages should be awarded.
Many kinds of damages are not susceptible to direct proof and are difficult
to quantify in dollars. Especially difficult to articulate are emotional injuries,
punitive damages, pain and suffering, and future business or financial losses.
Since there is likely to be little direct evidence in the record concerning the
value of such intangible harms, attempts by the attorneys to quantify how
much the jury should award are rife with possibilities for straying beyond
the reasonable-inference-from-the-facts limitation. The basic rule is that the
attorneys may suggest specific amounts as the proper measure of damages
even for intangible injuries, provided they derive those amounts from the
evidence.34 2 They may not base their requests on what their clients want, nor
on what similar lawsuits have been worth. 343
The most litigated of these issues is the so-called "per diem" argument,
in which an attorney attempts to make a concrete estimate of intangible
ecutor's repeated references to the state's case as unrefuted were not error where
witnesses other than the defendant could have testified); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) (prosecutor's comment that case unrebutted was harmless error).
340. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 698 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1983) (failure
to call alibi witness available to defense, proper subject of comment); United States
v. Mitchell, 613 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.) (failure to call wife unavailable to government
because of privilege, comment permissible), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980); State
v. Jenkins, 516 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (failure to call alibi witness
mentioned by defendant, comment permissible).
341. E.g., United States v. Lombardozzi, 335 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); State v. Purvis, 525 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
See generally People v. Smylie, 103 Ill. App. 3d 679, 431 N.E.2d 1130 (1981)
(reviewing cases on both sides).
342. See Bowers v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 182 F. Supp. 756 (D. Del.), aff'd,
281 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1960); Levin v. Ritson, 179 Conn. 223, 425 A.2d 1279 (1979);
Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Graeff v. Baptist
Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); see also Crescent
Transit v. Varnes, 399 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 1981) (improper to argue specific 15%
investment return absent some evidence to support it).
343. See, e.g., Clark v. Essex Wire Corp., 361 Pa. 60, 63 A.2d 35 (1949)
(cannot tell jury amount client wants); Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect
of Reference by Counsel in Civil Case to Amount of Verdict in Similar Cases, 15
A.L.R.3D 1144 (1967) (cannot inform jury of amount awarded by other juries).
The courts are split about evenly on the propriety of telling the jury the amount
contained in the ad damnum clause. Compare Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138
A.2d 713 (1958) (cannot tell jury amount sued for) with Meissner v. Smith, 94
Idaho 563, 494 P.2d 567 (1972) (rejecting Botta).
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damages such as pain and suffering by breaking down a long period of time
into small units-usually days-and asking the jury to assess a dollar amount
to that unit. Total damages are arrived at by multiplying, and what may
have seemed like an inconsequential amount for a day or an hour adds up
to millions of dollars when multiplied over several years. Courts are divided
over the permissibility of these mathematical formula arguments. Some pro-
hibit them altogether,3 " but most allow them under two conditions: the judge
must instruct the jury that the attorney's suggested formula is not binding,
but merely illustrative, and the dollar amount suggested must be based on,
or at least consistent with, evidence in the record.4s Attorneys also are per-
mitted to allude to facts that are matters of common knowledge, whether or
not those facts were introduced into evidence, and to ask a jury to use that
information to arrive at a verdict. Thus, for example, an attorney may wish
to remind the jury of inflation when arguing what the proper measure of
future damages should be. The argument usually is allowed, as long as the
attorney does not suggest a particular rate of inflation. 34 In criminal cases,
prosecutors like to remind the jury about the crime problem and the growing
crime rate. This argument, too, is permitted as long as the prosecutor does
not get too specific.3 47 Whether a fact is a matter of common knowledge is
left to the discretion of the trial judge.
The fourth group of rules concerning the content of closing argument
concerns argument about the law. The basic principle is simple: attorneys
can review and discuss the law, whether derived from statutes, case law, or
jury instructions, and suggest to the jury how to apply it to the facts, as
long as they do s6 accurately. Any misstatement or misapplication of the
law-by omitting part, including an unnecessary element, distorting or con-
tadicting it-is error. The most serious of these errors is an argument that
encourages the jury to disregard or circumvent the law.14 Another serious
344. E.g., Furlow v. Laclede Cab Co., 502 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974);
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438
(Utah 1979). See generally Graeff v. Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d
291 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (summarizing authorities on both sides).
345. See Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966);
Rodrigue v. Hausman, 33 Colo. -App. 305, 519 P.2d 1216 (1974); Christy v. Sali-
terman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970); DeMaris v. Whittier, 280 Or. 25,
569 P.2d 605 (1977); Felder v. Johnson, 273 S.C. 479, 257 S.E.2d 714 (1979); see
also Annotation, Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for Fixing Damages for
Pain and Suffering, 3 A.L.R.4TH 940 (1981).
346. See, e.g., Powers v. Illinois C.G. R.R., 92 Ill. App. 1033, 416 N.E.2d
1161 (1981); cf. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(specific inflation rate can be argued if based on expert testimony about wage
trends).
347. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d 832 (1971) (en
banc).
348. See State v. Thomas, 307 Minn. 229, 239 N.W.2d 455 (1976); People
1986]
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error is to discuss law that is not part of the instructions nor material to the
case, yet is likely to affect the verdict. One common example occurs in capital
cases, in which prosecutors tell the jury (accurately, of course) that if they
only impose a life sentence, the defendant could be eligible for parole in a
few years or be pardoned, and thus might be back on the streets soon, and
that a death sentence will be automatically reviewed by an appeals court
anyway. Such arguments alternately try to scare the jurors into returning a
death penalty and encourage the jurors to err on the side of execution and
let the appeals court make the hard decision. The Supreme Court has held
that a death sentence imposed in the wake of such an argument violates the
eighth amendment.149 Another common example occurs in civil damage cases,
in which a defense attorney points out to the jury that personal injury awards
are not subject to income taxes, hoping to proportionately reduce the final
award. 5 0
The final category of substantive errors is an eclectic collection of rules
prohibiting attorneys from arguing that the verdict should be based on any-
thing other than the facts applied to the law tempered by the jurors' common
experiences. In this group are rules that make it improper to ask the jurors
to base their decisions in part on the credibility and personalities of the
lawyers-by attacking the honesty or motives of one's opponent or stating
one's own personal belief in the proper outcome.3  Similarly, it is improper
v. Fields, 27 A.D.2d 736, 277 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967) (substituting religious com-
mandments); Makino v. Spokane P. & S. Ry., 155 Or. 317, 63 P.2d 1082 (1937)
(en banc); cf. Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Con-
troversy, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980) (gathering cases from the fewjurisdictions-notably Indiana and Maryland-that permit such arguments).
349. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (prosecutor informedjury that Supreme Court would review a death sentence, encouraging them to believe
that they were relieved of the burden of responsibility for determining the appro-
priateness of the death sentence); see Brothers v. State, 236 Ala. 448, 183 So. 433(1938); People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964) (en
bane); Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 243 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 903 (1978);
People v. Walker, 91 111. 2d 502, 440 N.E.2d 83 (1982); State v. Willie, 410 So.
2d 1019 (La. 1982). But cf. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (upholding
statute requiring court to instruct jury that governor can commute life sentence but
not that governor can also commute death sentence; future of this opinion is in
doubt because of contradictory holding in Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. 2633).
350. See Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.
1964); Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171, 564 P.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1977); Polster v.
Griff's of Am., 32 Colo. App. 264, 514 P.2d 80 (1973), rev'd on other grounds,
184 Colo. 418, 520 P.2d 745, aff'd on remand, 34 Colo. App. 161, 525 P.2d 1179
(1974); Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax Into Consideration in Fixing
Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action, 63 A.L.R.2D 1393 (1959). But see
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (such arguments permitted in FELA
actions), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
351. See United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1978) (error to state
personal opinion of witness's credibility); Missouri K.T. R.R. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d
692 [Vol. 51
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to ask the jury to award an extra amount for attorney's fees so the client's
award will not have to be reduced, or to comment on the large fees charged
by lawyers. 5 2 Also in this group are rules prohibiting an attorney from
bolstering his position by claiming that it is supported by "higher author-
ity"-the government, the supreme court, or God.153 The third common rule
prohibits arguments that inform the jury of the past procedural history of
the lawsuit, especially the results of a prior verdict reversed on appeal.
5 4
VI. Jury DELIBERATIONS
The final phase of the trial is the deliberation process, in which the jury
receives its instructions, deliberates, and returns a verdict. The legal frame-
work for deliberations is made up of the basic procedural structure and rules
concerning what jurors properly may consider in the jury room. It is a
common misunderstanding that this is a process largely immune from judicial
scrutiny, since jurors supposedly cannot impeach their own verdict. As will
be seen, this is not an accurate view.
363 (8th Cir. 1951) (error to impugn motives of opponent); Missouri Pac. R. R.
v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107 S.W.2d 546 (1937) (error to state personal opinion
of safety of railroad crossing); People v. Smylie, 103 Ill. App. 3d 679, 431 N.E.2d
1130 (1981) (error to accuse opposing attorney with improper tactics and fabricating
evidence); Paulsen v. Gateway Transp. Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 241, 252 N.E.2d 406
(1969) (error to attack opposing attorney); State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 181 S.E.2d
458 (1971) (error to inject personal evaluation of merits of case); Boyd v. State,
643 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (error to inject personal opinion); cf.
Swaite v. State, 274 Ark. 154, 623 S.W.2d 176 (1981) (attack on credibility of
opposing lawyer held part of "usual unnecessary banter" counsel engage in and
not error); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 431 N.E.2d 880 (1982)
(proper to comment on opponent's tactics if based on his introduction of incon-
sistent evidence).
352. See Decks, Inc. v. Nunez, 299 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974),
cert. denied, 308 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1975); Caplan v. Reynolds, 191 Iowa 453, 182
N.W. 641 (1921); Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979).
353. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980) (government
took steps to assure veracity of its witnesses), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981);
Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977) (reading excerpt from old
supreme court case implying that judges favor a particular verdict); People v. Hayes,
70 Ill. App. 3d 811, 388 N.E.2d 818 (1979) (suggesting popular congressman sup-
ported case); People v. Fields, 27 A.D.2d 736, 277 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967) (quoting
Bible, implying that religious law demands conviction).
354. See People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr.
124 (en banc) (two other juries found him guilty), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009
(1967); People v. Vanda, 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1982) (defendant's
first lawyer withdrew from the case), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 841 (1983); Washington
v. Lake City Beverage, 352 So. 2d 717 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (referring to failed
settlement negotiations), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1050 (La. 1978).
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A. Jury Deliberation Procedure
The procedural issues concerning jury deliberations fall into four cate-
gories: how do juries receive their instructions, how are they supposed to
deliberate, what happens if they want something-an instruction or some
evidence-repeated, and how can a party object and make a record of jury
misconduct for appeal?
Jurisdictions differ on how and when juries are to be instructed on the
law. All agree that this is primarily, if not solely, the province of the trial
judge, who bears the responsibility for preparing instructions and giving them
to the jury.35 Somewhat inconsistently, there also is agreement that it is a
prerequisite to appeal that a party must have requested specific instructions.35 6
The combined effect of these two rules is that a party will have to submit
detailed requests for instructions in order to preserve its right to appeal, but
the judge has broad power to select which instructions to give and which to
reject.
When the instructions are given to the jury, they are read out loud by
the judge. The common law majority for some bizarre reason prohibits the
judge from giving the jurors a written copy of the instructions,35 7 but this
prohibition is beginning to break down. As various studies show that jury
instructions are difficult to understand, particularly when the jurors have
only a single opportunity to hear them,35 several jurisdictions are beginning
to permit (but not require) the trial judge to send a written copy of the
instructions to the jury room.35 9 The majority practice is for the judge to
instruct the jury after closing arguments,316 which gives him or her the chance
to correct any misstatements about the law made by the attorneys, but in
355. See United States v. McCall, 592 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 936 (1979); People v. Pic'l, 114 Cal. App. 3d 824, 171 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1981), rev'd on other grounds, 183 Cal. Rptr. 685, 646 P.2d 847 (1982) (en banc);
cf. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Fender, 144 Ga. App. 6, 240 S.E.2d 555
(1977) (bailiff told jurors how to fill out verdict form, harmless error where it did
not affect verdict).
356. E.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 548 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977).
357. E.g., United States v. Hooper, 575 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
578 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978); Wofford v. State, 271
Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100 (1979).
358. See, e.g., Sales, Elwork & Alfini, Improving Comprehension for Jury
Instructions, in I PERSPECTIVES IN LAw & PSYCHOLOGY (B. Sales ed. 1977).
359. Compare United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d
1101 (7th Cir. 1979) (no error for trial judge to send written set of instructions to
jury room), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) with United States v. Quilty, 541
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1976) (no error for trial judge to refuse to send set of instructions
to jury); see also State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1978) (discretionary). But
cf. Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 897, 606 S.W.2d 746 (1980) (mandatory, judge must
send instructions to jury room).
360. E.g., People v. Wilson, 43 Ill. App. 3d 583, 357 N.E.2d 81 (1976).
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several states the judge instructs the jury before arguments. 61 In most states,
the parties are given an opportunity to request (in writing) particular instruc-
tions and to object to instructions out of the hearing of the jury. A request
or objection will be, of course, a procedural prerequisite to an appeal.
The precise deliberation procedures are left largely to the discretion of
the trial judge. The only universal principles are privacy and sobriety. The
jury must be allowed to deliberate in private, without any of the parties,
lawyers, witnesses, court personnel, law enforcement officers, or even alter-
nate jurors present. The presence of anyone other than the officer-in-charge
on legitimate business, or the delivery of any unauthorized communication
is error, however innocent or well-intentioned.3 62 In addition, the jurors must
deliberate soberly, and almost any alcohol use by a juror will require a
mistrial. 63
Beyond that, however, the court has discretion to decide such issues as
whether to sequester the jury during trial, whether to allow them to separate
once they start deliberating, or how late into the night to keep them delib-
erating. 64 In some jurisdictions, it is even within the judge's discretion to
refuse the jury food and refreshment. 365 This is a vestige of the old English
common law practice of keeping the jury together without food and water
until they reached a verdict. This discretion is limited by a few rules in some
jurisdictions concerning whether the jury can be allowed to separate. At
common law, the jury could not separate once sworn, and had to be kept
361. E.g., IDAno R. Crv. P. 51(b); TEx. R. Crv. P. 269(a).
362. Compare Vander Veer v. Toyota Motor Dist., 282 Or. 135, 577 P.2d
1343 (1978) (en banc) and Bullock v. State, 150 Ga. App. 824, 258 S.E.2d 915
(1979) (error to allow alternate jurors to participate in deliberations) with Minton
v. State, 269 Ind. 39, 378 N.E.2d 639 (1978) (alternate juror may be present as
long as he does not participate). See also United States v. Fredericks, 599 F.2d 262
(10th Cir. 1979) (error for marshall to enter jury room to display an exhibit); Szopko
v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co., 96 Mich. App. 64, 292 N.W.2d 486 (1980) (no
off-the-record conversations between jurors and judge permitted).
363. See Goldring v. Escapa, 338 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Schultz v. Valle, 464 N.E.2d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Crocker, 239 N.C.
446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954); cf. United States v. Taliaferro, 558 F.2d 724 (4th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (not per se reversible), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978); Hat-
field v. State, 243 Ind. 279, 183 N.E.2d 198 (1962) (use by juror of prescribed
tranquilizers insufficient to warrant new trial).
364. See United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148 (6th Cir.) (discretion), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1978); Jamison v. Howard, 275 S.C. 344, 271 S.E.2d 116
(1980) (judge has discretion whether to sequester, even in cases of extensive media
coverage). Compare Bolton Road Medical Center v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 151
Ga. App. 21, 258 S.E.2d 682 (1979) (discretion to allow deliberations to continue
into early morning hours) and State v. Garrett, 595 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (not error to send jury out at 11:10 p.m. and let them deliberate until 1:47
a.m.) with Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 581 P.2d 339 (1978) (judge should
not have sent jury out to begin deliberations at 9:00 p.m., but not error).
365. See, e.g., Gandy v. State, 373 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1979).
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sequestered from the possibility of outside influence.3 6 Vestiges of these two
principles remain. In some states, the jury still must automatically be se-
questered in capital cases; 67 in some, the jury may not be allowed to separate
once deliberations have begun. 68
With only a few exceptions, there are no rules governing how the jurors
deliberate among themselves. One of those few exceptions is that jurors are
not supposed to decide a verdict by lot, by chance, or by quotient. Verdicts
by lot are those derived at by drawing a possible verdict out of a hat or
flipping a coin. Quotient verdicts occur when a jury decides in advance that
each juror will write down how much damages he thinks appropriate and
agrees in advance that they will be bound by the amount derived by adding
them up and dividing by twelve. 6 9 The other common exception is that jurors
are not supposed to resolve an inability to determine liability by awarding
only a percentage of the damages proved or convicting for a lesser-included
offense. This is called a "compromise verdict," and is generally disallowed,
although difficult to prove.370
If the jury wants testimony or an instruction reread, they must ask the
judge, who has the discretion to permit or refuse it.37 1 As a general rule,
both parties have the right to be present and to be heard when the judge
makes the decision, and certainly have the right to be present when the
366. See, e.g., Davidson v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1977) (fel-
onies).
367. See Burnett v. State, 355 So. 2d 1139 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Tribe v.
District Court, 197 Colo. 433, 593 P.2d 1369 (1979) (en banc); Willis v. State, 243
Ga. 185, 253 S.E.2d 70, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 975
(1979).
368. See Bales v. State, 275 Ind. 515, 418 N.E.2d 215 (1981); State v. Willis,
371 So. 2d 1327 (La. 1979) (per curiam).
369. See Scheptmann v. Thorn, 272 Ark. 70, 612 S.W.2d 291 (1981); Frue-
hauf Trailers Div. v. Thornton, 174 Ind. App. 123, 366 N.E.2d 21 (1977); see also
Storie v. State, 390 So. 2d 1179 (Ala. Crim. App.) (in state where jury sets sentence,
error for jurors to agree in advance to add up their individual recommendations
and divide by twelve), cert. denied, 390 So. 2d 1184 (Ala. 1980). It is the advance
agreement that is disallowed; jurors may decide after the fact that a compromise
verdict, arrived at by averaging, is reasonable. See Collins v. State, 365 So. 2d 113
(Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1978); Bunker v. City of
Glendale, 111 Cal. App. 3d 325, 168 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1980); Moose v. Rich, 253
N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1977).
370. See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977); Sommer v.
City of Taylorville, 59 Ill. App. 3d 765, 375 N.E.2d 1031 (1978); McCawley v.
State, 274 Ind. 137, 409 N.E.2d 594 (1980); Storey v. Madsen, 276 Or. 181, 554
P.2d 500 (1976).
371. See United States v. Pimental, 645 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1981); United States
v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Humana,
Inc. v. Fairchild, 603 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); see also Parker v. Tuttle,
260 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1977) (dictum: error for bailiff to reread testimony without
judge's permission).
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testimony or instruction is read to them. This whole process is supposed to
take place on the record in open court, not informally in the jury room.372
When the request is to have testimony reread, the court is supposed to
question the jurors about exactly what they wish reread, and try to keep the
scope as narrow as possible. Unreasonably lengthy requests need not be
granted.3 73 However, in most jurisdictions, it is error for the judge to refuse
a reasonable request to have testimony reread, at least when it stems from
a disagreement among the jurors as to exactly what the evidence was. 374 When
the request is to have an instruction reread, however, the tendency is the
opposite. In general, an individual instruction should not be reread, for fear
of giving undue weight to it. The preference is that, if the judge permits
instructions to be reread, he should read all related instructions.3 75
A related issue concerns the propriety of additional instructions. May
the judge, because the jury requests it or because he or she feels it is necessary,
give the jury a new instruction after they have begun deliberations? As a
general rule, the judge has discretion to give or refuse new instructions,
whether requested by the jury or not,376 although in a few jurisdictions, the
judge is prohibited from giving any new instructions.3 77 Somewhat more
controversial is the giving of a so-called "dynamite" or "hammer" charge,
designed to try to break a deadlocked jury by telling them that the case will
have to be tried again if they are unable to arrive at a verdict, and suggesting
that any juror in a small minority reconsider his position. While such in-
structions have been criticized as tending to cause majority verdicts, most
372. See Dixon v. State, 605 P.2d 882, 884-89 & 884 n.6 (Alaska 1980); Boling
v. State, 589 P.2d 1089 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
373. See State v. Scott, 277 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1979) (per curiam); Hill v.
Robinson, 592 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
374. See People v. Litteral, 79 Cal. App. 3d 790, 145 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1978)
(refusal of reasonable request to allow testimony to be read back was error); Bloch
v. City of New York, 68 A.D.2d 932, 414 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1979) (judge must reread
if jurors disagree about what was said).
375. See Cole v. State, 353 So. 2d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cayer v.
Lane, 390 A.2d 467 (Me. 1978) (dicta); see also People v. Gonzales, 77 A.D.2d
654, 430 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980) (dicta), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 1001, 439 N.E.2d 351, 453
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1982); Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
376. See United States v. Collum, 614 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 923 (1980); Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline Ry., 341 So. 2d 671 (Ala. 1976);
Matthews v. Taylor, 155 Ga. App. 2, 270 S.E.2d 247 (1980) (mandatory for court
to clarify confusing jury instructions); see also Thompson v. Walker, 565 S.W.2d
172 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (judge may decline to instruct further if he feels original
instructions were sufficiently clear).
377. E.g., Hoover v. Gray, 616 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); cf. Stevens
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978) (judge may not give instruction
that coerces minority jurors).
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jurisdictions approve them.3 78 If further instructions are given, the parties
have a right to be present.3 79
The procedure for objecting and preserving error, which has been fairly
straightforward up to this point in the trial, now becomes complicated. Sup-
pose there is jury misconduct in deliberations-how does a party object and
preserve the issue for appeal? Since jury deliberations occur in private, much
misconduct goes undetected. Some comes to light only after the trial when
attorneys talk to the jurors, and it is difficult to do anything because of the
rule that a juror may not impeach his own verdict through testimony or
affidavit. 80 However, some misconduct may come to light during the trial.
If it does, it must be objected to, and a record made by calling witnesses,
including the jurors themselves. As long as the witnesses are being questioned
about what persons other than jurors did (outside influence), or about phys-
ical objects seen in the jury room, or about what jurors did outside the
deliberation process (such as visiting the scene or looking something up in
an encyclopedia), there is no problem with the rule that jurors are incom-
petent to impeach their own verdict. 8' A few states have misinterpreted the
rule, and forbid jurors from ever testifying about any kind of misconduct 8 2
and a few others have expressly changed their common law to permit broad
378. See United States v. Irwin, 593 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1979); O'Brien v.
Neiditz, 33 Conn. Supp. 778, 372 A.2d 525 (1976); Thompson v. Lee, 402 N.E.2d
1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Jones, 558 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978). But see United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 1069
(7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (error to give deadlock instruction if it was not included
in original instructions).
379. See Cendak Agri-Service v. Hausman, 275 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 1979);
Gilbert v. Caffee, 293 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1980); cf. McNeely v. M. & M. Super-
markets, 154 Ga. App. 675, 269 S.E.2d 483 (1980) (right is waivable; party can
consent to judge giving necessary re-instruction without being present); State v.
Safford, 24 Wash. App. 783, 604 P.2d 980 (1979) (parties need not be present if
judge refuses to reinstruct jury), review denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1026 (1980).
380. This rule means nothing more than that the mental processes of the
jurors engaged in deliberations may not be probed; a juror cannot testify about
how the jury reached a decision. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Haney, 27 Ariz. App.
692, 558 P.2d 720 (1976); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Florentine Marble & Tile
Corp., 549 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
381. See United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980); Omaha Bank
foi Coops. v. Siouxland Cattle Coop., 305 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1981); Verren v. City
of Pittsburg, 227 Kan. 259, 607 P.2d 36 (1980); Hebb v. State, 44 Md. App. 678,
410 A.2d 622 (1980); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1132 (1981).
382. E.g., LeBlanc v. K-Mart Apparel Fashions Corp., 399 So. 2d 753 (La.
Ct. App. 1981); Lachney v. Jones, 373 So. 2d 595 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
376 So. 2d 959 (La. 1979); Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors v. Gunter, 291
N.C. 208, 230 S.E.2d 380 (1976) (dicta); cf. Holden v. Coussens, 576 P.2d 758,
761 (Okla. 1978) (no juror testimony unless "actionable or criminal overtones pres-
ent").
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inquiry into juror misconduct. 83 Finally, a specific remedy must be re-
quested-a mistrial or an instruction that the jurors disregard an improper
influence. Generally, the judge is required to question the jurors about whether
they have been influenced, and to grant a mistrial if they admit their delib-
erations have been affected.: 4
B. The Basis for Decision: What May the Jurors Consider?
The more interesting rules of deliberations concern what kinds of in-
formation the jurors properly may consider during their deliberations. Ob-
viously, they may consider the testimony and the instructions, and discuss
the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. But to what extent, if any, can
they consider other information-exhibits, their personal experiences, or evi-
dence they gather themselves-or use deliberations aids, such as calculators
or notes taken of testimony?
Surprisingly, jurors are not entitled to take with them to the jury room
everything used in the trial. Obviously, they cannot take the witnesses in
with them; similarly they may not take with them depositions used in lieu
of live testimony even if those depositions were introduced as exhibits. 85
Some jurisdictions carry this prohibition one step further and exclude illus-
trative exhibits because they, too, are merely part of witness testimony.38 6
Also obviously, the jurors cannot take with them exhibits referred to but not
actually introduced, or the complete document when only a portion of it
was properly in evidence.3 8 7 However, even for exhibits properly in evidence,
the majority rule gives the judge discretion whether to send them to the jury
383. E.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1977); Quinn v. Winkel's, Inc. 279 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1979).
384. See United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 818, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977); see also Bell v. Brewton,
139 Ga. App. 463, 228 S.E.2d 600 (1976) (communications between jurors and
insurance agent not reversible error unless prejudice resulted); Kalianov v. Darland,
252 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1977) (question is not whether misconduct was intentional
or accidental, but whether party was prejudiced).
385. See National States Ins. Co. v. Jones, 396 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. 1980);
Thompson v. Walker, 565 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Luna, 264
N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1978).
386. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1980) (illustrative
exhibits usually should not be sent to the jury room), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844
(1981).
387. See Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976)
(harmless error to take lengthy report containing irrelevant information); People
v. Carr, 53 Ill. App. 3d 492, 368 N.E.2d 128 (1977) (dicta: error); Stanton v. City
of New York, 74 A.D.2d 623, 425 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1980) (error to take document not
in evidence). But cf. Smith v. State, 344 So. 2d 1239 (Ala. Crim. App.) (permissible
to send blackboard with diagrams drawn by witness but never formally introduced
into evidence), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 1243 (Ala. 1977).
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room. 88 In at least one jurisdiction, it is error to send exhibits to the jury
room without consent of the parties.38 9 Sending other kinds of documents
involved in the trial, such as pleadings or copies of the instructions, generally
is not permitted, but also generally is harmless error if sent.319
Perhaps more surprising than the discovery that jurors are not routinely
allowed to take all exhibits with them is the discovery that they are not
permitted to use their own personal experiences as a basis for decision. Jurors
are encouraged to use common experience, but are prohibited from becoming
a kind of "expert witness" and telling other jurors about their own unique
experiences, making the assumption that it was similar to what happened in
the case being tried.3 9' For example, a juror may not properly discuss how
severe his own back pain was in evaluating how severe the plaintiff's pain
is; nor bring expertise from his or her employment into the deliberations.
This injects information into the case that is not part of the evidence, and
is usually considered error. 92 It also is undoubtedly one of the most fre-
quently violated rules of trial procedure, and one of the most difficult vio-
lations to detect.
Similarly, jurors may not become detectives and gather new information
not offered into evidence. If a juror violates this rule on his own, it is usually
harmless error, but if he becomes a witness and shares this information with
the other jurors, and it becomes part of the basis for decision, it is likely to
be reversible.3 93 Under this rule, it has been held to be error for a juror to
look up information in the library,3 94 consult experts, 95 conduct investigations
or question witnesses,39 6 or to visit the scene of the incident.97
388. See Meadows v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 392 So. 2d 825 (Ala. 1981); New-
som v. Markus, 588 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Dyba v. State, 549 S.W.2d
178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 302 N.W.2d
421 (1981).
389. See, e.g., Collins v. Ogburn Realty Co., 49 N.C. App. 316, 271 S.E.2d
512 (1980).
390. See United States v. Milestone, 626 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.) (not reversible
error to allow redacted indictment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980); cf. Atlanta
Transit Sys. v. Smith, 141 Ga. App. 87, 232 S.E.2d 580 (1977) (judge has discretion
to send pleadings to jury room).
391. See generally State v. Rogers, 420 A.2d 1363 (R.I. 1980).
392. See Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1980)
(back pain; insurance rates); Naranjo v. Cull, 569 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978)
(former nurse telling about effects of drugs); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo.
1979) (in general).
393. Compare Heaver v. Ward, 68 Ill. App. 3d 236, 386 N.E.2d 134 (1979)
(juror visited scene, brought back diagram and shared it with other jurors; reversed)
with Harper v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., 140 Ga. App. 802, 232 S.E.2d 118 (1976)
(juror visited scene, did not tell other jurors; no reversal). See generally State v.
Baker, 224 Kan. 474, 580 P.2d 1345 (1978).
394. See State v. Amorin, 58 Haw. 623, 574 P.2d 845 (1978) (looked up
definition of insanity); Dutton v. Southern Pac. Transp., 561 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.
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New information brought to the jurors' attention by an outside agency
also creates potentially reversible error. If parties, witnesses, or court per-
sonnel provide new information to the jury, it is considered a serious error.39
Whether a mistrial will have to be declared, however, will depend on the
nature of the information provided, and there is little agreement among
courts on where to draw the line. 39 One common situation is when a news-
paper article or television story might have been read by some of the jurors.
For it to warrant a mistrial, the story must not only have contained wrong
information or new evidence not heard at trial, but also there must be evi-
dence that some jurors saw or heard it and were affected by it4O°-the latter
being very difficult to prove. However, "new" evidence derived by the jurors
from the testimony is not error. The jurors may make inferences and create
new evidence themselves in the jury room-for example, a juror may draw
a diagram based on witness testimony.401 Jurors' notes of the testimony
similarly are not considered prohibited new information. 402
A more difficult question is whether jurors may use exhibits or other
physical objects properly introduced to conduct experiments or otherwise
help them resolve an issue. At one extreme, where the jurors use some kind
of device to help them perform a purely mechanical task, such as using a
calculator to add up damages, or a projector to enlarge slides, it is not
error.4°3 The court even has discretion to provide them with such aids, al-
Ct. App.) (definition of proximate cause), rev'd on other grounds, 576 S.W.2d 782
(Tex. 1978); Arthur v. Washington Iron Works, 22 Wash. App. 61, 587 P.2d 626
(1978) (whether books were available), review denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1007 (1979).
395. See, e.g., People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal. 3d 150, 570 P.2d 1050, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 698 (1977) (en banc) (consulted criminal lawyer).
396. See, e.g., People v. Bullwinkle, 105 Cal. App. 3d 82, 164 Cal. Rptr.
163, app. dismissed, 449 U.S. 988 (1980); People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 399
N.E.2d 51, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1979) .
397. See Heaver v. Ward, 68 Ill. App. 3d 236, 386 N.E.2d 134 (1979).
398. See United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1978); Bell v.
Brewton, 139 Ga. App. 463, 228 S.E.2d 600 (1976); Department of Transp. v.
Drobnick, 54 Ill. App. 3d 987, 370 N.E.2d 242 (1977). See generally State v. Fenton,
228 Kan. 658, 620 P.2d 813 (1980).
399. E.g., Rhodes v. State, 364 So. 2d 1177 (Ala. 1978) (heard that defendant
tried to escape, no mistrial).
400. See Booton v. Hanauer, 541 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1976); State v. Johnson,
122 Ariz. 260, 594 P.2d 514 (1979) (en banc); Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590
S.W.2d 15 (1979); Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 255 S.E.2d 5 (1979).
401. E.g., Wagner v. Doulton, 112 Cal. App. 3d 945, 169 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1980); see also Harris v. Deere & Co., 263 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1978) (verdict cannot
be impeached based on what jurors do inside jury room).
402. E.g., United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1980).
403. See South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D.
1980) (stopwatch); Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Goldstein, 567 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1978) (calculators permitted).
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though it is not required to.404 At the other extreme, where jurors perform
experiments on exhibits in order to test a witness's version of the events,
thereby creating new evidence that may not be reliable, reversal is usually
required.4 5 Between those extremes is a gray area in which the courts have
to decide if a party's rights were prejudiced. While jurors are encouraged to
closely examine the evidence (including the exhibits), they are prohibited from
creating new evidence on their own and using it as a basis for decision.4
VIII. TiAL LAw ON APPEAL: PROCEDURAL DEFAULT, CURED ERROR, AND
INvrr.ED ERRxoR
On appeal, most judgments are affirmed. In cases in which appellants
assert violations of trial law as bases for their appeals, over seventy percent
are found to contain errors, yet less than twenty-five percent are reversed.
The familiar harmless error rule accounts only for about one-third of the
cases affirmed despite the finding of a trial court error; only another five or
six percent can be dismissed as bad decisions. That leaves over half of the
cases in which the appellate courts find that a trial law error was conunitted
but refuse to reverse unaccounted for. These are cases affirmed under three
doctrines: procedural default, cured error, and invited error.
A. Procedural Default
If a party fails to properly object and preserve a claim of error for
appeal, the appellate court supposedly will not consider the issue unless the
error is particularly egregious. This is the doctrine of procedural default. The
appellant often is said to have "waived" his right to appeal, but that is a
misnomer; rarely will the party intentionally have abandoned a known right
to appeal. Instead, procedural default occurs through ignorance, mistake, or
neglect on the part of the appellant's attorney. The doctrine has taken on
added importance since the Supreme Court announced that failure to adhere
to procedural technicalities can result in the inability to appeal even for
violations of constitutional law.41 The basic requirements for preserving a
claim of a violation of the trial practice rules are a prompt and specific
404. Compare Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co. v. Milwaukee County,
82 Wis. 2d 420, 263 N.W.2d 503 (1978) (overhead projector denied, no error) with
State v. Miller, 248 N.W.2d 56 (S.D. 1976) (slide projector supplied, no error).
405. But see United States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (experimenting with binoculars was permissible examination of the evi-
dence), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910 (1979).
406. For example, the jury in the movie "Twelve Angry Men" committed
serious misconduct.
407. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977); County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
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objection or motion, a request for an appropriate remedy from the trial
judge, an adverse ruling, and an offer of proof if appropriate; all of which
are recorded in an official transcript.
The timeliness requirement means that one must object as soon as the
grounds become apparent. In direct examination, that usually means the
objection must be made to the attorney's question on the grounds that it
calls for inadmissible evidence, rather than waiting until after the answer. 40
During other phases of the trial, failure to object to an error of any kind
immediately, as soon as it is committed, will likely be considered a procedural
default and waive a claim of error.40 Many attorneys believe it to be common
courtesy not to interrupt in the middle of their opponent's opening statement
or closing argument, and to wait until the end to assert objections. This
courtesy usually results in procedural default; objections to misconduct by
the attorney must be made as soon as the grounds become apparent, not
saved until the attorney is finished speaking. 410 Requests to exercise proce-
dural rights and privileges must be made in advance to be timely, but there
is little agreement how far in advance. 41' If an attorney can anticipate that
a particular trial law error is likely to occur-usually that his opponent will
'try to introduce inadmissible evidence or refer to that inadmissible evidence
during opening statement before he has a chance to object-the attorney
may be able to successfully move in limine for an order that the matter not
be discussed. 4 2 To preserve a claim of error if the ruling is violated, the
attorney must make a separate timely objection; the motion in limine does
not by itself preserve any claim of error for appeal.
The specificity requirement means that the objecting attorney must state
the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity that the judge can
understand which trial practice rule is being violated. A general objection
that does not explain the grounds is insufficient to preserve any claim of
408. See, e.g., United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977); Wilkinson v. Duncan, 294 Ala. 509, 319
So. 2d 253 (1975); Cartier v. State, 420 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980); In re Luntsford, 24
Wash. App. 888, 604 P.2d 195 (1979).
409. E.g., Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 430, 119 N.E. 716 (1918); State v.
Diedtman, 58 Mont. 13, 190 P. 117 (1920).
410. See Houston v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982);
Watts v. State, 630 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); cf. United States v. Pool,
660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981) (not necessary to interrupt attorney in mid-sentence during
closing argument).
411. See Horney v. McKay, 138 Neb. 309, 293 N.W. 98 (1940) (request to
open and close argument must be made before, or at, close of evidence); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-209 (Supp. 1983) (request for additional time to argue must be
made before argument begins).
412. See generally Epstein, Motions in Limine-A Primer, 8 LmIGATION 34
(1982); J. TANFoRD, supra note 1, at 313.
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error for appeal.4 11 If the judge makes an incorrect ruling by denying a
challenge for cause, it will support an appeal only if the grounds were spe-
cifically stated. 4 4 An objection to evidence or attorney conduct, or a request
to exercise a procedural right, similarly must be specific. A vague or general
objection does not preserve any issue for appeal nor compel the trial court
to take any action.415
If an objection is made to something the jury already has heard-
evidence or part of an attorney's argument-it must be accompanied by a
motion to strike and a request for an instruction that the jury disregard
it.416 Usually that means that a party is expected to do three things: object,
move for an instruction to the jury to disregard the improper argument or
evidence, and move for a mistrial if the error is serious. 417 The mistrial
motion need not be made at the same time as the objection, because it may
be based on cumulative errors. 4 8 In voir dire, a party can only appeal from
a judge's refusal to allow a question if he made a motion or other formal
request that it be asked.419
Because one can only appeal from an adverse ruling by the judge, a
party has a right to a ruling on an objection,420 although the judge properly
may reserve ruling until later.4 21 Failure to insist on or try to obtain a ruling
usually is also considered procedural default. 422
If the judge sustains an objection and wrongly prevents a party from
offering its evidence, that claim of error is preserved only if the party makes
413. Short v. Riles, 144 Ga. App. 463, 241 S.E.2d 580 (1978); Brown v.
State, 417 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 1981); Wirtanen v. Provin, 293 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
1980); see also FED. R. EviD. 103(a)(1).
414. Tatum v. United States, 330 A.2d 522 (D.C. 1974); Dukes v. State, 578
S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
415. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Union Constr. Co., 439 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1969);
Jones v. State, 644 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 805.11
(West 1977).
416. See, e.g., Laguna v. Prouty, 300 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1981); Haines v.
State, 170 Neb. 304, 102 N.W.2d 609 (1960); Isom v. River Island Sand & Gravel,
273 Or. 862, 543 P.2d 1047 (1975) (en banc). This is not entirely a semantic exercise
of saying the right words. See James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984) (defendant
moved for "admonition" instead of "instruction," Kentucky court found proce-
dural default; Supreme Court reversed).
417. See, e.g., Derby v. Jenkins, 32 Md. App. 386, 363 A.2d 967 (1976);
Barnes v. Quality Beef Co., 425 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1981); State v. Sparks, 298 S.E.2d
857 (W. Va. 1982).
418. See Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997 (Del. 1982); Bew v. Williams, 373 So.
2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
419. E.g., Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 430, 119 N.E. 716 (1918).
420. E.g., State v. Staley, 292 N.C. 160, 232 S.E.2d 680 (1977).
421. See McElwain v. Schuckert, 13 Ariz. App. 468, 477 P.2d 754 (1970);
Comber v. Inhabitants of Plantation, 398 A.2d 376 (Me. 1979).
422. E.g., Bahnsen v. Rabe, 276 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1979).
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an offer of proof-includes in the record (but out of the hearing of the
jury) a specific statement of the evidence that he or she intended to intro-
duce. 423 Similarly, if one is prevented from making an argument or follow-
ing a line of questions on voir dire, one must make sure the record includes
an explicit statement of what the attorney intended to do.
Finally, the alleged error, the objection, the request for a remedy, the
ruling, and the offer of proof must appear in an official transcript, and
that transcipt supplied to the appellate court.42 4 Many claims of error are
defaulted away because voir dire, opening statements, and arguments are
seldom transcribed. The first rule of preserving error, then, is to move that
a court reporter be present to record the entire trial, not just the witness
testimony. At least objections and rulings must be made with a court re-
porter present. In many jurisdictions, the judge must provide for a court
reporter upon request, but usually is not required to do so on his own.4 25
Misconduct that occurs after the jury has started deliberations must also
be placed in the record, usually by calling witnesses, including the jurors
themselves. As long as the witnesses are questioned about what persons
other than jurors did (outside influence), or about physical objects seen in
the jury room, or about what jurors did outside the deliberation process
(such as visiting the scene or looking something up in an encyclopedia),
the rule that jurors may not impeach their own verdict is not usually im-
plicated. 426
There are a few common secondary rules of procedure that also must
be complied with to preserve a claim of error. Failure to comply with these
relatively inconsequential ones is supposed to result in a procedural default,
although they are not as often strictly enforced by the appeals courts.
Objections to erroneously admitted evidence must be made every time the
same or similar evidence is offered, 427 either by a series of objections or by
423. See Watts v. Six Flags Over Georgia, 140 Ga. App. 106, 230 S.E.2d 34
(1976); State v. Hall, 183 Mont. 511, 600 P.2d 1180 (1979); Palazzolo v. Rahill,
121 R.I. 31, 394 A.2d 690 (1978); State v. Ahearn, 137 Vt. 253, 403 A.2d 696
(1979). But see Sherman County Bank v. Kallhoff, 205 Neb. 392, 288 N.W.2d 24
(1980) (no offer of proof necessary if "substantial right" affected and context of
excluded evidence apparent to judge).
424. E.g., FED. R. Api. P. 10.
425. See Sherman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 691, 237 S.E.2d 5 (1977); State v.
Farris, 420 A.2d 928 (Me. 1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brewer, 505
A.2d 774 (Me. 1985); cf. State v. Seitzinger, 180 Mont. 136, 589 P.2d 655 (Mont.
1979) (implying that court should order trial recorded sua sponte).
426. E.g., Omaha Bank v. Siouxland Cattle Coop., 305 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa
1981); Verren v. City of Pittsburg, 227 Kan. 259, 607 P.2d 36 (1980).
427. E.g., Jones v. State, 425 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1981); Dunes Club v. Cher-
okee Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 294, 130 S.E.2d 625 (1963); Winkel v. Hankins, 585 S.W.2d
889 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
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lodging a continuing objection. 428 Similarly, if a party makes a similar
argument or introduces similar evidence himself, going beyond what is
necessary to rebut an improper argument of evidence, he "waives" a claim
of error for his opponent's conduct. 42 9 In most jurisdictions, in order to
preserve a claim of error for the wrongful denial of a challenge for cause
during voir dire, a party must exhaust his peremptory challenges. If a party
still has a peremptory left, he could use it on the juror in question, and
failure to do so is a waiver of the claim that the juror should have been
excused for cause. 430
B. Cured Error
Appellate courts have developed another rule that reduces the number
of reversible error cases: cured error. This doctrine says simply that ap-
propriate remedial action by the trial judge or one of the attorneys may
reduce the negative effect of a trial law error, thereby eliminating the need
for a new trial. Appropriate remedial action may include the attorney with-
drawing or apologizing for a remark or question that violates the rules of
trial practice, or the trial judge admonishing the jury to disregard what
they have seen or heard.
Attorney self-help remedial actions include withdrawing an improper
remark or question, apologizing for a rule violation, and correcting a mis-
statement or rephrasing an improper question. Such actions are more than
just courtesies or good tactical ways to avoid being reprimanded by the
judge. They are court-approved procedures for correcting rule violations
that effectively cure at least the more trivial kinds of trial law errors. For
example, attorney self-help is an appropriate response to minor errors such
as making obviously inadvertent misstatements of fact 43' or commenting on
the credibility of the attorneys in argument. 432
The trial judge may respond with more or less severity as the situation
demands. The usual curative response is for the judge to instruct the jury
428. See, e.g., Oliver v. Perry, 293 Ala. 424, 304 So. 2d 583 (1974); People
v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1969); see also N.C. R.
Civ. P. 46(a)(1).
429. See Lockhart v. Robbins, 386 So. 2d 424 (Ala. 1980); Fullerton v. Rob-
son, 61 111. App. 3d 93, 377 N.E.2d 1044 (1978); State v. Weeks, 345 So. 2d 26
(La. 1977); State v. Ashley, 616 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
430. See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 1981).
431. See State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La. 1981) (the defendant pleaded
guilty-I mean, not guilty).
432. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(the government believes in the justice of this cause); Funk v. Venture Stores, 94
I11. App. 3d 115, 418 N.E.2d 498 (1981) (attacking defense attorneys as "high-
priced").
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to disregard improper evidence, questions, or statements by the attorneys.
In some situations, relatively weak corrective action that does not tell the
jury to disregard improper information-merely sustaining an objection,
giving the jury a general instruction about the propep way to deliberate, or
reprimanding the attorney-may be sufficient. In other cases, the instruc-
tion may not suffice, and a mistrial is required. Overly broad language in
many opinions says that the trial judge has broad discretion to select the
appropriate remedy, but that does not appear to be the case. Appellate
courts are fairly consistent in their holdings on when the various remedies
are appropriate, and are not shy about reversing a trial judge who takes
either inadequate action or too drastic action.433 It does not seem to make
any difference whether the instruction is given at the time of the violation
or later, during the regular instructions. 43 4
The weaker judicial responses-sustaining an objection, giving a gen-
eral instruction, and admonishing the attorney-are sufficient to cure only
relatively trivial errors. For example, weak responses have been held to cure
such violations as misstating unimportant facts, 435 referring to a juror by
name, 436 and commenting on the credibility of the attorneys in closing
argument.437 They have been held insufficient to cure more serious errors,
such as suggesting in argument that a defendant had an unproved criminal
record, 438 misstating law,43 9 or trying to place information about the wealth
or insured status of the defendant before the jury.440
The usual, and presumptively correct, judicial response is to specifically
instruct the jury to disregard an improper question or comment, inadmis-
sible evidence, or events that occurred outside the courtroom. This kind of
instruction is almost always considered adequate to cure a rule violation,
whether the underlying error is trivial or serious. 441 It is never too drastic
433. Compare State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975) (merely
sustaining objection not adequate; reversed) with Graham v. Simplex Motor Re-
builders, 191 Neb. 320, 215 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (granting mistrial too drastic; re-
versed).
434. See Laguna v. Prouty, 300 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1981); People v. Millard,
90 A.D.2d 590, 456 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1982).
435. See People v. Rhoads, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 443 N.E.2d 673 (1982);
Jones v. State, 381 So. 2d 983 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980).
436. E.g., Lane v. Mathews, 74 Ariz. 201, 245 P.2d 1025 (1952).
437. Joseph v. Monroe, 419 A.2d 927 (Del. 1980); People v. Trolia, 107 III.
App. 3d 487, 437 N.E.2d 804 (1982) (I believe the defense attorney has tried to
distort the case), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).
438. State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975).
439. Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (misstated
law of contributory negligence).
440. E.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Foreman, 194 Ark. 490, 107 S.W.2d
546 (1937).
441. See United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.) (cures judge's
improper remark in voir dire), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
7071986]
708 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
a remedy.4 2 However, there are situations in which the error is so serious
that even an instruction to the jury to disregard it will not cure the error.
Mistrials are the most extreme remedy, and are to be granted only for
the most serious trial errors. The opinions make it clear that mistrials are
to be used sparingly, 443 although there are situations where they are re-
quired. For example, mistrials may be required if the prosecutor makes an
unconstitutional comment on the defendant's failure to testify,4" if an
attorney appeals to racism or other extreme passions and prejudices of the
jury, 441 or if the plaintiff's attorney discloses that the defendant has insur-
ance and suggests that a verdict be returned on that basis." 6 Less serious
errors apparently will not support a mistrial under any circumstances, 447
and these serious errors only require a mistrial if their inherently prejudicial
effect is aggravated by the presence of multiple errors, 448 the bad faith of
the guilty party,449 or the existence of an otherwise weak case. 4 0
The concept of curing error rests on the premise that jurors will in
fact be able to disregard something improper that has occurred. Lawyers
have long analogized this to "unringing" a bell, and argued that it is
unrealistic to think that any sensible juror would, for example, acquit a
defendant who confessed to child molesting, no matter how many times
the are told to disregard it. Justice Jackson stated it well: "The naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.' '451 More recent
evidence from social scientists also undercuts this premise. In one experi-
ment, model jurors actually gave more weight to improper information
442, See, e.g., People v. Vanda, 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1982)
(usually any error is cured by instruction to disregard), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 841
(1983); Parker v. Kangerga, 482 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (instruction to
disregard ordinarily overcomes harm caused by improper argument).
443. E.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
444. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
445. See Eastern S.S. Lines v. Martial, 380 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); State v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968 (La. 1981); Houston Lighting & Power Co.
v. Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring
Co., 163 Wash. 305, 1 P.2d 221 (1931).
446. White v. Piles, 589 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
447. See State v. Mayfield, 506 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1974) (prosecutor used
evidence outside the record, judge denied mistrial stating he had watched jurors'
reactions and they seemed unaffected; appellate court reversed anyway).
448. See Lopez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (dicta);
Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305, 1 P.2d 221 (1931).
449. See Poole v. State, 295 Md. App. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983).
450. See Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); People
v. Scott, 108 Ill. App. 3d 607, 439 N.E.2d 130 (1982).
451. Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
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when told to disregard it. 4-2 The weight of the published research is that
jurors are able to follow positive instructions, such as what the elements
of a cause of action are, relatively well, but ignore negative instructions to
limit their use of prejudicial information. 453 Nevertheless, the doctrine per-
sists probably because of the continuing naive belief that, despite the evi-
dence to the contrary, instructions from the judge must have some tendency
to reduce the prejudice from a trial law error.
C. Invited Error
The most controversial doctrine that appellate courts use to avoid re-
versing judgments is invited error, also known as the retaliation doctrine.
It says that if one side commits a trial law error-introduces inadmissible
evidence, or makes an improper argument-then the other side may retaliate
by introducing additional inadmissible evidence or making an improper
argument of its own. While one trial law error might be reversible, two
similar errors are not reversible; two wrongs make a right. For example,
if a defendant improperly argues that his client is a poor man and cannot
afford to pay a large verdict, the plaintiff may retaliate by arguing that
the defendant has a $300,000 insurance policy. In one sense the two ar-
guments sort of offset each other. While either argument by itself might
have skewed the verdict radically toward one side or the other, the argu-
ments together pull in opposite directions. In another sense, however, the
two arguments compound the problem. It is now virtually certain that the
jury will decide the case based on the defendant's ability to pay, rather
than the facts and law-precisely the result the rule against bringing up the
wealth of the parties was designed to prevent.
The ambivalence the courts feel about this doctrine is well illustrated
by a recent opinion of the Supreme Court:
The situation before the Court of Appeals was but one example of an
all too common occurrence in criminal trials-the defense counsel argues
improperly, provoking the prosecutor to respond in kind, and the trial
judge takes no corrective action. Clearly two improper arguments-two
apparent wrongs-do not make for a right result. Nevertheless, a criminal
452. See Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago
Law School, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 368. 377-78 (1958) (experiment in which jurors'
average verdicts increased from $34,000 to $37,000 when they found out an insur-
ance company would pay the bill, and increased to $46,000 when the judge in-
structed them to disregard the information); see also Wolf & Montgomery, Effects
of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the
Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 205 (1977).
453. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9
L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 37 (1985); Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CouRTRoom 29-31 (N. Kerr & R. Bray, eds., 1982).
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conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's
comments standing alone, for the statements. . . must be viewed in context
[to determine] whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of
the trial. To help resolve this problem, courts have invoked what is some-
times called the "invited response" or "invited reply" rule, which the
Court [approved] in-Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) ....
This Court's holding in Lawn was no more than an application of settled
law.454
The invited error doctrine is used to affirm cases containing relatively ser-
ious trial errors. Trial law violations that cannot be said to be harmless
error, and which probably could not be cured by an instruction to disregard,
may nevertheless be found to have been invited, so that the judgment may
be affirmed. 455 The invited error doctrine has been used to affirm cases
containing the most serious kinds of errors for which mistrials normally
are required. For example, cases have been affirmed that contained a pros-
ecutor's unconstitutional comments on a defendant's exercise of his right
to remain silent,45 6 an attorney's deliberate attempt to appeal to racial or
religious prejudices, 457 and a judge's criticism of the defense attorney in
front of the jury. 458 In all of these cases, the courts permitted a conviction
to stand despite the presence of serious error that threatens the reliability
of the verdict, because the defendant's own conduct invited it.
The true retaliation doctrine must be distinguished from its common
misuse-cases in which the language of invited error is used but the facts
do not justify it. The true invited error doctrine permits only reasonably
commensurate responses-in-kind, where the effect of an improper argument
or of otherwsie inadmissible evidence is to correct or negate the prejudice
caused by an opponent's impropoer conduct. 4 9 A significant number of
cases can be found in which trial law errors grossly disproportionate to or
454. United States v. Young, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1044-45 (1985) (the Burger
opinion criticizes the doctrine and also uses it as part of its reason for decision).
455. See Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (defendant suggested that verdict would raise jurors' insurance rates; argu-
ment not harmless and could not be cured, would only be permissible in retaliation);
Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442 A.2d 236 (1982) (improper for
attorney to express personal opinion of witness's credibility except to retaliate).
456. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Lincoln v. Commonwealth,
217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
457. State v. Lee, 631 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
458. United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 992 (1981); State v. Stewart, 162 N.J. Super. 96, 392 A.2d 234 (1978).
459. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1045 (1985) (doctrine
permits only responses-in-kind to right the scale); United States v. Nardi, 633 F.2d
972 (1st Cir. 1980) (judge may admit otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut or
explain prejudicial evidence erroneously admitted); Commonwealth v. Smith, 387
Mass. 900, 444 N.E.2d 374 (1983) (retaliation only available to correct errors); State
v. Stewart, 162 N.J. Super. 96, 392 A.2d 234 (1978).
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even totally unrelated to a supposedly provoking error have been affirmed
under the rubric of invited error. For example, the invited error doctrine
has been used to justify such totally disproportionate responses as the pros-
ecutor telling the jury that a codefendant had been sentenced to death in
response to an innocuous defense statement that the prosecutor had a duty
to the state, 460 prosecutors unconstitutionally commenting on the defend-
ant's failure to testify in response to an argument that the state was being
overzealous, 461 and that the defendant did not have to take the stand, 462
In other cases, invited error has been erroneously invoked when an
attorney commits error responding to proper conduct from the other side.
For example, the invited error doctrine has been used to justify normally
reversible errors as responding to proper conduct, such as an argument that
the defendant was unable to get anyone to testify on his behalf being
responsive to a proper defense argument asking for an adverse inference
from the fact that the state did not call some res gestae witnesses, 463 and
a speech by a prosecutor vouching personally for his witness in response
to a proper defense attack on their credibility through evidence. 464 These
cases of excessive retaliation tend to have one thing in common-they are
almost all criminal cases in which the appellate court upholds the convic-
tion. Indeed, the invited error/retaliation doctrine is almost exclusively a
creature of criminal cases, used to uphold error-ridden convictions on ap-
peal. 465
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have tried to define and analyze the basic legal structure
of trials. In so doing, it seemed useful to separate procedural and substan-
tive regulation. I recognize of course that there is not always a clear dividing
line between them. Nevertheless, it is often valuable to draw the distinction.
For example, a trial court's discretion to vary procedures may be greater
than its discretion to vary from the usual rules on what issues may be
debated, while its power to restrict the exercise of procedural rights may
be less than its power to control content.
The body of procedural law is made up of a reasonably balanced
mixture of common law, statutes, and court rules. Its primary purpose
460. People v. Gangestad, 105 Ind. App. 3d 774, 434 N.E.2d 841 (1982).
461. Brown v. State, 639 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
462. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
463. People v. Barney, 11l IIll. App. 3d 669, 444 N.E.2d 518 (1982).
464. Salinas v. State, 625 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
465. In the sample of 692 closing argument cases I studied closely, the invited
error doctrine was used to affirm 30 criminal cases-10% of those containing
errors-but only 10 civil cases-approximately 4% of those containing errors. It
was used to affirm particularly serious errors only in criminal cases.
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seems to be to provide all parties with fair opportunities to present their
messages to the jury. It covers such issues as the scope of the right to be
heard, the order of trial, who may participate and the forms in which they
must couch their words, the extent of judicial discretion to impose time-
saving measures, and the requirements for objecting and preserving a claim
of error for appeal. However, it is incomplete. There is almost no settled
law concerning a number of the most important trial issues-how to create
fair procedures that reduce the incidence of perjury, protect the rights of
victims (expecially child abuse victims) and witnesses, and make the trial
system more efficient without sacrificing the litigants' rights. Procedural
rules facilitate the correction of errors at the trial court level-through
retaliation or curative instructions-rather than an appeal where a retrial
might have to be granted. 466
Substantive trial law affects what attorneys, witnesses, judges, and
jurors may say and do during trial. Its primary purpose seems to be to
control- the content of the information that is communicated to the jury.
Except for the Federal Rules of Evidence, this part of trial law is comprised
almost entirely of appellate cases. Common law limits the topics attorneys
may raise during jury selection, restricts opening statements to nonargu-
mentative discussions of the forthcoming evidence, excludes distracting or
unreliable evidence, discourages arguments that primarily appeal to emo-
tions, and controls what information the jurors may use to reach a verdict.
On some issues, the rules vary for different phases of the trial. For example,
law generally may be discussed during closing argument, jury selection, and
deliberations, but not during opening statements or witness examination.
On other issues, overriding principles have led to rules common to all
phases. The strongest probably are the rules designed to reduce the adverse
impact of bias, prejudice, and strong emotions, by prohibiting participants
from trying to arouse these passions and by facilitating the exposure of
those who hold such strong feelings. The other pervasive principle is that
the jurors' decision should be based only on evidence introduced at trial
and not on outside "untested" information.
Although many trial law issues implicate fundamental concepts of fair
trial and due process of law, few of them have been addressed by the
Supreme Court or firmly grounded in constitutional principles. Trial law
seems to be largely a concern of state appellate courts, which treat it as a
matter of nonconstitutional common law. There are a few notable excep-
tions, however. It has long been a rule of constitutional criminal procedure
466. For a marvelous example of the bureaucratic mentality at work, see
McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984) (in refusing to
reverse a judgment, despite evidence that a biased juror lied in order to get on the
jury, the court emphasized the importance of finality and the "practical necessities
of judicial management").
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that a criminal defendant has a right under the confrontation clause to
cross-examine witnesses against him.467 rn recent years, the Supreme Court
has decided that the equal protection clause prohibits a state prosecutor
from peremptorily challenging black prospective jurors on account of their
race, 468 that due process gives a defendant the right to make a closing
argument, 469 and that the eighth amendment prohibits imposing a death
sentence when a prosecutor has argued to the jury that their decision will
be reviewed on appeal. 470 The Court has decided in several other cases that
particular trial practices do not offend the constitution. 471
However, in reviewing the cases on which this article is based, I found
that although appellate courts seemed intuitively to reach similar results in
similar cases, they rarely articulated any general principles of trials, or cited
previous cases as precedent. One reason may be that access to a basic
description of the doctrines of trial law, a collection of a substantial number
of its cases and statutes, and a framework within which new or doubtful
cases could be analyzed has not been easy. There seems to be a need for
a more systematic examination of trial law if it is to be used by the profes-
sion and analyzed by scholars more effectively in the future. This article
has been intended to begin that process.
467. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
468. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
469. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
470. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
471. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (6th amendment
does not prohibit death qualifying jury); Holbrook v. Flynn, 106 S. Ct. 1340 (1986)(neither 6th nor 14th amendment prohibits presence of uniformed law enforcement
officers in courtroom); United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986) (6th amend-
ment does not probhibit admitting co-conspirator statement into evidence); Nix v.
Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (6th amendment not violated when defense attorney
threatened to withdraw from case if client committed perjury); Tennessee v. Street,
105 S. Ct. 2078 (1985) (6th amendment not violated by evidentiary use of co-
defendant's confession); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (neither 8th nor
14th amendment prohibits instructing jury that life sentence is subject to commu-
tation); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (6th amendment not violated by
requiring trial to proceed with substitute counsel); South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553 (1983) (neither 5th nor 14th amendment prohibits admitting evidence of
driver's refusal to take a breathalyzer test); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858 (1982) (neither 5th nor 6th amendment prohibited prosecuting attorney
from deporting eyewitnesses under circumstances); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209(1982) (not a due process violation to allow a juror who had applied for job with
prosecutor to decide case); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (neither 5th
nor 14th amendment prohibited state's use of prearrest silence to impeach defend-
ant).

